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Abstract
The thesis is a study of change in the transition from youth to adulthood in
contemporary Britain. Through an analysis of data collected in a survey of young
adults and their parents, undertaken in conjunction with a critical appraisal of more
general evidence on the organisation of employment and life cycle processes, the
thesis explores the social organisation of dependency and obligation. Following the
recession and mass unemployment in the early 1980s there has been an increasing
interest in the consequences of economic change for life cycle processes. Several
writers have explored the question of whether employment restructuring has
disrupted the attainment of adult lifestyles, and citizenship rights, amongst recent
cohorts of young people. Research, however, has reached contradictory conclusions
over the significance of economic change for patterns of transition to adulthood.
Another problem is the failure of research to locate youth adequately in relation to
the social structure. Further, the coherence of gender processes in the organisation
of transition has been obscured, since the life cycles of men and women are
conventionally seen to be structured around different principles. It is an argument of
the thesis that these problems are related, and arise from an inadequate
consideration of the interrelations which give meaning to youth and transition as life
cycle stages. Existing studies of family related life cycle transitions and studies of the
youth labour market both embody, and reflect, a conceptual division between 'social'
and 'economic' processes. This division, however, does not reflect real processes. The
framework developed in the thesis offers an integrated analysis of life cycle dynamics
and economic processes, through which changes in the organisation of transitions
from youth to adulthood are explained.
ii
1. Introduction
The subject of this thesis is change in the transition from youth to adult
status. Research in the area has been dominated by a concern with the
consequences of economic restructuring on experience within this life cycle phase.
The research reported here started with a question shared by several other
commentators: what are the consequences of economic change, in particular
changing structures of employment and labour demand, for the transition from
youth to adulthood? In the course of the research it became apparent that this
question, and the ways in which it is variously formulated and addressed, is
unhelpful. It suggests a causality from employment restructuring to life cycle
relations which entails a division between 'economic' and 'social' processes. As a
consequence, research into youth in transition has failed to develop a coherent
explanation of the relationship between life cycle processes and economic change.
Some of the problems which arise are reflected in recent criticisms, which
charge youth research with a failure to locate youth, as a meaningful social
category, within the structures and values of society (Jones, 1988; see also Ashton
and Lowe, 1991; Chisholm, 1990). This points, correctly, to a remarkable impasse.
It brings into question the efficacy of understandings which operate with an
'unlocated' version of youth. The failure to 'locate' youth does not arise from
neglect. On the contrary, the problem has been important in shaping research
agendas. 'Youth' has been problematised, although it will be argued inadequately
so, in efforts to explain its social construction, and its relationship to 'adult' forms
of inequality, to citizenship and to economic change. Quickly, however, such
reconstructions fall back onto a division between separate spheres, the 'social' and
the 'economic', 'youth' and 'adult', and locating youth in relation to general
processes becomes a post hoc affair. To define youth as a category and then to
acknowledge a failure to locate it suggests that the category has attained
precedence over the relations which give it social meaning. This thesis argues that
an elucidation of social change in the experience of youth, and in patterns of
transition from youth to adulthood, requires a wider interpretation of youth as a
life cycle stage than that offered by contemporary commentators.
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Youth research in the 1980s was shaped by the experience of recession and
mass unemployment at the beginning of the decade. Some writers suggested that
the collapse in job opportunities amongst young people undermined traditional
routes to independence and adult status (eg. Willis, 1984,1985; Williamson, 1985).
This hypothesis was taken up and explored by those interested in the 'social'
consequences of economic insecurity amongst young people. Previous research on
the transition from school to work was overtaken by an interest in life cycle
trajectories, and in the consequences of economic change for the organisation and
timing of family related life cycle events. In such accounts, employment is seen
to underwrite transitions from dependence to independence and adult lifestyles
through a series of status transitions, specifically leaving the parental home,
cohabitation, marriage and parenthood. Much of this research has focused on the
experience of the 1980s, comparing the timing of life cycle transitions amongst
unemployed and employed young people, and comparing their experience with
that of cohorts seen to experience 'normal transitions' during the 1950s and 1960s,
decades of full employment. Contradictory conclusions have emerged as to the
consequences of economic change for the transition to adulthood. Some writers
argue that employment restructuring has, at least for some groups, underlain a
prolonging of dependency at the parental home (eg. Wallace, 1987; Harris, 1988),
and others maintain that economic change is not really significant to the
attainment of adult status (eg. Hutson and Jenkins, 1989).
Behind the ambivalence over the nature of change in transitions to
adulthood, which characterises the sociological literature, is a curious neglect of
evidence on patterns of demographic change. The neglect is surprising because
the demographic data demonstrates aggregate level changes in the timing of
marriage and childbearing, precisely those life cycle events which are identified
in the youth literature as labelling the 'upper end' of youth and of the transition
to adult status. However, recent research into youth in transition has relied
heavily on ethnographic and micro level evidence and has focused on the
experience of the 1980s (eg. Coffield, 1986; Wallace, 1987a; Hutson and Jenkins,
1989). Hypotheses of delay have been explored in relation to the economic and
political events of the decade but national level demographic evidence
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demonstrates a reversal, since the early 1970s, of a long term trend to younger
ages at marriage and parenthood. In other words, the sorts of changes envisaged
as a consequence of the employment crisis of the early 1980s, principally amongst
the most disadvantaged, were already in train across the general population. The
contradictory conclusions which have emerged from youth research can be traced,
in part, to the gap between macro and micro level analyses and the associated
failure of youth research to relate its hypothesis of delay in household and family
formation, as a consequence of employment crisis, to the practice of delay in
family formation relative to previous cohorts manifest in the 1970s.
Running in parallel with the neglect of demographic explanation is the
limited engagement with historical change in the organisation of the family and,
in particular, the family life cycle. There has been little consideration of the
processes underlying changes in family structure or in the organisation of family
resourcing amongst its members. Much of the youth debate concerns the
undermining of claims by young people to adult lifestyles, and the increasing
emphasis of government policy on parental responsibility for young adults without
independent means. Change in the organisation of the family has been decribed
in terms of a privatisation of unemployment and insecurity amongst young people
where parents are increasingly expected to meet the costs of extended periods of
dependency amongst their young adult children (eg. Jones, 1987; Harris, 1988;
Hutson and Jenkins, 1989). This is an important element of changes in social
security legislation but it is only a partial picture, reflecting a particular aspect of
change in the organisation of dependency and obligation at the level of the
household. More general processes of change in the organisation of the household
as an economic unit have been sidelined in these accounts. The emphasis on
employment and a wage as the key to independence and adulthood has led to a
partial view of family related life cycle transitions, where these are explained in
relation to the 'sphere' of paid employment but not in relation to the organisation
of households. Historical developments in the structure of households indicate
quite significant changes in the relations of different family members to family
income maintenance and related changes in the position of youth within the
family. However, these changes have not been integrated into accounts of change
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in patterns of transition from youth to adulthood.
Another aspect of the theoretical division between employment structure
and life cycle dynamics, which characterises the youth debate, is the model of
parallel trajectories which is used to describe individual biographies through the
labour market on the one hand and through domestic, or family related,
transitions on the other hand. Those researching the consequences of economic
change for the attainment of adult status have argued that a longitudinal model
provides a solution to the limitations of earlier, cross sectional, descriptions of
transitions from school to work. Employment and a secure wage is seen to enable
independence, and transitions to adulthood are described in terms of associated
status transitions around departure from the parental home, household and family
formation. Labour force trajectories and household 'careers' are understood to
interact but it is here, in particular, that difficulties are encountered in attempts
to specify the articulation of 'the economic' and 'the social' and it is here that
contradictions emerge as to the consequences of economic change for the
organisation of the domestic life cycle.
The analytical frameworks focus attention on life cycle trajectories but do
so at the expense of an understanding of the relation between dependency and
independence. In order to explain the consequences of such an omission it is
useful to draw a parallel with theories of gender and inequality. Labour market
theories and descriptions of inequality often bracket together women and young
adults as disadvantaged in employment by virtue either of their low productivity
relative to adult men, or through their exclusion from forms of employment
advantage by direct or indirect discrimination. Critiques of descriptions of
inequality, in which individuals are seen to be rewarded according to their
productivity, have stressed the importance of the family, and the domestic division
of labour, to patterns of inequality in employment. Drawing on Marx, but
extending his argument to analyses of gender inequalities, labour is understood
to be valued not according to its product but in relation to the costs of its
reproduction (the day to day reproduction of people's livlihoods, relative to some
customary standard of living). Because labour is reproduced through the domestic
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division of labour, women in paid work are rewarded not at their true costs of
reproduction but are partly dependent on others for the resourcing of their day
to day livlihoods. Gender inequalities in rewards to employment are organised in
relation to the domestic division of labour, and adult male earnings reflect men's
particular relations to household income maintenance (Beechey, 1978; Humphries
and Rubery, 1984; Brenner and Ramas, 1984). In addition, the availability of
labour at different costs affects the organisation of labour demand, so people's
differing relations to household income maintenance are themselves significant
to the organisation and reproduction of employment inequalities (Garnsey, 1982;
Stanworth, 1984). In these arguments, the processes underlying inequalities in the
'social' sphere of the family and in the 'economic' sphere of employment are
inseparable. There are important parallels to be drawn here in developing an
understanding of the particular position of youth as a life cycle stage, and in
developing a framework for exploring change in the organisation of the transition
from youth to adulthood.
The separation of life cycle structure from the distribution of resources
through employment, and through the state, has become part of a dualistic model,
one which apparently gathers momentum since the parameters of youth and
adulthood cannot be read off from economic structures. However, in drawing
back from a definition of youth which is economically reductionist, sociological
writers have at the same time left intact the concept of the economic sphere as
a realm of distribution which is neutral with respect to the earnings claims of
different social groups. In consequence, inequalities in earnings and employment
opportunities become an issue of access and constraint. The gender critique of
conventional theories of class and stratification sees the 'labour market' as a
process of distribution which embodies the relations of different groups to the
resourcing of social reproduction, through the domestic division of labour. If the
value of this critique is accepted (and it will be argued that it should be) then it
is clear that it holds similar value for analysing life cycle processes.
Youth and transitions to adulthood have been defined in relation to
trajectories from (partial) dependence to independence. Independence, however,
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is a misleading term. The concern with trajectories focuses attention on
biographical journeys from dependence to independence, but in the absence of
a theory of their mutual significance, explanations of change in life cycle processes
must be called into question. Claims by dependents for resources, for reproducing
their day to day living, are met indirectly through the state or, more generally,
through immediate kin with 'independent' access to a wage. In the case of young
children and to some extent amongst dependent young adults these claims are
standardly met by parents. The ways in which claims to resources by children and
women are met cannot be separated from the historical "success" of claims to a
family wage by adult men. A structure of earnings which is patterned in relation
to domestic obligations suggests that independence is a misleading term because
it entails the accumulation of domestic financial and caring obligations, through
which the claims of dependents are met. Changes in the structure of life cycle
transitions from dependence to independence is simultaneously a restructuring of
the relations between dependents and those on whom they make claims for
resources. The historical structuring and reproduction of these relationships has
been of quite limited interest to recent youth research, and marginal to its
methodology, yet an adequate understanding of processes of change in the
structuring of life cycle transitions requires that it be placed centrally.
Issues of citizenship are often considered indirectly in discussions of change
in the transition from youth to adulthood but are important, especially where
economic changes and government policy are seen to have undermined the claims
of young people to independence and adult lifestyles. Some writers have placed
questions of citizenship more centrally in their descriptions of transition (eg.
Hutson and Jenkins, 1989; Jones and Wallace, 1990). The latter authors stress the
value of a life cycle approach to citizenship and argue that we should consider the
biographical incorporation of individuals into citizenship rights, and address the
ways in which such rights vary over the life cycle. In such an argument, however,
citizenship, like independence, is represented as a set of rights from which some
people are excluded, or to which they are formally entitled yet, through a lack of
social or economic resources, are unable to exercise. Issues of citizenship thereby
become an issue of access. Rights are divorced from the social claims on which
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they are based, and the organisation of rights is not itself called into question.
Historical studies of change in individual and family life cycle trajectories
demonstrate clearly an articulation between 'the social' and 'the economic', that
is between the organisation of daily, and generational, reproduction in the
domestic sphere, and the structuring of access to, and rewards from, employment.
Evidence of change at an aggregate level illustrates the historical interdependency
of labour supply and labour demand structures. Whilst recently youth studies have
struggled with the hypothesis that economic change may be significant for
domestic life cycle transitions from dependence to independence, an historical
understanding suggests that the ambivalence which characterises such research
can be a consequence only of its conceptual and methodological particularity. The
need to 'locate'youth in its social context is simultaneously a need to transfonn the
ways in which youth as a life cycle stage is conceptualised.
The Research Design and General Social Processes
This section outlines the design of the survey, of young people and their
parents, on which the thesis reports. A two stage questionnaire was carried out
in the spring and summer of 1988. The first stage of the survey was employer
based and comprised a series of interviews with 92 young people in varying
occupations and in a range of domestic life cycle stages. The second stage was a
linked survey, of parents of 36 of the young respondents. These linked surveys will
be referred to throughout as the main survey and the parents' survey. A principal
objective of the survey was to gather evidence on the processes underlying
transitions from youth to adult status, and to contribute to a more general analysis
of change in the structure and organisation of early life cycle transitions. Before
describing the sample and questionnaire design in detail it is important to point
to some general methodological issues, in order to explain the place of the survey
within the research.
To understand the processes underlying change in life cycle event timing
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it is necessary to locate the data gathered in a small scale, cross sectional, survey
in relation to more general evidence. Such a strategy will help to avoid the pitfalls
of being too quick to generalise from a relatively small number of cases. Whilst
the problem of locating survey evidence is brought into sharper focus when the
survey sample is small, a larger sample would not itself provide a simple solution.
To locate the data next to other evidence helps in assessing the validity of the
former and helps to 'contextualise' such data. However, such a strategy is only a
partial one. As well as evidence from other studies of youth in transition there is,
of course, a wealth of data available on patterns of demographic change, on, for
example, ages at marriage and parenthood. As we will see, this has not received
the attention it deserves. Since such data reveals historical changes in life cycle
event timing, that is, in precisely those family related transitions generally
considered as indices of the transition to adult status, it demands our
consideration. Whilst this macro level evidence has not been totally ignored by
youth researchers, it is generally invoked as a device for contextualising analyses
of contemporary patterns of transition. The aggregate level changes which it
reveals tend to be vaguely specified and there has been little engagement by
youth researchers with explanations of these changes. Why should this be? In part
it appears to reflect a division between disciplines, with aggregate level, historical
changes in patterns of marriage and fertility more the concern of demographers,
economists and social historians than of sociologists. It may be too, that it reflects
the methodological difficulties of relating macro and micro level evidence.
However, these are difficulties which must be resolved in order to furnish a more
adequate understanding of change in the organisation and experience of
transitions to adult status.
To address the problem of the division between macro and micro level
evidence it is essential not only to locate the latter with respect to the former, but
to recognise also a need to go beyond 'contextualising' our interpretation of the
experience of survey respondents. Such an approach suggests that understandings
of aggregate level changes are themselves unproblematic. As we will see this is
not the case. Simply stated, the relationship between experience at an individual
level and general changes in the organisation of life cycle transitions is a
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conceptual as much as an empirical issue. The call to locate youth 'within the
structures and values of society' reflects an artificial dualism between youth and
transition on the one hand and social structure on the other hand. Locating data
on patterns of transition requires more than simply contextualising empirical
evidence, socially, historically or whatever. The 'context', after all, is also the
substance of the research problem. The format of the thesis is not one of simply
reporting evidence from my survey, suitably located. Rather I analyse data from
the survey, and from other sources, as part of an attempt to reconstruct a more
adequate understanding of the transition from youth to adult status. Data from
my survey can be only part of the story. It was, however, designed with a view to
enabling an exploration of particular relationships and processes which have not
been well handled in existing youth research. These features, of the survey sample
and of the questionnaire design, are described below.
The main survey was principally employer based, that is all respondents
were in employment or on a training programme at the time of interview. It was
conducted in the insurance, retailing and construction industries. Small scale
studies have provided detailed descriptions of the experience and perceptions of
youth (eg. Coffield et al, 1986; Cockburn, 1987; Wallace, 1987a,b,c; Hutson and
Jenkins, 1987a,b; 1989). However, they have been less successful in informing
hypotheses of change in the transition to adulthood. A focus on particular, often
problematic, circumstances has contributed to the difficulties in locating
hypotheses of delay in the attainment of adult status, as a consequence of
economic recession and unemployment of the 1980s, in relation to more general
and longer term patterns of change in life cycle structure. My survey was
employer based in order to furnish data on, and contribute to an analysis of,
standard processes shaping the organisation and experience of the transition to
adulthood. The timing and, as we shall see, the organisation, of household and
family formation has changed over recent decades across the population. It is the
processes shaping these general changes which have been neglected by youth
researchers and with which I will be principally concerned.
Another important features of the sample is its age structure. Much of the
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research into youth and transitions to adulthood has defined its subject in terms
of a specific age group (eg. Wallace, 1987; Hutson and Jenkins, 1989; Banks et
al, 1992; Ashton et al, 1990). Several authors maintain the inappropriateness of
an arbitrary age limit to 'youth', arguing that the 'upper end' of youth transitions
would be better defined in relation to household and family formation. However,
even amongst its proponents, this view is rarely matched by the design of data
collection involving people aged over 25. The problem here is clear, since in 1988
the mean age at first marriage amongst men was 26.7, and the median age 25.6.
The mean age at first marriage amongst women was 24.6, and the median age
23.6 (Population Trends, 1989). Amongst married and unmarried women in 1989
mean ages at first childbirth were 26.9 and 24.4 respectively (Jones, 1991).
Samples which do not include respondents aged over 25 fail to do justice to the
diversity of experience which is associated with older, as well as younger, ages at
these family transitions. Further, the social meanings of age should properly be
part of the analysis. An age based definition of youth is quite inappropriate for
exploring hypotheses of a prolonging of this life cycle stage. For this reason a
strategy of the main survey was to furnish information on the experience,
perceptions and attitudes of people in a range of life cycle stages. Respondents
to the main survey were between 16 and 35. The sample, however, was defined
principally with reference to life cycle related criteria.
The respondents left school between 1970 and 1988. In a larger survey it
might be tempting to consider separately the experience of those leaving school
at different periods in this timescale, taking into account the raising of the school
leaving age in 1973, the recession of that period, equal pay legislation, the
recession and employment crisis of the early 1980s and the growth of the Youth
Training Scheme (YTS) as a standard route into employment for many, especially
disadvantaged, school leavers. The consequences of such changes are not sensibly
explored through disaggregating an already small data set. In analyses of the
survey data the young adults are treated as if they form a single cohort. There are
reasons why such a treatment may in any case be more appropriate than a
division between the experience of young people pre- and post the recession of
the early 1980s. The latter division might appear more valuable than is in fact the
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case because of the stress by youth researchers through the 1980s on this
particular period. Data on aggregate level changes in event timing suggests that
the early to mid-1970s marked the most significant turning point in patterns of
leaving home and family formation that has occurred in the latter half of the
twentieth century.
The survey was conducted in Scotland. Interviews with young adults in the
insurance and retailing sectors were conducted in Edinburgh. Young people in the
construction industry were interviewed in Edinburgh and Glasgow. Most
respondents to the parents' survey lived in Edinburgh, or in other parts of
Lothian. Those living further afield were sent postal questionnaires. Because of
the importance attached throughout the analysis to locating the data in relation
to more general evidence, the Scottish base of the sample need not compromise
the salience of the evidence to understanding patterns of transition across Britain
more generally. Edinburgh itself is probably closer to the socioeconomic make-up
of parts of England than it is to the rest of Scotland. Further, it may be no more
appropriate to point to the particularity of a Scottish base of the survey than to
question the national representativeness of any regional or local base for
empirical research. With respect to national differences in youth employment
opportunities between Scotland and England and Wales, it appears that the
similarities outweigh the differences (Raffe and Courtenay, 1988). The evidence
presented by the authors shows that the occupational and industrial structures
across Scotland and England and Wales are broadly alike, and have very similar
labour markets (Raffe and Courtenay, 1988).
There are two key areas of contrast between Scotland and England
identified by Raffe and Courtenay. Firstly, there is a more staggered entry into
the labour force amongst youth cohorts in Scotland, in contrast to the more
clearly defined transitions at ages 16 and 18 in England and Wales, the latter
associated with the completion of 'A' level courses. In contrast the Scottish
students who stay beyond the minimum school leaving age standardly sit the
Higher grade of the Scottish Certificate of Education. Highers are usually taken
over one year of study although the flexibility of the system means that a number
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of highers are often spread over a two year period. For this reason, along with
school leaving arrangements which differ to those in England and Wales, 17 is a
a more significant transition stage in Scotland (Raffe and Courtenay, 1988). The
second key difference is described by Raffe and Courtenay as the weaker labour
market in Scotland. Data comparing the Scottish Young People's Surveys of 1985
and 1986 to the England and Wales Youth Cohort Study indicates that two years
after the minimum school leaving age, by April 1986, rates of employment stood
at 61% in Scotland and at 72% in England and Wales. Where YTS trainees were
excluded from the analysis the rates stood at 68% and 76% respectively.
The Youth Training Scheme was slightly more extensive in Scotland where,
of the year group who were eligible to leave school in 1984, 42% had entered
YTS by 1986 compared with 37% of their English and Welsh peers. Raffe and
Courtenay note that this inverse relationship between the scale of YTS and the
strength of the labour market is apparent also in gender differences. A demand
for young male employees which is more depressed than that for young females
is mirrored in YTS participation rates of 39% and 46% amongst girls and boys
respectively in Scotland, and of 35% and 39% respectively amongst girls and boys
in England and Wales. Trainees in Scotland had more difficulty entering
employment at the end of their schemes. Of those on YTS in April 1985, one year
subsequently 56% in Scotland were in full time jobs compared with 65% in
England and Wales. Amongst males the respective percentages were 57% and
67%, and amongst females, 56% and 63%. By April 1986, 49% of full time
employees in the surveys had been on YTS (Raffe and Courtenay, 1988).
Early in the design of the research project I was interested in the operation
and consequences of YTS. However, it became apparent that this was a rather
narrow approach, particularly as I became more interested in the general features
of the transition from youth to adult status. Further, the operation of YTS, where
it is employer based, cannot easily be separated from more general employment
processes. It is the relation between these general processes and the
reorganisation of life cycle transitions which became the central concern of the
research. However, my initial concern with YTS is reflected in the choice of
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employment sectors in which the main survey was based. The insurance, retailing
and construction sectors were chosen for the variety of youth training strategies
and the differing articulation of YTS with their recruitment policies and
employment structures. This is described in Chapter 3. The inclusion of YTS
related factors did not limit the sample choice, but rather was consonant with a
strategy of defining a sample which would cover a wide range of employment
circumstances. The choice of sectors enabled the sample to cover manual and
non- manual employees, different gender patterns of employment, and a range of
socioeconomic class backgrounds and employment and income prospects amongst
respondents.
Interviews were conducted during work hours on the companies' premises.
The main survey comprised 28 interviews in the insurance sector, 27 in the
retailing sector and 32 in the construction sector. The insurance and retailing
sample comprised similar numbers of female and male respondents. All
respondents in the construction sector were male. The employers, and a
Construction Industry Training Board representative, knew of no female
apprentices or crafts workers in Lothian or Strathclyde. Interviews with young
adults in the insurance and retailing sectors were conducted in Edinburgh, the
sample drawn from two large, Edinburgh based, insurance companies and two
retailing organisations, one a national DIY chain and the other a supermarket
retailer. Construction workers and trainees were drawn from two large companies,
a college of further education and a Scottish District Council Direct Labour
Organisation, where interviewees were on the Community Programme, a
government training programme for people aged 18 to 25 who had been
unemployed for a year, or on a YTS Special Measures programme established for
those in particularly disadvantaged circumstances. Most respondents in the
construction industry were apprenticed or qualified joiners and brickworkers,
although some were in white collar occupations.
Within the three employment sectors the sample of organisations in which
employees were interviewed turned simply on access. I interviewed senior
management personnel about their company's employment structure, recruitment
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and training programmes in several companies across the three sectors. After
detailed discussion of my research design a number of organisations agreed to
allow me to interview a number of their employees. In most of the survey
organisations potential respondents were identified and approached by a manager
with whom I had discussed the criteria for selecting a sample of respondents. The
principal criterion was to organise a sample which covered a variety of
occupational grades, ages and domestic circumstances, 'up to' those who had
recently become parents, but including also older, single or childless respondents.
In two companies I was permitted to identify the sample of respondents directly.
In one of the the insurance companies I was provided with an anonymised list of
employees which identified their occupational grade, age, sex and marital status,
and interviews were scheduled with the sample I identified. In the supermarket
I was permitted to approach staff directly, through department managers. In all
organisations I was provided with a private room in which to conduct interviews.
Current workloads on staff appeared to be the main criterion by which
respondents were 'filtered' in the other organisations. However, the level of access
granted allowed me to interview a range of respondents which appear
representative of the available spectrum of employee 'types' within the
organisations.
Not all respondents were in employment at the time of interview. Access
to a small group of respondents who were on YTS in building industry schemes
was gained through a college of further education. Also, in the building sector,
some respondents were on a Scottish district council special measures youth
training scheme, providing training for disadvantaged school leavers, and some on
the Community Programme. Other than these all respondents were working in the
private sector. The sample includes some, mostly those on the Community
Programme, with a background of unemployment. In general, however, the most
disadvantaged and those with continuous records of unemployment are excluded
by the sample design. Another consequence of basing the survey in employing
organisations is the particular gender structure of the sample. Women with young
children were interviewed but their inclusion in an employer based sample
suggests that they may be in particular circumstances which require or enable
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them to work full time, and which may differentiate them from their non-working
peers (all of the five mothers in the main survey had divorced or separated from
the father of their children). Whilst all respondents were in employment or on a
training programme at the time of interview, their backgrounds are diverse, some
arriving at their current position through continuous employment and promotion
through an internal career ladder, some with a background of unemployment,
temporary jobs and training scheme placements and some women with children
entering or returning to work after full time childcare obligations.
The questionnaire schedule for the main survey is included as Appendix
1. Interviews lasted between fifty and ninety minutes, the typical interview lasting
one hour. Interviews collected information on socioeconomic circumstances,
labour force histories and employment expectations; domestic or 'demographic'
histories and expectations, focusing in particular on the timing of life cycle events;
and on attitudes towards 'appropriate' forms of household resourcing and
employment participation. The questionnaire design will be described in more
detail shortly. At the end of each interview, respondents were asked for their
parents names, addresses and telephone numbers and, if willing, to tell their
parents about the survey. A total of 63 contact names were given (14 from
retailing, 24 from insurance and 25 from construction workers).
Contact with parents was made by telephone where possible and
interviews, with one of the parents, were arranged and carried out in their homes.
A total of twenty parents (ie. parents to 20 of the original respondents) were
interviewed in this way. The interview schedule for the parents' survey is included
as Appendix 2. The schedule again followed a structured format but a number of
open ended questions were followed through in some detail. These interviews
lasted from one to over three hours but were typically one and a half to two hours
duration. A number of parents lived outside Lothian. To supplement the face-to-
face interviews the questionnaire schedule was revised and posted to 24
households, that is to all the remaining households who had not refused to
participate over the telephone. Eleven completed schedules were returned. The
postal survey questionnaire schedule is included in Appendix 2. Adding
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questionnaires from pilots for the face to face interviews and postal survey gave
a total of 36 completed parental questionnaires. The final sample of parents was
inevitably self selected, the most obvious feature of which was a gender bias in
the sample structure, towards respondents' mothers. Access to parents was filtered
through the permission of their children before approaches were made to parents
themselves, and the sub-sample of parent-child pairs is liable to be biased towards
households with more sympathetic relations between generations.
As well as providing a basis for inter-generational comparisons, in
designing the survey I was exercised also by the question of how to explore class
variation in the transition to adult status. This was in preference to exploring the
experience of a particular (say, unemployed) group, without the resources for
locating it adequately in relation to standard labour force careers and life cycle
transition behaviour. Clearly, however, characterising the class location of young
people has particular problems, given that youth tend to be concentrated in fewer
occupations than the (male) adult population, and given the potentially diverse
labour force trajectories on which they have embarked. Research into the timing
of family formation based on analyses of large data sets clearly demonstrates class
related differences, where working class youth tend to leave their parental homes,
marry and have children at younger ages than their middle class counterparts (eg.
Dunnell, 1979; Kiernan and Diamond, 1983; Joshi, 1985; Jones, 1987;
Oppenheimer, 1982). Much of the variation is accounted for by socioeconomic
indicators: parents' (typically fathers') social class, own occupation, educational
qualifications and so on, but most studies stress also the significance of
orientations and class related norms and expectations. Patterns of early event
timing by working class young adults is rational in relation to their lifetime labour
force circumstances, which typically manifest a shallow, and often insecure,
earnings profile. In contrast, later event timing by middle class young adults is
rational in relation to standard careers, which entail security, promotion and a
rising earnings profile, at least to middle age. This clearly reflects standard male,
rather than female, experience, as women, typically, are involved in childbearing
at precisely those ages at which promotion decisions are important to male
careers. It is male earnings profiles which are central to these explanations of
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class related differences in life cycle event timing. To explain differences in event
timing in relation to such earnings trajectories clearly requires a theory of
orientations to the future, and all those studies just cited invoke concepts of class
culture, norms and expectations as part of their explanation of class differences
in life cycle event timing. However, attitudes are rarely available for empirical
investigation in analyses of large data sets. Exploring attitudes and perceptions is
more important in ethnographic studies of transition, and often detailed in
research with a more qualitative leaning. In designing the survey an objective was
to gather sufficient data to furnish some form of quantitative analysis, albeit
within the methodological provisos already indicated. Within this format I wished
to address perceptions and attitudes in some detail, and to do so in a way which
would be amenable to quantitative analysis.
Another intention of the questionnaire design was to provide a basis on
which to make inter-generational comparisons in patterns of transition. I hoped
that attitudinal data would help in extending an understanding of young adults'
social circumstances, given the limitations to socioeconomic data gathered from
their own, often short, labour force careers. One possibility would be to
disaggregate the sample so as to explore co-variation between socioeconomic
circumstance, attitudinal data and life cycle event timing. This sort of analysis
would provide a basis from which to consider differences in event timing across
the generations. For example, would there be evidence that some socio-economic
groups were deferring transition relative to their parents, in contrast to other
socio-economic groups? Such an analysis would provide a basis for an inter-
generational comparison of life cycle event timing. However, whilst elements of
such an analysis are revealing, it became clear that as a general strategy, it relied
too heavily on a small sample, whose diversity is better understood in relation to
other available data. Further, the potential for comparison was reduced since the
reporting of parental ages at marriage by respondents to the main survey are
unreliable. Respondents were asked the ages of their siblings and the year in
which their parents married, but where comparison with parents' self reported
ages at marriage is possible, it is clear that there is some inaccuracy in the reports
of their young adult children. Across the sample as a whole, then, such reports of
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parents' ages at marriage are liable to be less accurate still. The sample allows at
best a limited comparison of life cycle event timing across both generations.
I outline some of the questions designed to gather attitudinal data here,
since they comprised a substantial element of the questionnaire schedule, and are
important in subsequent analyses of the survey data. The questionnaire collected
data on labour force and life cycle event histories. Where respondents were not
yet married or parents they were asked if and when they expected to marry and
have their first child, and to describe what they saw as important in deciding when
to marry and have children. Those who had already married or become parents
were asked parallel, retrospective, questions. These open ended questions were
designed to gather data on attitudes towards the timing of particular life cycle
events. Given the varied ages and circumstances of respondents, the questions
about cohabitation, marriage and parenthood clearly have differing salience, a
problem which is taken into account in subsequent analyses of expectations.
To supplement these open ended questions a series of other, structured,
attitudinal questions were asked of respondents. The questions cover information
on attitudes relating to life cycle event timing, to independence, and to the
appropriate domestic division of labour in particular circumstances, and on
perceptions of the strength of claims to employment and earnings by different
social groups. Respondents were asked to self-complete a list of Likert style
attitudinal statements. However, a number of other forms of questions were used.
Their inclusion has the advantage of providing a diverse array of attitudinal data,
and also 'livened up' the interviews, engaging respondents with a variety of
questions and tasks. For example, a series of vignettes were read to respondents,
outlining imaginary scenarios in which social actors are faced with some dilemma
which needs resolving. Respondents are invited to advise on the best course of
action. The vignettes covered questions concerning decisions whether to marry
without access to independent housing, decisions about childcare, employment and
the division of labour in a marriage, and decisions around female earnings,
careers and parenting. The use of vignettes was inspired by Finch's description of
their possibilities (Finch, 1987). One of the problems in their use which she
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identifies is the inability to know precisely the interpretation of the scenarios
made by respondents and hence whether comparisons of responses are comparing
like with like. However, this is a charge which presumably could be levelled at all
'closed' attitudinal questions. The advantage of such questions is that they enable
more straightforward groupings and comparisons of responses than do open ended
questions.
The questionnaire also invited respondents to rank the claims to
employment of a series of individuals, described in terms of their household
circumstances. Respondents were also asked about the structure of their
employing organisation through a series of questions asking for the typical
attributes (sex, age, marital status) of employees across a series of job grades.
Respondents were asked to say what the typical earnings carried by these grades
were, and to say whether or not they felt that the pattern of earnings across job
grades was fair. As well as revealing the significance of life cycle stage and
domestic obligations in respondents' perceptions of appropriate actions in given
circumstances, and in their perceptions of fairness, some of the questions revealed
a pattern of attitudes which varied with respondents' own life cycle circumstances.
Further, questions assessing the claims of young people relative to other groups
reveal a broad consensus suggesting the claims of young people, whilst seen to be
important, have less sympathy than the claims of groups seen to hold obligations
to dependents. Domestic circumstances are clearly salient in respondents'
perceptions of 'who should get (and do) what'. It will be argued that these
perceptions reflect the social arrangements through which relations to household
resourcing are important to the structuring of social inequality.
In summary, the survey was designed to furnish 'qualitative' information
but also to enable a quantitative analysis, where survey data can be located with
respect to more general evidence on change in the organisation of transitions to
adulthood. As we will see, youth and transition have generally been treated as
objects of analysis, as pre-given categories. Whilst the focus on life cycle events
by recent writers begins to address this problem, their research does not go far
in defining youth and the transition to adult status as truly social categories.
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Issues of transition to adulthood, then, are central in the questionnaire but
the form of questioning is often structured, and indirect in its approach to
perceptions of adulthood or adult status. Such questions, I believe, hold
advantages over direct forms of questioning on this issue. For example, to ask
respondents whether they feel, or perceive themselves to be, adult (eg. Hutson
and Jenkins, 1989) may be interesting, but interpreting responses is fraught with
problems given that we do not know the basis on which responses are given. It
seems likely that an important basis on which responses to such a question are
made will be a desire by respondents to demonstrate to the interviewer that they
possess the social competencies implied by adult status. To address the
psychological and emotional aspects of the transition to adult status clearly has
intrinsic interest and reflects on broader societal expectations and forms of
support. The transition to adulthood entails more than a progression through a
series of employment and family related circumstances. Maturity reflects
experience, and it is often a perception of maturity which is reflected in everyday
distinctions between youth and adult status. However, in a study of change in the
organisation of transition, I have kept to a minimum questions addressing young
respondents' perceptions of their own adult status, or parents' perceptions of their
sons' and daughters' status.
Several writers have focused on the timing of life cycle transitions as
indices of the attainment of adult status. It is, however, meaningful to consider
these life cycle events as more than simply proxies, or indices, of adulthood.
Because they label transitions through forms of family dependence to forms of
independence and obligation in the resourcing of households and dependents,
they also reflect the social arrangements through which individuals and families
reproduce their living conditions. It is not simply that change in the organisation
of transition is reflected in changes in these social arrangements, particular
aspects of which have been identified by youth researchers. We might also
consider that changes in the social organisation of obligation and dependency will
be reflected in the timing of transitions between life cycle stages. Such an
approach acknowledges that changes in the structure of the life cycle are integral
to change in the social organisation of obligation and dependency. It meets the
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call to locate youth and the transition to adult status within 'the structures and
values of society' because it acknowledges that these life cycle processes are an
integral aspect of those structures and values.
The chapters are organised as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the two,
broadly distinct, research agendas which have developed through the 1980s, and
which focus on the consequences of economic change and employment
restructuring for the experience of youth and young adults. Chapter 2 focuses on
research into domestic life cycle transitions from youth to adult status, a transition
seen by some to be disrupted by resource constraint and job insecurity. The
chapter questions descriptions of gender in understandings of transition, and
examines the reasons why youth research has reached contradictory conclusions
as to the significance of economic change for life cycle organisation. In part this
is due to the failure to locate the findings of small scale studies in relation to
demographic evidence on change in life cycle event timing, despite the importance
of the latter in definitions of the transition to adult status. In part, too, it is due
to the conceptual framework in which the consequences of economic change are
thought through. Employment routes are seen to underwrite domestic trajectories
from dependency to independence and adult status. The employment, or
'productive' sphere, then, is of particular importance yet there is no analysis of the
significance of the domestic division of labour, or the 'reproductive' sphere to the
organisation of employment and rewards to employment. Such an analysis would
address the ways in which 'dependence' and 'independence' are constructed. The
framework of parallel trajectories through the labour market and through
domestic life cycle events fails to address the interrelation of rewards in
employment and the domestic division of labour and, in connection, fails to
acknowledge the interrelatedness of dependency and 'independence'. To
hypothesise change in the transition from youth to adult status is necessarily to
hypothesise change in the social organisation of dependency and obligation.
The division between life cycle processes and the labour market which
characterises theories of the transition to adulthood is a feature, too, of the
development of the two, distinct, research agendas. Chapter 3 continues the
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review and critique of research into the consequences of economic change for
youth but here the discussion lies with research into the youth labour market and
change in the structure of youth employment opportunities. Chapters 2 and 3 are
organised in terms of these distinct research agendas in order to clarify their
arguments, and to posit the value of an approach which challenges the treatment
of employment processes and the domestic division of labour as autonomous
'spheres' of social experience. As in the literature on domestic transitions, this
dichotomy is reproduced within the literature on youth labour markets which,
influenced by labour market segmentation theory, operates with a division
between labour demand and labour supply side processes. Whilst the debate on
transition treats labour demand as independent, research into youth labour
markets fails to analyse the organisation of labour supply. Different types of
labour are treated as entities, meaningful through employers' discriminatory
recruitment practices. These are shaped, in the case of gender, by expectations of
childcare obligations. However, rooted in a model of direct or indirect
discrimination, such an approach fails to account adequately for the diversity of
gendered experience or for change in its contours. Youth is assumed to be a
distinct labour supply group, and is defined principally as an age group. In
consequence, there is no scope for analysing change in the organisation of youth
as a life cycle stage, even though its significance as an age period derives in large
part from its particular life cycle relations of semi-dependency and a lack of
extensive material or caring obligations. The agendas described in Chapters 2 and
3 share explanatory problems. The conceptual division between 'economic' labour
market processes and 'social' life cycle processes is entailed within, and reflected
by, their distinct research agendas. The following chapters develop an analysis
which attempts to move beyond this dualism in order to locate change in the
transition to adulthood as an historical process, and one which reflects the
integrated development of social reproduction and employment structure.
Chapter 4 describes aggregate level patterns of change in the organisation
and timing of life cycle events, in particular marriage and birth of the first child,
over the twentieth century. This evidence gives historical perspective to
hypotheses of delay in the transition to adult status. Demographic evidence
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demonstrates that the long term trend through this century, to younger ages at
marriage and parenthood, was reversed in the early 1970s. Writers on youth in
transition have compared the experience of the 1980s with 'normal transitions'
seen to have obtained during full employment in the 1950s and 1960s. However,
a longer term perspective illustrates clearly the historically specific nature of both
periods. Whilst this is an obvious point it is stressed because existing youth
research has failed to locate contemporary patterns of transition as part of a
wider historical process. The chapter considers patterns of event timing amongst
the survey sample in relation to aggregate level evidence. Within the survey,
information on parents' perceptions of changes between the experience of young
people now and their own experience of transition was gathered. Their responses
are described and examined in relation to other evidence on changes in factors
which are salient to the timing of family formation. The most important changes
are seen to lie in job security, housing availability and home ownership, female
careers and expectations concerning living standards amongst contemporary
cohorts of young adults.
Female employment and careers were the most frequently cited aspect of
change. This response touches on a set of issues which has been barely addressed
by the youth literature. However, there is evidence to suggest that changes in
gender relations, in employment and with respect to household resourcing, are of
great importance in historically recent changes in the timing of family formation.
Deserving of an extended treatment these issues are the subject of Chapter 5. To
elucidate the processes which are operating here requires an understanding of the
contingency of productive and reproductive processes. Changes in the organisation
of the family and relations to its resourcing by family members are inseparable
from changes in the organisation of labour demand and the patterning of rewards
to employment. Changes in gender relations to employment and to the family are
central to this dynamic. Economic theories of demographic change explain
declines in fertility and delay in the timing of marriage and parenthood in terms
of historical changes in female, relative to male, earnings. Economic models rely
on macro level data and have been criticised for their assumptions about
individual behaviour. Their conclusions are contradicted by studies which, using
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data on household level earnings, identify stability in the relative contributions of
female and male partners. It is argued that such a conclusion is misleading, and
derives from still too general an interpretation of the data. An analysis of national
level earnings data, disaggregated by age groups, reveals significant changes in
gendered earnings ratios amongst recent cohorts of young adults. There has been
an improvement in young women's earnings relative to those of young men. This
is associated with a decline in the earnings of young men relative to peak adult
earnings. Improving female to male earnings ratios are a consequence of differing,
gendered, rates of decline relative to those of older workers. These developments
in gender and age related patterns of earnings correspond with patterns of delay
in the timing of family formation relative to previous cohorts. These processes are
integral to one another. An understanding of the contingency of relations in the
domestic and economic 'spheres' is essential to an explanation of change in the
organisation of the transition from youth to adult status.
In Chapter 5, peak adult earnings, against which changes in the earnings
of young women and men are measured, are used as an index of general
consumption standards. Chapter 6 disaggregates this general measure and
considers the class related patterning of life cycle event timing against a measure
of consumption standards, derived from the survey data, which is sensitive to the
differing socioeconomic circumstances of the survey respondents. Recent research
has failed to reconcile its hypothesis of delay in the attainment of independence,
as a consequence of 'new' forms of employment disadvantage amongst youth, with
the traditional expectation that socioeconomic disadvantage is associated with the
attainment of independence at young ages. Associated with this problem is the
limited analysis of class variation in life cycle event timing. Models of class
differences propose that lifetime employment and earnings profiles are significant
in shaping orientations which in turn are necessary to explaining class differences
in the timing of marriage and parenthood. Middle class life chances reward long
term planning and later ages at parenthood are seen to be a rational strategy in
relation to an earnings profile which rises progressively over the working life. In
contrast, early ages at family formation amongst the working class are seen as
rational in relation to 'careers' where earnings levels do not increase much
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beyond early adulthood and where insecurity is common. However, whilst a theory
of orientations to the future is necessary to explain class related differences, such
orientations are typically deduced from a measure of class location. Consequently,
such a theory adds little to the analysis of class differences.
Accepting a cross sectional measure of class location as an adequate
description of social difference is questionable because it neglects the way
standard class related employment trajectories may entail mobility across jobs.
The analysis of Chapter 6 attempts to build in respondents' expectations for the
future, in part through exploring their perceptions of the circumstances of salient
reference groups. Gendered relations to employment careers and family formation
are described, and illustrated through respondents' attitudes towards the timing
of marriage and parenthood. The association between current employment
position, orientations and patterns of life cycle event timing is explored. The
discussion questions the marginality of life cycle processes to definitions of class
related inequality. This issue is developed in Chapter 7 through a consideration
of recent critiques of sociological theories of inequality, critiques which are
informed by a concern with demographic change and a growing dependent
population. A reading of the literature on ageing, and inter-generational conflict,
reveals similarities with research into youth and transition. Both proceed as if
economic processes and social relations over the life cycle have their own
dynamic, yet it is precisely this dichotomy which compromises explanations of
social change.
The ageing population structure, and claims on resources by non-working
groups, are seen by many to be contributing to a growing welfare crisis. In
particular, the interests of the working, 'productive', population and the interests
of the non-working, 'dependent' population are understood to be at odds with one
another. Further, historical changes in the relative welfare of different non-
working groups, in particular between the young and the elderly, are expected to
engender perceptions of injustice. In these arguments, relations between age
groups and generations will become increasingly fraught, as 'unacceptable' levels
of taxation are expected to blight the experience of a contracting workforce,
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required to resource a growing welfare population. Social conflict will ensue and
undermine the welfare project. The chapter questions the division between 'the
political' and 'the economic' on which these arguments rely. The division is part
of a conceptual framework where the claims of particular (welfare) groups appear
as problematic while other aspects of resource distribution (claims to
employment) are not questioned. As it is, more seems to be known about
researchers' views on distributive justice than is known about the perceptions of
their subject populations. It has not been demonstrated that members of age
groups share interests which are consonant with their cohort experience, or
perceive their interests to be in conflict with those of members of other age
groups or generations. Further, the literature offers little evidence on social
actors' perceptions of inequality over the life cycle. Empirical evidence drawn
from the survey suggests that standard processes do not place age groups or
generations in an antagonistic relationship. The changing structure of the life cycle
amongst women and men, and the diversity of experience of those not in paid
employment, present a challenge to theories of inequality which prioritise people's
location within the 'productive' (employment) sphere over other areas of social
experience. Understanding the relations between age groups and generations is
essential to explaining change in patterns of inequality, but the interdependency
of these relations is not a precursor to crisis but part of a coherent social
structure.
As we have seen, existing research has been charged with a failure to
locate youth and transition within 'more general' social processes. Part of the
reason such a criticism can be made is because youth research has proceeded as
if life cycle processes and economic processes have their own dynamic. The
potential of such research is compromised because it fails to specify the
relationship between individual biographies and social change. Change in the
transition to adult status simultaneously reflects and embodies changes in the
social arrangements through which the reproduction of day to day living, and the
reproduction of generations, are organised. 'Locating' the transition to adulthood
in relation to social processes requires also that we explore the ways in which it
is an integral part of such processes. This is the task taken up through the thesis.
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2. Economic Change and the Transition from Youth to Adulthood
Transitions in the Youth Debate
Youth research has reflected shifting sociological paradigms in recent
decades, from neo-marxist analyses of youth culture, and representations of the
transition from school to work as a critical moment in the reproduction of the
labour force (eg. Willis, 1977; Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1981;
Frith, 1984; Rees and Atkinson, 1982), to recent concerns about citizenship,
gender inequality and socioeconomic polarisation in the transition from youth to
adult status (eg. Ashton et al, 1990; Jones and Wallace, 1990; Ashton and Lowe,
1991; Chisholm et al, 1991). The changing circumstance of youth, and the
perceived inadequacy of previous theories for explaining contemporary
developments, have led to theoretical reformulations. These are aimed at
exploring the consequences of economic restructuring for the experience of youth
and the patterning of transitions from youth to adult lifestyles. However, the static
model of youth which characterised earlier studies of the transition from school
to work has not been adequately transformed.
In the 1960s and 1970s, years of relatively full employment, processes of
class continuity in the transition from school to work were a principal concern of
youth research. Forms of socialisation, through the family, school and work
relations, were seen to underlie 'smooth' transitions between these life cycle
stages (Roberts, 1968; Ashton and Field, 1976; also cf. Willis, 1977). This
research was, in part, a critique of human capital theories of occupational
selection. It emphasised the significance not only of structural constraint but
attempted also to describe its 'acceptability', through the structuring of young
people's conceptions of their interests and capabilities. The structuring of
orientations was therefore a central theme. Class related orientations, formed
through the family and through school were seen to be 'confirmed', and reified
on entry into different career routes (Ashton and Field, 1976). For Willis, the
structuring of orientations was a dimension through which working class
schoolboys 'seal their own fate' (Willis, 1977). The issue of life cycle transitions
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amongst youth was directed at processes underlying class continuity, as individuals
traversed the distinct institutions of school and work.
Through the 1980s, following the severe recession and employment crisis
at the start of the decade, youth research moved its focus to novel forms of
structural discontinuity. This shift in emphasis reflected a concern that the school
to work transition had been replaced, for many working class youth, by a
'school-to-no-work' limbo. Writers focused on the changing structure of demand
for youth labour as it was shaped by economic recession, by industrial
restructuring and by government policies on youth training, employment and
wages. Different research agendas developed. These focused on the political and
social consequences of government, in particular youth training, policy, and on
economic restructuring and its consequences for domestic life cycle trajectories
and for labour force careers and occupational mobility. These research agendas,
concerned respectively with domestic life cycle and labour force trajectories, have
remained largely distinct. They are addressed in some detail through this and the
subsequent chapter.
The circumstance being addressed by researchers was one of rapid change
in the structure of demand and levels of reward to youth labour. The number of
school leavers entering the labour force with no guarantee of a secure wage was
a cause of increasing political and social concern. The percentage of 16 to 18 year
olds in Britain who were unemployed or on training schemes grew from 10.1%
in 1979 to 27.0% in 1984 (DES figures, quoted in Raffe, 1987). The percentages
of 16 year olds in paid employment fell from 60% in 1975 to 16% by 1986 (rising
slightly to 20% by 1988). In 1988, 25% of the age group were on the Youth
Training Scheme, a slight decline from the peak participation rate of 27%
between 1985 and 1987. 47% were in full time education and 8% were registered
as unemployed. Of 17 year olds in 1988, 33% were in full time education
compared to 25% in 1975. YTS was extended to a two year scheme in 1986, and
the proportion of 17 year olds on the scheme increased from 10% in 1987 to 21%
in 1988. Those in employment fell from 45% to 36% between 1987 and 1988. In
1975, 84% of 18 year olds were in paid employment, a percentage which fell to
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62% by 1983 and recovered slightly to 68% by 1988 (Employment Department,
Labour Market Quarterly Report, 1989). By 1988 the most common route into
employment amongst 16 years olds was via YTS, accounting for 36% of labour
force entrants, compared to 30% who went directly into employment, and 30%
who entered employment after full time education beyond the minimum school
leaving age (Employment Department, Labour Market Quarterly Report, 1990).
Social security legislation was altered throughout the 1980s, effectively
increasing the age at which independence, as recognised by social security
arrangements, is deemed to start (Harris, 1988). In 1988 the Social Security Act
replaced the supplementary benefit system with Income Support, and only in
exceptional circumstances would payments be made to 16 and 17 year olds.
Guarantees of a place on YTS, with its weekly allowance, replaced the automatic
claim to benefit amongst the age group. Whilst the YTS allowance is higher than
rates of Income Support it is well below wage rates for most young people. Harris
argues that the consequences of such policies has been to extend the dependency
of young people on their parents, a situation which has grown through the
twentieth century because of the extension of compulsory education and, more
crucially, according to Harris, because of the growth of youth unemployment
through the 1970s and 1980s (Harris, 1988).
An assumption quite general to youth research, and only indicated here
since it will be addressed in some detail through the thesis, is that the transition
from school to employment, and the independence achieved through earning,
once underwrote 'normal', class related, transitions to adulthood. Now hypotheses
of change in the attainment of adult status are assessed in relation to the timing
of life cycle events which mark transitions from semi-dependency to
independence, through departure from the parental home, household formation,
marriage and parenthood. The prime mover in this change is seen to be
unemployment, job insecurity and resource constraint amongst youth, all potential
obstacles to achieving adult lifestyles and familial independence. Changes in the
earnings of youth relative to older workers have received some attention in
studies of the relation between youth wage rates and unemployment rates (see
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Raffe, 1987 for review), but otherwise they have been largely neglected. In fact,
mean earnings amongst young people have been increasing over recent years, but
at a slower rate than amongst older age groups, and amongst the lower quartiles
of the earnings distribution, young adults have experienced a decline in real wages
(New Earnings Survey data). These changes are indicative, too, of important
changes in the economic relations of youth and early adulthood. Since the
unemployed and those on training allowances are not included in the earnings
data, the evidence suggests more broadly based changes in the period of youth
and early adulthood than is suggested by the emphasis of youth researchers on
YTS and unemployment.
Early accounts of the unemployment crisis amongst youth in the early
1980s presented vehement critiques of government policy, then in the early years
of the Thatcher administration. Writers addressed the perceived discrepancies
between youth labour supply and demand as they were manifest in training
policies, and many argued that government intervention amounted to an
ideological assault on working class youth. Policies were argued to be
restructuring the substance of youth as a life cycle stage, by forcing down youth
wages, and shaping the ambitions and expectations of the young in order to meet
the demands of industry. Government policy, the increased powers of the
Manpower Services Commission and, in particular, the development of the Youth
Training Scheme were characterised as a form of ideological management by the
state (eg. Markall and Gregory, 1982; Finn, 1982, 1987; Benn and Fairley, 1986).
The 'skill deficit' model implicit in YTS was a theme connecting the writing of
several authors. Training policy, in particular the emphasis on training for 'Social
and Life Skills', was argued to reify the popular myth that unemployment is a
consequence of the mismatch between young people's abilities and those required
by employers (eg. Bates et al, 1984; Rees and Atkinson, 1982). State training
policy was seen as an attempt to ingrain the work ethic in the young, and "to
break people, especially working class young people, into a life of low wages and
long periods of unemployment" (Benn and Fairley, 1986, p.3). The critiques were
accompanied by rather vague policy recommendations, features of what now
seems a fast dated political manifesto, with arguments for a participatory debate
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on the kind of work society needs (Benn and Fairley, 1986) to teaching
'subversive skills' (Atkinson et al, 1982).
A number of writers claimed that the sorts of changes being addressed
would effectively prolong the period of youth. The collapse in employment was
simultaneously a collapse in the means by which young people could secure
independence and adult lifestyles. Young 'adults', in their early twenties and
unemployed, or in work but without security or decent prospects, were said to be
'trapped as teenagers' (Williamson, 1985; see also Caffrey et al, 1986) or to
experience an extended youth as a period of suspended animation, and be caught
in a 'frozen transition' (Willis, 1985).
The argument that routes to adult status and independence were being
undermined remained a euphemism for the problematic employment status of
young people, but it presented a hypothesis that wage security was necessary to
'normal' transitions, through leaving the parental home, getting married and
becoming parents in an independent household. A number of research projects
were set up to explore the relationship between youth and young adults'
experience in the labour force and the organisation of family related life cycle
transitions (eg. Jones 1986,1987; Wallace, 1987a,b,c; Hutson and Jenkins, 1987a,b;
1989; Furlong and Cooney, 1990; Murphy and Sullivan 1986). Consequently the
earlier emphasis on the transition from school to work shifted to a more general
concern with labour force and life cycle trajectories. The age at leaving parents,
setting up a household, cohabiting, marrying and becoming a parent are
standardly used as indicators of the attainment of adult status. Their incidence
is not necessary, nor equivalent, to adulthood, their order not rigid nor uniform,
but their timing serves as a useful and parsimonious framework for exploring class
differences across the population and patterns of change across cohorts or
generations. As life cycle events, of individuals and households, they provide
indices which map out patterns of progression from childhood dependency
through the partial independence of youth to the attainment of forms of 'adult'
independence and responsibilities.
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The longitudinal emphasis of this research was a useful departure,
reflecting a concern to elucidate processes of structural change in life cycle
trajectories. It will be argued below that this commitment has fallen short of its
objective since it has not adequately challenged the cross sectional limits to
earlier definitions of youth. The concern with trajectories focuses attention on
biographical journeys from dependence to independence, but in the absence of
a theory of their interaction, explanations of change in life cycle processes become
problematic.
Reformulations and Contradictions
Youth research, focusing on the consequences of economic change for the
labour force and domestic careers of young adults, has been shaped by a concern
with individual, cohort and class trajectories. The integrated nature of the statuses
of dependence and independence that youth is supposed to bridge is largely
neglected, or ruled out by notions of transition between life cycle stages where
different structural principles appear to operate. The dichotomy between youth
and adult labour markets based in segmentation theory (eg. Ashton et al, 1987)
or between relative gender equality in youth which contrasts with its 'wider
context' of gender inequality in adulthood (Hutson and Jenkins, 1989) are two
examples of a more general paradigm which seeks to elucidate processes
structuring life cycle continuity as individuals 'traverse' different social statuses.
It is the conceptual separation of individual trajectories from these statuses which
is, in part, responsible for contradictory statements concerning economic change
and the structuring of transition to adulthood. Such contradictions are in evidence
not only across the conclusions of different writers, but are embedded, as we
shall see, in supposedly unified statements of contemporary circumstances.
Youth research has been dominated by ethnographic evidence, with
relatively small scale studies often using in-depth interviews, and focusing on the
experience of contemporary cohorts of youth and young adults (eg. Sawdon,
Pelican and Tucker, 1981; Griffin, 1985; Coffield et al, 1986; Stafford, 1981;
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Cockburn, 1987; Wallace, 1987a; Hutson and Jenkins 1989). The success in
achieving detailed descriptions of the experience, social relationships and attitudes
of young adults has not been matched by the development of general frameworks
capable of exploring change in the structuring of transitions to adult status.
Evidence of historical change is used anecdotally, or general references are made
to aggregate level patterns of change in the timing of early life cycle events but
the processes underlying such changes are not explored and are not
methodologically integrated in studies of the contemporary experience of young
adults (Chisholm, 1990, and Bynner, 1991 make similar criticisms). The class
related patterning of transitions to adulthood is well established (eg. Dunnell,
1979; Kiernan and Diamond, 1983, Jones, 1987), but its relation to 'new' forms
of disadvantage (eg. mass unemployment) is less clear.
The following discussion considers two recent research projects in some
detail, those ofWallace and Hutson and Jenkins, since they are important in their
attempts to move the youth debate forward by reframing its remit, and both help
to illustrate problems which are general to conceptualisations of the transition to
adult status. Parallel issues which confront theories of gender in the transition to
adulthood are discussed in the next section. These problems are fundamental to
the incoherence of discussions of change in transitions to adulthood, and
addressing them may enable us to move on from the current vogue of mutual
chastisement, amongst youth researchers, for allowing the critical questions of the
late twentieth century to pass us by (Bynner, 1991; Chisholm, 1990; Ashton and
Lowe, 1991).
Wallace argues that the 'normal' paths to adulthood, established in the
1950s and 1960s during full employment, are no longer possible, and a substantial
proportion of under twenty fives have joined a marginal, subemployed, population
(Wallace, 1987a). A central theme of her research is the impact of new patterns
of work and unemployment on patterns of transition to cohabitation, marriage
and parenthood. The empirical basis of her work is a sample of young people
living on the Isle of Sheppey, who she interviewed three times between 1979 and
1984, from the ages of 16 to 21. In the context of previous theories based on a
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narrow concept of 'transition', and the tendency to equate youth with an age
period, this longitudinal emphasis is welcome, although the structure of her
sample still poses a methodological difficulty given that most people marry and
have their first child at ages over 21. Wallace could therefore examine the
attitudes of her interviewees to marriage, cohabitation and parenthood but relate
these to the practice of only a minority of her sample. Most of her respondents
were opposed to the idea of marrying and having children whilst unemployed, but
in practice a number did:
"Hence, unemployment would appear to inhibit 'normal' family transitions in
principle. However, in practice .. those with irregular employment careers
were just as likely to have had children by the time they were 21, particularly
amongst the girls. This would confirm the idea that the unemployed tend to
'drift' into parenthood for lack of any positive alternatives" (Wallace, 1987b,
p. 126).
Wallace suggests that marriage was postponed as a consequence of
unemployment. Unemployed people were more likely to be cohabiting with their
partners, either independently or with their parents, than they were to have left
home, married and established a household in a 'conventional' way. She notes the
growing significance of owner occupation to patterns of household formation
amongst young couples and argues that female, as well as male partners' earnings
were crucial to house purchase. This is an important point. It hints at a changing
relationship between the earnings of young men and women, in relation to the
timing of household formation, an issue to which I shall later return.
The tension in Wallace's argument between the attitudes of her sample as
a whole and the practice of a few in terms of family formation is not resolved. The
cut-off age of 21 amongst her sample presents a fundamental problem. Only 13
of the 84 young adults interviewed at the age of 21 were parents. The point made
by Wallace that those with irregular employment careers were as likely to have
children as those with secure employment careers is based, amongst men, on a
sample size of 4. It is the attitudes of the sample as a whole and the level of
unemployment amongst them which leads Wallace to her speculative conclusion
that family formation amongst the unemployed is likely to be postponed "at least
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in principle" (Wallace, 1987b, pl33). Yet simultaneously "unplanned family
formation .. may increase as prospects look increasingly hopeless for young
couples" (Wallace, 1987b, p. 135).
Wallace's conclusion of change amongst the unemployed turns more
satisfactorily on patterns of cohabitation, marriage and housing 'careers', but it
is not clear how the experience of the unemployed relates to general patterns of
change here. She notes a general growth in the incidence of cohabitation, the
national rate being exceeded amongst her unemployed interviewees, and she
points to aggregate level changes in the timing of marriage and parenthood,
specifically "a tendency towards younger marriage and first pregnancy and a
compression of the child bearing years generally" (Wallace, 1987b, p. 115). She
does not address a footnoted reference to an argument by Rindfuss and Morgan
that "a longer time span in the USA (sic) [suggests there is] increasingly a
tendency for young people to postpone having the first child" (1987b, p. 135). This
pattern, in fact, is not unique to the USA. It is surprising that the implications are
not addressed. Aggregate level patterns of marriage and parenthood, as Wallace
is clear in the case of housing availability, are not a distinct explanatory problem.
It is as if such patterns, which are simply aggregate level statements of change in
life cycle, or demographic, event timing, do not touch on questions which are
central to the sociological debate on transitions to adult status. The failure to
integrate understandings of macro and micro level changes has been a
fundamental obstacle to progress in theorising the structural dynamic of life cycle
trajectories.
The level of generality in Wallace's description of aggregate level changes
in marriage and pregnancy is not helpful. The tendency towards younger marriage
and first pregnancy is true only as the most general characterisation of change
through the twentieth century. The long term trend to lower ages at family
formation, quite marked in the 1950s and 1960s, was reversed in the 1970s, with
the trend to later ages becoming more pronounced through the 1980s (OPCS,
Marriage and Birth statistics). Since the mid-1960s there has been a significant
decline in marriage and birth rates, most dramatically amongst younger age
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groups. The number of births per thousand women aged under 20 fell by 40%
between 1971 and 1986, and by a similar rate amongst those aged 20 to 24 (Social
Trends, 1988, figures for England and Wales). These figures on birth rates, of
course, do not clarify patterns of the timing of childbirth. However, other
evidence suggests that cohorts of women born from the mid 1950s onward showed
a significant change in the timing of their first births, relative to older cohorts.
While up to age 18 the cohort born in 1955 had a fertility rate higher than that
of previous generations, as the cohort aged it manifested a pattern of delayed
starts in childbearing (Thompson, 1980). Later cohorts have continued this trend.
These patterns of aggregate level demographic change are addressed in
detail in Chapter 4, but are sketched here in order to highlight the significance
of their neglect, both theoretical and methodological, in the youth literature. The
changes have been the subject of a largely separate research literature, the remit
more of demographers and economists than sociologists, and the explanatory
problems raised by aggregate level theories have not been addressed in youth
research. Busfield and Paddon attempted such a project in the 1970s (Busfield
and Paddon, 1977), but the implications of the framework they adopted, and the
inferred necessity of cross-disciplinary engagement, has been passed over by
recent youth research. The authors note that despite the widely acknowledged
importance of economic factors to patterns of nuptuality and fertility, the relation
of the latter to material standards, or orientations to living standards, has received
little detailed study (Busfield and Paddon, 1977). The writers address this
omission and explain changes through the twentieth century, up until the 1960s,
in terms of increasing affluence, and a decline in the advantages to be gained by
accumulating material assets prior to marriage. They suggest that economic
recession, and increased difficulties in attaining a mortgage at a time when there
were newly inflated expectations of home ownership, underlay the decline in
marriage rates at young ages through the 1970s. Whilst they are interested
principally in questions concerning decisions to parent, and in family size and the
spacing of children, they offer some evidence on the timing of first births,
suggesting that economic considerations, particularly accumulating assets prior to
family formation, were of particular significance in decisions about when to start
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a family (Busfield and Paddon, 1977). As we will see, such considerations were
important also to many of the young adult respondents in my own survey. The
ambivalence amongst recent writers over the relationship between material
circumstances and patterns of life cycle event timing is partly a consequence of
the lack of interest in linking detailed evidence from ethnographic studies on
attitudes and perceptions with aggregate level changes in life cycle event timing.
For example, in Wallace's research it is unclear how processes of change,
identified in the experience of her survey respondents, relate to general patterns
of deferral in the timing of marriage and first births. Her evidence of change is
partial and provisional.
Wallace, however, does provide some evidence in support of the hypothesis
that employment restructuring has been important to life cycle processes. She
argues its consequence has been a 'fracturing' of work and domestic transitions
(Wallace, 1987a,b). In contrast, Hutson and Jenkins vigorously oppose the
suggestions that unemployment amongst young people undermines the process of
'becoming adult'. The significance of other aspects of adult status makes absurd,
in their view, the idea that its attainment is somehow undermined by changing
economic conditions. The authors take issue with the failure to theorise adult
status within youth research and place this problem centrally in their research on
youth transitions (Hutson and Jenkins, 1987a,b; 1989). Their study is based on
in-depth interviews of unemployed young adults and their parents, conducted in
the mid 1980s in Swansea and Port Talbot. The 'great majority' of young
respondents had been unemployed for six months or more, and were aged 18 to
25 at the time of interview. Broadly, Hutson and Jenkins approach the definition
of adulthood, and the structuring of transitions, from two directions, firstly
stressing the social psychological aspects of attaining adult status and secondly,
developing an understanding of transitions in relation to a general concept of
citizenship. On the first, the authors point out that most of their respondents
considered themselves, or their sons and daughters, to be adult, and they ask why
this should be so. Reasons given by respondents lay partly in terms simply of their
age, but more typically in terms of achieving maturity and an "independence of
mind and action, and responsibilities in their attitudes and behaviour" (Hutson
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and Jenkins, 1987a, p.94). So, the authors argue:
"The language which is used implies that the transition from childhood to
adulthood is in large part a moral transition - a change in the individual's
ability to make certain kinds of decisions - and that a bargain, and an agreed
definition of adulthood, is struck between parents and children" (Hutson and
Jenkins, 1987, p.94).
Ultimately, it may indeed be appropriate to characterise the transition to
adulthood, and change in its social organisation, as having a moral character, but
in a broader sense than that implied by Hutson and Jenkins. For them, the
significance of inter-family relationships for young people's attainment of adult
status, lies in the 'symbolic economy' of the family. Transitions to psychological
independence are managed through financial and other exchanges, where young
adult children negotiate greater responsibilities and independence with their
parents. Where money is short, in this argument, the payment of dig money may
be more important symbolically than economically, but it is an important
precursor to managing one's own, adult, affairs. Further, social security benefits
"while not as symbolically powerful or as economically substantial as a 'proper
wage', allow young men and women more independence from their parents than
they enjoyed whilst at school" (Hutson and Jenkins, 1989, p. 108).
Like Wallace, the authors appear to agree that economic change may have
particular consequences for the attainment of adulthood but, they argue, adult
status is not as compromised as suggested by Willis because it is rooted in a much
wider notion of citizenship than implied by the stress on economic relationships.
In particular, jural and political adulthood is not dependent on employment
status. Core components of adult status are independent of material resources. In
criticism of Willis, they argue that:
"It is the failure to distinguish the legally constituted rights and duties
defining adult status - which, taken together, may be conceptualised as a
portfolio of enablement and obligation - from the capacity, whether
economically based or whatever, to actualise the potential bound up in that
status, which allows Willis to diagnose the suspension of adulthood for the
young unemployed" (Hutson and Jenkins, 1989, p. 107).
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Thus, the authors argue, independent living or marriage and sexual partnership
are only facets of a much wider set of relationships which constitute adult status:
"It is the right to each, not their presence at any particular instance, which is most
important" (1989, p. 109, original emphasis). This emphasis on rights over their
realisation leads to a static and uniform model of adulthood unable to address
one of the principal research questions asked by the authors, of the consequences
of unemployment for the transition to adult status. In fact, amongst many quotes
from their respondents are a number which suggest particular concerns regarding
the possibility of attaining adult lifestyles, and responsibilities, while unemployed.
The authors note that these are broadly consistent with Willis' arguments, and are
themselves ambiguous about the 'social' consequences of long term
unemployment. Written in their slightly earlier publication, but consistent with
their subsequent arguments, the authors maintain that:
"Young people continue - despite all the odds that are stacked against them
- to achieve adult status. Although it would be stretching credulity too far to
argue that they can achieve full adult status or full social membership as long
as they are unemployed, neither is it the case that they are left in limbo,
abandoned to a purgatorial appendix of the life cycle. Despite youth (and
adult) unemployment life - of a sort - goes on" (Hutson and Jenkins, 1987a,
p. 106, original emphasis).
Clearly adulthood is a vague concept and, as the authors maintain, poorly
developed in the youth literature. However, the ways in which they define
adulthood present problems for exploring change. Keen to highlight the problems
inherent in arguments of delayed adulthood, arguments which they presumably
see as labelling disadvantaged young men and women as childlike dependents,
the authors fail to elucidate those aspects of transition which are changing in
structured ways. Their conclusion of continuity in patterns of transition to
adulthood, despite economic restructuring, becomes tautological when economic
relationships are defined as trivial to the substance of adulthood.
The argument of continuity is the outcome of a framework which is ill
suited to exploring processes of change in the social relations of youth and
adulthood. Three points serve to illustrate. Firstly, Hutson and Jenkins define
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adulthood in terms of jural and political citizenship rights on the one hand and
as a managed transition to forms of psychological and emotional independence
on the other, but it is unclear how these two aspects relate to one another. The
implied significance of respondents' perceptions of their personal identity is not
integrated with the argument of citizenship. Further, it is not clear why economic
relationships have no role in relation to living standards as an aspect of
citizenship rights, nor in relation to their consequences for the uneven
mobilisation of jural and political rights. The authors acknowledge that
unemployment has effects on the substance of adult experience, but their point
is that many aspects of adult status do not depend on material resources.
However, the drive to an eclectic definition of adulthood ends up with a level of
generalisation where, along with aspects of citizenship status and forms of
financial management, adult status is defined simply in terms of its inevitability;
becoming adult is, the authors suggest, 'only natural' (Hutson and Jenkins, 1989,
p.109).
Secondly the emphasis on the 'symbolic economy' of the household
neglects the significance of its material economy. This emphasis on the symbolic
nature of exchanges within the household in relation to the structuring of
transitions from youth to adulthood is part of a more general reluctance to engage
with processes of change in the structuring of the individual and family life cycle.
If family structure, and the relationship of household members to the resourcing
of households were autonomous, and not related to economic processes, then the
relatively limited contributions of dependent youth might indeed allow what
Hutson and Jenkins label as symbolic to take precedence in explanations of
transitions to adult status. However, the substance and structure of transitions to
adulthood requires an understanding of the relationship between household
structure and the organisation of household resourcing amongst its members, and
their relationship to patterns of access to and rewards from employment. General
patterns indicate changing relationships between household members in their
respective contributions to household income maintenance. To give the 'symbolic
economy' precedence over processes of change in the structuring of households'
'real economies' is to confront dynamic social processes with a cross sectional
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conceptual framework.
Lastly, as with other studies, data gathered from the interview based
fieldwork is not related to more general processes, of the patterning of life cycle
trajectories across the population or over generations, in any detailed way. The
historical and methodological particularity of such studies diminishes the
significance of social change.
Before describing further the outlines of an approach more sensitive to
processes of change it is instructive to consider the ways in which gendered
patterns of transition to adulthood are addressed in the youth literature. Again,
models established to explore change in the transition to adulthood are
compromised, here by understandings of static forms of 'adult' gender inequality,
and by a notion of processes which adhere to categories as if such categories, and
their relationships to one another, are not problematic.
Gendered Processes and the Transition to Adulthood
As we have seen, an earlier emphasis by youth research on the transition
from school to work has been overtaken by more recent concerns with the impact
of economic restructuring for early labour force careers. For many authors the
emphasis on employment relationships was inadequate to the task of
understanding female transitions to adulthood. For women, adult status appeared
more appropriately thought of in terms of family formation, or motherhood in
particular (eg. Bazalgette, 1978; West and Newton, 1983; Busfield, 1987). Surveys
which asked young people about their expectations for the future found 'gender
typical' expectations which were argued to:
"reflect a prevailing view in society .. that adulthood for the male is generally
marked by his entry into the world of work whereas adulthood for the female
appears to be contingent upon her marriage" (West and Newton, 1983, p. 162).
More recently, writers have begun to consider the relationship between
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work and parenthood for both men and women. However, there remains a
tendency to emphasise the distinctness of work and family careers, although
increasingly they both are seen as relevant to men and to women. The transition
from youth to adulthood still appears to crystallise the divergence of female and
male life cycle trajectories. Female life cycle trajectories are still seen to be
shaped principally in relation to the domestic sphere. There is some recognition
of the importance to employers' recruitment strategies of male domestic status.
For some employers family men with financial obligations to dependents will be
more reliable employees than those without similar obligations (eg. Wallace,
1987a; Hutson and Jenkins, 1989; also cf. Blackburn and Mann, 1979). In parallel,
it is women's domestic responsibilities which are seen to exclude them from 'male'
career routes and the associated rewards. An extreme version of this argument is
presented by Bynner, in his synopsis of a UK/USA comparison of transition made
by Kerchkoff, where:
"The conflicting demands on girls, stemming from their desire to pursue a
'domestic career', is seen to stunt their progress towards qualifications and
consequently to depress their opportunities in the labour market" (Bynner,
1991, p.649).
Whilst many would be sceptical of locating gender inequalities in female
'choices', there is nevertheless a general characterisation of forms of gender
inequality which reside in processes of discrimination, whether it is through labour
market segmentation in the economic sphere (eg. Ashton et al, 1990) or through
patriarchal processes in general (eg. Jones and Wallace, 1991). Gender inequality,
as a feature of social arrangements, is not so much addressed as taken for
granted, even where the processes giving rise to it are seen to be of decreasing
salience for the study of gender relations in youth. Such an approach again
underlies a curiously isolated theory of youth. Hutson and Jenkins, for example,
identify relative equality amongst young adults living with their parents,
underwritten, they suggest, by mothers' domestic work. They therefore argue that:
"The apparent gender equality of young women within the family can .. only
be understood in the context of a wider, generational pattern of gender
inequalities" (Hutson and Jenkins, 1989, p. 155)
42
In such a view, youth and adulthood appear as distinct spheres with respect to
understanding structures of inequality. The biographical, or life cycle transition
between these 'spheres' is abrupt:
"The young women's relative freedomwithin the [parental] household is likely
to be shortlived, vanishing with marriage and the move into an independent
household" (Hutson and Jenkins, 1989, p. 155).
There is no consideration here that 'adult' forms of gender inequality might be
anything other than static. The argument suggests that there is increasing equality
in the treatment of young women and men whilst they are still dependent, but the
domestic division of labour which follows parenthood reflects more general
continuities in 'wider gender inequalities'. Such an understanding, as will be
argued in detail later on, is misleading.
Cockburn, too, argues that continuity prevails, although aspects of change
are apparent. Here differences lie not across life cycle stages but between social
norms and social action. Her study of YTS schemes in London in the mid-1980s
addressed the reproduction of gender inequalities amongst youth, via YTS, to
gender inequality in adulthood. Critical of models of gender discrimination and
stereotyping, models which cannot explain the dynamics of change, Cockburn
maintains that her respondents were more liberal in their attitudes to 'gender
appropriate' jobs than such models suggest. However, in the context of economic
recession, and the associated risk of making gender contrary choices, "this
openness at the level of ideas coexists with an actual behaviour that is almost
always conformist" (Cockburn, 1987, p. 198).
The characterisation of gender inequality as general, uniform and
unchanging is a common feature of research. In consequence there has been a
neglect of processes of change in the structuring of forms of 'adult' inequality.
Change, it appears, requires a particularly dramatic quality to arrest the attention
of researchers. Recently, Chisholm has argued that gender has beenmarginalised
and argues the reason for this is the relative weighting of the sphere of production
over the sphere of reproduction. She maintains that the latter effectively "becomes
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that which cannot be allocated to the production sphere" (Chisholm, 1990, p.38,
original emphasis). As a result, she notes, reproduction is treated analytically as
if it were secondary to, and dependent on, production. She argues that we should
regard the two spheres as interdependent so that issues of gender are integrated
rather than 'tagged on'. However, despite this promising statement of intent, she
goes onto argue that:
"The changes in patterns of marriage, childbearing and household size and
structure over the course of this century are both fascinating and are
becoming increasingly complex, but the central point remains that kinship and
marriage expressed through the life cycle of the nuclear family still structures
most people's domestic arrangements for most of their lives .. all studies of
the domestic division of labour show that neither ideologies nor (still less)
practices have changed with respect to gender roles .. Young people's
experience of family life are unlikely to change dramatically in the near
future, then" (Chisholm, 1990, p.53).
Other authors, similarly, have argued in favour of a balance between research into
the reproductive and productive spheres, between domestic and employment
experience. Jones and Wallace suggest that "attempts to produce
gender-symmetrical studies of men and women in terms of both their labour
market behaviour and their domestic responsibilities are lacking" (Jones and
Wallace, 1990, p. 138).
Calls for a 'gender-symmetrical' methodology seem bound to fail as a
critique of the theoretical division between male and female experience because
a dualism is already built into the call for symmetry. Such an approach would
presumably endeavour to produce a theoretical balance between the significance
of work to women and of domestic responsibilities to men. However, this sort of
methodological 'symmetry' would not redress the fragmented nature of
explanations of male and female transitions, or of employment and household
processes. Patterns of difference, whether in gender inequality or between the
claims of youth and adults, are aspects of a coherent social structure. A symmetry
would follow not from balancing the fragments, but from locating differences in
relation to the processes which underlie them. A number of problems ensue from
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the treatment of gendered relationships and inequalities in the transition to adult
status, although these issues are salient also to the broader debate on gender,
work and inequality. The problems are summarised in three points.
Firstly, there is a standard supposition that the gender division is itself a
sufficient statement of the causes and dimensions of gender related inequality.
The outcome is a failure to account for change in the organisation of gendered
relations and for diversity and change in the experience of women and men. As
Siltanen has argued, the category 'gender' provides an inadequate statement of
the processes giving rise to related forms of inequality in employment (Siltanen,
1986). She develops this argument through an analysis of forms of segregation
amongst Post Office employees. Conventionally, analyses of occupational
segregation by sex, see gender to be the defining characteristic and principal of
such segregation. Such studies, however, fail to account for empirical 'exceptions',
and the presence of a minority of women or men in jobs atypical for their sex are
glossed over. In her case study, Siltanen differentiates job types on the basis of
their rewards, as these relate to domestic obligations. She defines as a full wage
job one which enables its incumbent to take sole responsibility for maintaining an
independent household, which may entail contributing to the maintenance of
dependents. In contrast, a component wage job allows its incumbent to contribute
to household financing, but not to resource the household single-handedly.
Siltanen illustrates the way in which financial need and relations to household
income maintenance structure the distribution of people to full and component
wage jobs. Thus, she present evidence which demonstrates inequalities in
employment, and patterns of segregation, correspond not directlywith gender, but
with relations to household income maintenance. 'Exceptions' to conventional
explanations of gender inequality, where people are employed in 'gender-atypical'
jobs, are accounted for within a more coherent explanation of employment
inequalities. Material and social obligations to dependents are essential to
understanding patterns of inequality in employment, and provide a more inclusive
explanation of patterns of inequality in employment than do undifferentiated
understandings of 'gender' (Siltanen, 1986). Evidence suggests that a full wage job
may be more apppropriately defined as a principle wage job, and that two wages
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are increasingly necessary to family formation and household income
maintenance. Siltanen's analysis suggests the value of considering the relations of
young women and men to household resourcing, both in their parental households
but also in household and family formation, rather than adopting a 'symmetrical'
approach where women and men are given equal space but treated separately.
Historical change in the relative contributions of women and men to household
income maintenance suggests the value of such an approach.
Secondly, within the youth literature, 'parallel' models of work and family
related trajectories maintain the significance of each to the other, but they fall
short of locating the experience of men and women in relation to this interaction.
In part, the methodological frameworks, which generally focus on young and
single adults, detract from developing this argument. Young single adults have
received more attention than young couples, and questions about change in the
joint organisation of family formation amongst couples are rarely addressed.
Finally, there has been little engagement with the causes and consequences
of the post war changes in female labour force participation rates. As we will see,
there are strong grounds for being suspicious of arguments that the consequences
of increasing levels of female employment mean simply 'more of the same' in
terms of inequality in earnings and in patterns of household income maintenance.
These changes are important to understanding the underwriting of youth as a
period of semi-dependency within the parental household, as well as to
understanding change in patterns of household and family formation amongst
recent cohorts of young adults.
Whilst gender issues have been addressed in a separate section, to clarify
their treatment in youth research, the problems they raise are not separate from
those which characterise theories of youth transitions more generally. Both models
entail conceptual divisions, between youth dependency and adult forms of
independence, and between female and male life cycle trajectories. Further, there
are parallels in analyses of the experience of youth and of women, parallels which
are formalised in labour market segmentation theory. Both groups standardly
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achieve lower rates of earnings than their adult male social class peers. Both are
characterised by their partial dependence on others for material resources, where
the organisation of the family and the domestic division of labour is inseparable
from inequalities in rewards to employment. By implication, then, the relationship
between dependence and independence should be central to understanding
processes of change in the transition to adult status.
Reconceptualising Transition: the Interaction of Economic Processes and Social
Claims and Obligations
This chapter has argued that the interaction of family and work related
processes must be a central component of an adequate understanding of change
in the transition from youth to adult status. The interaction reflects the social
organisation of 'dependence' and 'independence'. Claims to resources by those
who are dependent, or partially dependent, are standardly furnished, at least in
part, by the income of those who have direct access to a full wage (cf. Siltanen,
1986). For example, the ways in which claims to resources by children and by
women are met, cannot be separated from the historical 'success' of claims to a
family wage by adult men. Independence, then, is not an 'independent' category.
Where it is defined in material terms in the youth literature, the definition is
vague and entails a uniform notion of adult status being gradually achieved
through the receipt of a secure wage. However, the longitudinal definition of
transitions to adult status as a combination of life cycle events entails more than
simply a transition from dependence to independence. For example, the
'independence' enabled by a youth wage is partial, and contemporary household
structures standardly enable dependent young adults to be net consumers where
the costs of their day to day living are subsidised by their parents. The
'independence' signalled by parenthood implies the need for access to resources
sufficient to care for dependents. In short, transitions through these domestic life
cycle events do not simply label a 'more complete' independence, but entail
changing circumstances with respect to the organisation of social claims and
obligations. Further, developing an explanation of life course transitions in terms
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of social claims and obligations allows us to explore male and female transitions
to adulthood as aspects of an integrated dynamic. In youth research, women are
represented as being excluded from male forms of advantage because of their
particular position in the family and their relation to childbearing and childcare.
However, this approach neglects the ways in which aspects of 'male advantage' are
predicated precisely on their own, particular, relationship to domestic obligations.
Defining both youth and adult statuses in terms of social and economic claims and
obligations is theoretically coherent. Youth and adulthood, then, are located in
the same conceptual framework. Rather than seeing them simply as different
statuses, such an approach allows us to explore the ways they are interrelated.
Acknowledging the interrelatedness of dependence and 'independence',
where the latter may entail the means to resourcing dependent kin, also enables
a dynamic understanding of change in life cycle structures. The youth debate is,
after all, a debate about the changing nature of claims by youth to independence.
However, the emphasis on changes in labour demand in the youth literature has
not been accompanied by a parallel interest in changes in household structure.
There has been little interest in the processes underlying the development of
'youth' as a significant life cycle stage, or in the changing ways in which youth,
as a period of semi-dependency, is resourced, other than in terms of its direct
access to employment-based earnings. Recent generations of youth and young
adults have grown up in a period of increasingly parent centred obligations to
household resourcing. This, historically recent, dispensation of the young from the
sharing of economic obligations for maintaining their parental household is part
of the background to contemporary studies of the transition to adult status, yet
such studies barely address the processes by which changing household structures
have enabled youth as a period of semi-autonomous independence, partly
underwritten by the income of parents. These processes demonstrate the
interaction of labour demand and labour supply side structures and are outlined
below.
The patterning of income over the family life cycle demonstrates an
historical continuity with relative poverty occurring around the family building
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period and in old age, and relative affluence occurring during middle age. In their
study of intergenerational income mobility, based on a 1970s follow-up survey of
families interviewed by Rowntree in York in 1950, Atkinson and his colleagues
present data which manifests a life cycle related profile of relative wealth and
poverty, similar to that identified by Rowntree in his 1899 study of poverty.
(Atkinson, et al, 1983). The reasons underlying the general pattern, however, have
changed. At the turn of the century relative affluence occurred in the middle
years because children had begun earning, and contributing substantially to
household income maintenance. In the latter part of the twentieth century the
financial contributions of children are less important. The most important factor
influencing relative affluence in the middle years is identified by the authors as
mothers' employment (Atkinson, et al, 1983).
The most significant aggregate change in women's employment patterns
this century has been the increased participation rate. This is acounted for largely
by the amount of time spent in employment over the life cycle, a period which has
increased dramatically in association with the reduction in the time spent
childbearing. Thus, there are many more women in the labour force at any one
point in time. Fertility declined significantly in the inter-war period, in part
because of the imbalanced sex ratio following the first world war but also because
improvements in infant survival rates, and extended periods of familial
dependence by young people, meant that children had become an economic
burden rather than an asset to their parents (Gittins, 1982. Also cf. Banks, 1954,
on declines in fertility amongst the Victorian middle classes as this related to
rising aspirations; and Lewis, 1980, on declining fertility amongst the working class
through the early decades of the twentieth century). Low fertility rates in the
inter-war years meant smaller cohorts of new entrants to the labour force in the
1940s and 1950s. Economic growth and an increasing demand for labour faced
labour supply side shortages. High marriage rates and a trend to younger ages at
marriage and childbirth after the Second World War further reduced the
population of single women from which employers could recruit. Employers
turned increasingly to the recruitment of married women (Tilly and Scott, 1978).
Compression in the ages of childbearing also have been identified as an important
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supply side factor in the rise of female participation rates since the 1950s. Whilst
the overall female participation rate doubled between 1921 and 1981, the married
women's participation rate increased from 12% in 1931 to 57% in 1981 (Joshi,
1990).
These processes are essential to understanding the structure of
contemporary households, and they demonstrate the interaction of economic and
demographic processes. The domestic 'sphere' interacts with economic processes
not just in relation to daily resourcing but also in relation to fertility patterns,
and to the restructuring of households and the composition of the family. Perhaps
at first sight the changes described merely underline the current position of youth
as a period of semi-dependency, partly enabled by an historically small typical
family size and by the high labour force participation rate of middle aged
mothers. However, it is an argument of this thesis that changes in gendered
patterns of employment and rewards over the life cycle are bound up with recent
patterns of delay in household and family formation. The relationship between
economic and demographic changes is not merely 'historical background' but part
of the substance of a restructuring of transitions from youth to adulthood.
Some authors have hinted at a recent decline in the relative economic
value of the 'traditional' male breadwinner wage (Humphries and Rubery, 1984).
The significance of female earnings to household income maintenance is
sometimes described in terms of the importance of female employment for
keeping a percentage of families out of poverty. For example, Bruegel notes, after
the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (Research
Report 6, 1978), that when wives do not work in paid employment the chances of
a family being in poverty are one in three. In contrast, in families where wives
work the chances of being in poverty are one in fourteen (Bruegel, 1986).
However, there seem to be few studies of historical changes in the significance of
the relative contributions of household members to household resourcing. Those
empirical analyses that exist, in fact suggest evidence of generational continuities
in the relative contributions of male and female partners in household income
maintenance (eg. Rainwater et al, 1986; Joshi, 1990). Such analyses, based on
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aggregate level data, are misleading. Changing patterns of earnings indicate that
female contributions are, indeed, increasingly important to household resourcing,
and particularly so in relation to household formation. This evidence is explored
in detail in a later chapter. It is highlighted here in order to stress the
shortcomings of arguments which maintain continuity in patterns of gender
inequality, and which simultaneously compromise an adequate understanding of
change in patterns of transition to adult status.
To summarise, this chapter has traced developments in the youth debate,
focusing in particular on research into the consequences of economic change for
patterns of transition from youth to adulthood. Research conducted through the
1980s, in the wake of the employment crisis at the beginning of the decade,
explored a hypothesis that lack of employment or security amongst a significant
section of the youth populationwould give rise to extended periods of dependency
at the parental home and to a disruption in the ability of young people to attain
independence and adult lifestyles. Earlier interest in the transition from school to
work was replaced by a concern with biographical trajectories, and the relation
between labour force careers on the one hand and the timing of domestic life
cycle transitions on the other hand. Despite this focus, research has failed to
specify adequately the relation between employment processes and life cycle
structures. This problem lies behind the contradictions which characterise
descriptions of the consequences of economic change for patterns of transition
from youth to adulthood.
Such research has left itself open to the charge of a failure to locate youth,
as described in the last chapter. There a number of reasons which underlie this
failure. Firstly, whilst writers stress the significance of life cycle events, most
studies of youth and transition operate with a sample defined in relation to age,
rather than in relation to those life cycle events. This results in a tension between
a concern with the consequences of economic change for youth as a life cycle
period, suggesting that the age boundaries of youth may be subject to change, and
a framework which ties youth to a given range of ages. Secondly, the question of
change in the timing of life cycle events has been explored principally in relation
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to 'new forms' of disadvantage, in particular uenmployment, but with an
inadequate concept of the relationship between hypotheses of delay in the timing
of independence, marriage and parenthood and the processes underlying general
patterns of deferral in the timing of these events since the mid-1970s. Thirdly,
whilst the focus of research on life cycle trajectories is a positive development, the
frameworks offered are still too narrowly defined to provide a basis adequate to
the task of explaining change in the organisation of transitions from youth to adult
status. The emphasis on biographical trajectories has led to the foregrounding of
dependency and transitions through domestic life cycle events, and to a neglect
of their relationship to independence and obligation. The literature would seem
to suggest that dependence is socially constructed, yet independence and adult
status are largely taken for granted, as a straightforward outcome of attaining a
secure wage and adult lifestyles through family formation and parenthood. The
notion of a secure wage, or of employment which would underpin 'normal' rites
of passage to adulthood, is undertheorised in the literature, and appears to be an
ahistorical concept. This not only has significant consequences for explanations
of how gender related differences in transition are organised but it also limits
explanations of change in the social organisation of transitions to adulthood.
Before looking in detail at the elements of an integrated analytical framework,
which would address the historical interaction of family organisation and
employment processes, I will examine another area of youth research, into
employment restructuring and change in youth employment opportunities. The
next chapter explores these issues and argues that the related research mirrors the
problems of the transition literature, where the interest in youth as a life cycle
stage, and the relative neglect of employment relations, is transposed into a
position where employment relations are central, but youth, as a life cycle stage,
defined in terms of age, is taken for granted.
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3. Employment, Training and the Experience of Youth
Introduction
Research into the consequences of employment restructuring has been
characterised by a division of academic labour. Studies of youth and early
adulthood have been organised around hypotheses of change in domestic life cycle
transitions or around the restructuring of the youth labour market. The former
research, described in the last chapter, defines itself in relation to changes in
employment opportunities amongst youth, exploring their consequences for
experiences of transition to adult status. The latter research, into youth labour
markets, has focused on processes of employment restructuring and changes in the
demand for youth labour. Such research traces the implications of economic
changes, both national and global, for youth employment opportunities, and has
highlighted their association with increasing inequality in life chances across the
British population since the late 1970s. The first part of this chapter continues the
review begun in the last chapter but the focus here is on studies of youth in the
labour market rather than on studies of domestic life cycle transitions. I have
argued that the theoretical division between these spheres is one which obscures
the nature of change in the experience of youth. The emphasis of this and the last
chapter lies with these divisions only in order to clarify their particular features
and in an attempt to establish the value of an approach which places centrally the
historical interdependence of the 'spheres' of production and reproduction. It is
to the task of developing an historically located understanding of youth as a life
cycle stage which the thesis turns in later chapters.
Labour market segmentation theory has been developed by a number of
authors in their descriptions of change in youth employment opportunities
(Ashton et al, 1990; Lee et al, 1987). Part of the reason for this appears to lie
with a theoretical inclination towards structural, employment-demand led,
explanations of inequality. In a segmentationist framework, gender and age are
recognised as important dimensions of inequality. Their significance is seen to
stem from the organisation of household circumstances and constraints. As
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explanations of employment inequality, however, they are invoked at the point at
which people 'enter the labour market', or in relation to this life cycle transition
point through, for example, gender socialisation. Position within the family is seen
as a constraint on access to certain types of employment. Ironically, through a
framework which appears at first sight to challenge individualist explanations of
inequality, household circumstance becomes simply another attribute which
individuals bring to the labour market. Further, segmentationist approaches to
youth employment opportunities operate with a taken-for-granted definition of
youth as a life cycle stage. This is highlighted by the essentially static character
of a division between youth and adult labour markets which is a feature of youth
labour market research. The interest in labour force trajectories is sustained only
up to this division, beyond which youth 'graduates' to adult forms of employment.
However, if young people are still partially dependent on others for their
livelihoods or without extensive financial commitments of their own and can
thereby afford to take low paying jobs, a trajectory approach which stops when
'youth' become 'adult' neglects a particularly interesting dimension of change in
the experience of youth and transitions to adult status.
The youth literature has drawn on developments in labour market
segmentation theory directed at explaining patterns of gender inequality in
employment. The next section describes these developments and considers some
difficulties presented by recent empirical analyses in the area. Similar difficulties
are reflected in youth labour market theories and are taken up in the subsequent
discussion.
Labour Market Theories
Dissatisfactionwith orthodox economic models of socioeconomic inequality
has led several authors to develop arguments that the labour market is
segmented, or organised around barriers to labour mobility. Important to both
approaches is the relationship between labour demand and supply. In orthodox,
neoclassical analyses of the labour market, all commodities, including labour, are
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seen as homogeneous economic units whose prices are a function of their scarcity
and their marginal productivity (del Mercato, 1981). With respect to labour,
differences in price, or wage inequalities, are seen to stem from the characteristics
of individual workers, who compete freely in the labour market. In this approach,
earnings differences are seen to measure inequalities in the quality of labour,
whose productivity is largely dependent on its acquisition of human capital
(Rubery, 1988). Most criticisms of orthodox theory focus on its assumptions of
open competition between workers. Segmentation theory formalises the
importance of institutional barriers to labour mobility, that is of barriers to a
market equilibrium where rewards to employment would be in line with a
worker's market value.
Early, dualistic versions of segmentation theory focused on the demand
side of the labour market distinguishing between primary and secondary labour
markets (eg. Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Piore, 1975). White, male, middle class
workers are associated with the internal labour markets and career ladders which
characterise primary sector employment, and women, young people and older
workers, ethnic minorities and the disadvantaged working class are associated with
secondary sector jobs characterised by low pay, poor conditions and high turnover.
This characterisation of the employment circumstances of young workers implies
that all primary sector workers have spent some time in the secondary sector, a
life cycle aspect to employment careers which is rarely addressed by segmentation
theorists. Dual labour market theory has been criticised for its crude
characterisation of labour market structure, its stress on labour demand over
labour supply side factors, and the interpretation of divisions between labour
market segments in terms of a capitalist conspiracy to divide and rule the labour
force (Rubery, et al 1984). The emphasis on demand side processes has been
criticised for understating the importance of reproductive processes, or the way
in which the resourcing of daily life is organised (del Mercato, 1981; Humphries
and Rubery, 1984). Processes of reproduction, in particular the organisation of the
family, and of waged and unwaged labour, underlie a heterogeneous wage labour
force. In this argument, the broad divisions of labour which characterised family
organisation since industrialisation, and most markedly so during the interwar
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period of the twentieth century, have been embodied in a system where
employment rewards are patterned in relation to claims by men for a family wage
(Pahl, 1984; Land, 1980; Barrett, 1980; Brenner and Ramas, 1984; Humphries and
Rubery, 1984). Much of the literature here focuses on the dualisms which are
part of the Marxist-Feminist debates on the relation between gendered forms of
opportunity and inequality and the dynamics of capital accumulation. Women's
lower earnings are explained in relation to expectations of their, at least partial,
dependency on male earnings. Thus, jobs may be low paid, or classified as low
skilled, on the basis not of technical content or the product market characteristics
of firms, but because they are performed by female labour or by unqualified
labour (Rubery, 1988). In other words the market model, barriers or not, is an
inadequate statement of how women standardly come to have lower remuneration
from employment than do most men. The model operates with a division between
labour supply and labour demand, and segmentation theory considers that certain
groups are allocated to particular labour market segments on the basis of their
perceived attributes. However, if labour demand and rewards to employment are
patterned in relation to the costs of labour then the treatment of supply and
demand as autonomous structures must be called into question. Humphries and
Rubery criticise divisions made by segmentation theorists between pre- and in-
market segmentation, where social, pre-market inequalities and divisions are
invoked but not adequately explained. They argue that:
".. if [labour suppy] differences are in fact endogenously determined by, for
example, different current opportunities for market work and differences in
family organisation resulting from historical differences in income earnings
opportunities, then labour supply cannot be taken as independent of demand
side variables and an historical interactive analysis of the relationship between
production and reproduction must be undertaken" (Humphries and Rubery,
1984, p.334)
However, in an attempt to operationalise the argument in an empirical
study of employers' policies and recruitment decisions, rather than, as might be
expected, locating these strategies in relation to more general social processes,
Rubery allows that some continuity exists between employers' recruitment
decisions and labour supply inequalities, yet maintains that women 'have already
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been categorised in the social and economic sphere as relatively disadvantaged
workers' (1988, p.274). The division between pre-market segments and labour
market processes is thereby reproduced in her analysis, where employer
recruitment decisions are no longer located with respect to the interaction of
social and economic processes but take on an explanatory force of their own. In
consequence, it is difficult to sustain the argument that labour supply and demand
structures are integral to one another, and the claim that labour supply
inequalities and demand processes interact in a dynamic relationship becomes
suspended in her analysis of current processes:
the structuring or segmentation of the labour supply has been recognised to
be itself in part the outcome of policies of recruitment, pay and promotion
adopted by firms; women are available at low wages and relatively high
efficiency because of the exclusion of women from large areas of the
employment system. Thus the breaking of the direct link between current
labour market demand and current labour market supply still allows for
recognition of interdependency in an historical or long period sense" (Burchell
and Rubery, 1989, p.4).
The central argument in the revised segmentation model, of the
inseparability of productive and reproductive processes, becomes merely the
historical context of empirical analysis. This need to 'bracket off the explanatory
claims of the earlier theoretical statement stems from a model of employers as
gatekeepers where recruitment decisions are seen as constitutive of employment
inequalities. Originally, for Humphries and Rubery, an explanation of such
inequalities required an analysis of coherent social relations, and of the
organisation of the reproduction of labour. By treating ensuing inequalities as
already determined they become static, their continuity explained only in relation
to employers' recruitment strategies. Here, and, as we will see, in youth labour
market theory, the salience of reproductive processes, and the associated
endeavour towards a unified understanding of employment inequalities, are
pushed into the wings as writers focus on the particular features of labour market
segments.
Like women, youth are often seen to hold a distinct set of labour market
characteristics which give them restricted access to adult male employment
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opportunities. In the case of women, it is their particular relation to childbearing
and childrearing which are seen as constraints to equality of opportunity in
employment. However, changes in these relations, for example the reorganisation
of female labour force participation over the life cycle, are neglected because
gender itself becomes treated as a principle of employment inequality. Similarly,
as we will see, youth is not considered in terms of the social relations which
constitute its particular character. Rather, youth as an age group appears as the
principal dimension around which labour demand is organised. Interest in change
amongst youth relates to its particular circumstances and prospects but in the
absence of a theory of change in the social relations of youth the category
acquires a static character. Consequently such theories do not address change in
youth and transition as life cycle stages.
Central to recent research into the 'youth labour market' is the concern
with economic and institutional changes and their consequences for youth
employment through the 1980s. Part of what is at stake for contributors to the
debates about the impact of recession, the growth of the Youth Training Scheme
and industrial and occupational restructuring is how best to characterise the
nature of change in youth employment opportunities, and their relationship to the
general pattern of socioeconomic polarisation which occurred through the 1980s.
The following sections consider research into change in youth labour markets and
debates over the relation of YTS to the general labour market. Paradoxically,
approaches which operate with a division between youth and adult, in order to
explore change in the former, become caught in a static analytical framework. To
move beyond this requires a reappraisal of the social organisation of dependency
and obligation, structures which are reflected in patterns of transition from youth
to adult lifestyles.
Structural and Cyclical Change and the Youth Labour Market
The reorganisation of youth employment opportunities through the 1980s
has been heavily contested (Raffe, 1986; 1987; Ashton and Maguire, 1986;
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Ashton, Maguire and Spilsbury, 1987; 1990). A central issue in the debate is
whether demand for youth labour is contingent on general labour demand, or
whether school leavers enter a youth labour market distinct from the adult
market. In the former case, labour demand processes are seen to increase the
vulnerability to unemployment of youth relative to adults. Unemployment has a
cyclical nature, and during economic recession the slowing of new recruitment and
the operation of last-in first-out policies has a disproportionate effect on levels of
youth unemployment. During economic upturn, in this argument, youth are
recruited more rapidly than other groups. These processes are represented by a
job queue model, where youth are understood to be subject to the same processes
as adults, but differently located in their attractiveness to employers depending
on macro economic circumstances (Raffe, 1987). The empirical evidence for this
argument is derived mostly from analyses of the relative concentration of youth
in declining industries, which suggest that those sectors which declined the most
rapidly during the recession of the early 1980s did not hold a disproportionate
share of young employees. Raffe illustrates his argument through an analysis of
change in employment rates across industries. Using data from the Scottish School
Leavers Survey for 1979 and 1983, he argues that the decline in school leaver
employment was a consequence of a heavy reduction in the recruitment of school
leavers within industries, rather than a consequence of a disproportionate
concentration of youth in contracting industries (Raffe, 1984; see also Main and
Raffe, 1983). Raffe is critical, then, of arguments which insist that structural
change in youth employment has occurred, resulting in a permanent decline in
youth employment opportunities (Raffe, 1986, 1987).
Ashton and his colleagues are critical of Raffe's analysis, and of his
argument that economic upturn would see a rapid rise in the recruitment of
school leavers, mirroring the decline in youth employment during recession. They
repeat Raffe's use of shift share analysis in assessing the pattern of losses and
gains of youth jobs across industries and occupations and the extent to which this
is a consequence of change in the general demand for labour, or of change in the
industrial and occupational structure. Their evidence, drawn from the Labour
Force Survey, suggests that Raffe's aggregated analysis obscures different patterns
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of change in the organisation of employment amongst young men and women. For
young men in particular, changes during the recession and since have had negative
consequences. The authors argue that recession contributed to structural changes
in the youth labour market, having long run consequences for the nature of youth
employment opportunities. Using a measurement of the relative concentration of
16 to 19 year olds across industrial orders and occupational sectors the authors
criticise job queue theories. Their analysis of Labour Force Survey data suggests
that there was a continued decline in the relative proportion of youths employed
in most industrial sectors through the recession and early economic recovery,
between 1979 and 1984. Across occupations the measure suggests a decline in
youth employment in the higher level occupations and an increase in the lower
level ones, particularly in clerical employment for young men, and in selling and
catering and cleaning both for young men and young women. They suggest that
the extensive use of youth training measures in these sectors were partly
responsible for job growth there. Changes in the organisation of production, in
particular technological change and the rationalisation of labour, were responsible
for a loss of many skilled and semi-skilled manual jobs in the manufacturing
sectors (Ashton et al, 1990).
Data gathered in a survey of young adults, aged between 18 and 24,
conducted by the authors in the early 1980s across four English towns, illustrate
the extent of the decline in manual, particularly skilled manual, occupations. The
percentage of men in the sample employed in skilled manual employment two
years after their minimum school leaving age, fell from 44% to 14% between 1975
and 1981. Employment in semi- and unskilled jobs declined from 15% and 13%
of the 1974/75 cohort to 11% and 3% of the 1980/81 cohort. Amongst young
women the largest single occupational group at both points was in clerical work,
declining from 21% to 13% of employment amongst eighteen year olds over the
period. The largest single labour force status in 1981 was unemployment,
accounting for 45% of the 18 year old young men and 30% of the 18 year old
young women interviewed, although a further 13% of the younger female cohort
defined themselves as being out of the labour force altogether (Ashton et al,
1990).
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The authors, then, are critical of models of cyclical change in employment
demand and argue that youth employment opportunities changed irrevocably over
the decade to the mid-1980s. Economic recession contributed to change and may
have quickened its pace, but its consequences were not separable from those of
a more general economic restructuring. In particular the authors stress the
position of British industry in relation to global product markets and the changing
international division of labour. In part the rise of transnational corporations and
the associated new management strategies have loosened the relation between
national product demand and the level of demand for labour. The recession
accelerated a longer term restructuring of companies' labour strategies, a process
which has led to the spread of flexible work practices and the growth of casual
and part time labour and the use of subcontracting. The authors argue that these
processes, along with the growth of technology, have had profound consequences
for youth employment opportunities. In particular there has been a decline in
'traditional' routes of entry into employment, not least through the collapse of
manufacturing industry, with a severe decline of employment opportunities for
minimum age school leavers. Further there have been shifts in the composition
of labour market segments as employers have switched between different types
of labour. In the service sector the growth of part-time jobs and preferences for
older, married, female workers has in many cases meant the further displacement
of youth jobs. The growth of youth unemployment and of YTS have meant a
diverse set of responses by employers to these changed circumstances (Ashton et
al 1990).
It is not the intention here to try and resolve the disagreements over the
causes of youth unemployment. It seems that the authors may not be so
irreconcilably at odds with each other as they maintain. Raffe concedes that
during the early 1980s the demand for young workers may have changed in non-
cyclical ways as youth unemployment has increased in its duration, and may
permanently affect the life chances of disadvantaged groups in the relevant
cohorts; that macro economic processes may have changed, and that government
training and employment policies may have encouraged employers to structure
recruitment more along age lines than hitherto (Raffe, 1987). Further, both Raffe,
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and Ashton and his colleagues, examine the period 1979 to 1984, which appears
to be a rather narrow time span for analytical confirmation or rejection of Raffe's
argument that economic recovery will underwrite the reabsorption of youth into
employment. Lastly, the argument by Raffe that recession underlay the massive
rise in youth unemployment in the early 1980s is not necessarily incompatible with
the argument by Ashton and his colleagues that recession was accompanied by
industrial reorganisation which altered the structure of demand for young workers.
Segmentation and Transition
L Youth and Adult Labour Markets
The argument of significant and permanent changes in youth employment
opportunities raises questions concerning the relation between youth and adult
employment and concerning the nature of employment trajectories. It is here,
however, that a segmentationist perspective and the focus on a distinct youth
labour market provides only a partial description. Ashton and his colleagues
provide an interesting and detailed account of change in patterns of employment
amongst young adults. This is set out in relation to particular occupational groups,
or labour market segments, defined by the authors as covering professional,
administrative and managerial occupations, clerical occupations, skilled manual
occupations and semi- and unskilled occupations. Each of these segments, the
authors maintain, manifest a dual, gendered, opportunity structure. The labour
market consequently comprises eight segments (Ashton et al, 1990).
Age is understood to be another central dimension along which the labour
market is organised. The authors argue that the significance of age discrimination
in shaping the labour market has been largely neglected. Much here turns on
employers' recruitment policies. Employers are seen to differentiate types of
labour, principally on the basis of qualifications, gender and age, and through
their recruitment decisions, to allocate labour force groups into different market
segments with very different prospects for career advancement. These segments
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are represented as clusters of occupations into which young people tend to get
'locked' after entry, with mechanisms operating to restrict movement across
segments. Segments are created in part by employers' recruitment strategies, by
legal requirements (eg. under 18s cannot work shift systems, under 17s cannot do
driving jobs), and by union pressures, for example restrictions on age of entry into
apprenticeships. The general structure of the youth labour market, then, is one
in which more jobs become available as young people grow older, although
sectors into which young adults (defined by the authors as between 18 and 24) can
enter from outside are limited. By the age of 18, those who have not obtained a
formal training are excluded froms large parts of the labour market (Ashton and
Maguire, 1986; Ashton et al, 1990).
How, then, are particular labour force groups typed and defined as
appropriate labour by employers? The authors are critical of neoclassical
treatments of labour as an undifferentiated commodity and stress the significance
of sex and age discrimination in structuring the labour force. One of the most
important sources of such discriminination is the way in which employers perceive
worker characteristics as these relate to the position a person occupies in the
domestic division of labour and in the life cycle:
"It is the ability of employers to enforce their definitions of worker
characteristics that provides one of the most important mechanisms linking the
position a person occupies in the family to their position in the labour market
(Ashton et al, 1990; p. 76).
The authors acknowledge the influence to their own work of members of
the Cambridge Labour Market Studies Group (Rubery et al., 1984; Wilkinson,
1981). However these writers' critique of the theoretical division between pre-
market 'social' inequalities and in-market 'economic' inequalities is not developed
(eg. Humphries and Rubery, 1984).1 Ashton and his colleagues stress change in
the access of young people to different job opportunities but do not consider
together the organisation of rewards to youth and change in the meaning of youth
as a life cycle stage. The influence by the Labour Market Studies Group, as
acknowledged by Ashton and his colleagues, appears to relate to their shared
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emphasis on macro economic change and the position of Britain in the global
economy, and the significance of technological change for patterns of employment
at a national level, but not to issues concerning the interdependence of labour
supply and labour demand structures. Household and family circumstances are
seen by Ashton and his colleagues as constraints to equal participation in the
labour market. Position within the family, through institutional constraints and
discriminatory recruitment practices, appears as another attribute which
individuals bring to the labour market. The family as a social institution is treated
ahistorically. Thus, the authors address changes in the relative demand by capital
for different types of labour but they do not discuss the social construction of such
labour force groups nor, importantly, changes in the relations between them.
However, changes in household structure and the division of labour
amongst its members appear to be important to changing patterns of, and rewards
to, employment. For example, the growth in part-time work amongst older
women, which Ashton and his colleagues see as displacing youth jobs in the
service sector, cannot be separated from the increasing availability and preference
for work of women through the post war period. By treating gender
unproblematically, as a description of employment inequality, any changes in
gendered relations in employment are elided. Similarly, youth is treated as a 'type'
of labour, but its meaning as a life cycle stage is treated obliquely. The majority
of those aged 18 to 24 have no dependents of their own and many are partly
dependent on others for the day to day reproduction of their lifestyles. The age
group itself covers a diverse set of social relations with respect to household
circumstances. Whilst relations of dependency and independence are implicit to
the definition of youth, it is youth as an age group which counts in Ashton's
definition of a distinct youth labour market.
Unfortunately, the authors cannot explore the patterning or timing of
transitions to the 'adult labour market' in relation to domestic circumstances.
They define as 'adult jobs' those from which young people (16-18) are excluded
on the grounds of age, and youth jobs as those which have sheltered access for
young people (eg. apprenticeships) or those where young and older workers
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compete. On this definition, their data reveals that of 18 year olds, 94% held
youth jobs and 6% held adult jobs; and of 24 year olds, 53% held adult jobs. This
distribution clearly reflects the salience of life cycle trajectories to employment
processes. It would be interesting, here, to know in more detail the circumstances
of those in youth and adult jobs, and the pattern of movement between 'youth'
and 'adult' jobs as it relates to domestic circumstances. How did the almost even
split between such jobs amongst 24 year olds relate to class location and to
domestic obligations? The authors note that only 11% of their male respondents
were married. That they tended to show greater occupational stability after a life
cycle event such as marriage or parenthood the authors see as partly underlying
the exclusion, by employers, of young employees from a large part of the labour
market. Further, they suggest that amongst young adults, the absence of
responsibilities allows them to move more freely between jobs. This evidence is
indicative of the salience of domestic circumstances not only to age related
differences across occupations, but also to the patterns of movement through
occupations.
Associated with the definition of youth as a 'type' of labour, defined
principally in relation to labour demand and separated from the social relations
through which it takes on its characteristics as a life cycle stage, is the lack of
specificity in descriptions of labour force trajectories between youth and adult
labour markets. For young people, according to Ashton, the transition to the adult
labour market "will be made automatically as a result of the ageing process"
(Ashton et al, 1990, p. 170). After Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn (1980) the
authors invoke the concept of 'upward drift' to describe the processes by which
movement between first and subsequent occupations shifts the population into
better paying and more prestigious occupations. Ashton and his colleagues explain
this pattern in relation to the exclusion of young people from senior jobs, and in
terms of the decline in less skilled jobs in the youth labour market, a structural
effect which points to a difference between cohorts (Ashton et al 1990).
The authors also point to household relations as having some significance
for occupational mobility. For example, they see family formation as having
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important implications for the behaviour of young adults, and note that across
their sample of young adults, 24 year olds were almost twice as likely as 18 year
olds to mention 'more money' as their reason for making a job move. This
example suggests that a pattern of job movement may be related to domestic
circumstances, but this relationship, pointed to by the authors, is not taken up in
their analysis. Rather, patterns of job movement are seen as more firmly dictated
by the labour market and processes of age discrimination. Such processes then are
firmly located with respect to labour demand but the salience of labour supply
side structures is not integrated within their analysis. Whilst the authors point to
forms of occupational segregation which distinguish youth and adult labour
markets, they do not analyse the differing rewards which accrue to jobs across the
'markets'. However, a patterning of rewards in relation to life cycle stages suggests
that the potential value of an analysis of the relation between labour force
trajectories on the one hand and domestic life cycle trajectories and the
organisation of dependency and obligation on the other.
For Ashton and his colleagues, the distinctness of youth and adult labour
markets is attested to by age related segregation across employment sectors. They
note the skewed nature of the industrial composition of youth employment. The
authors treat age related differences across employment sectors as evidence of a
segmented labour market. However, an examination of the earnings associated
with the industrial sectors suggests a pattern which is consonant with patterns of
movement over the life cycle into higher paying jobs. The young adult respondents
of the authors' surveys were heavily concentrated into 5 industrial sectors,
specifically in the Distributive Trades, Miscellaneous Services, Professional and
Scientific Services, Clothing and Footwear, and Public Administration. These
sectors, notably, are amongst the lowest paying industries. Data from the New
Earnings Survey for 1988 shows that of 25 industrial sectors, for male full time
manual workers, only two industries pay less per hour than any of the five sectors
in which Ashton's sample is concentrated. The lower paying sectors are the Hotel
and Catering sector (which appears anyway to be bracketed by the authors
alongside distributive trades), and Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. Amongst full
time non-manual males the gross hourly earnings of those in professional and
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scientific services compare quite well with other industries. However, amongst the
remaining industries, all except construction have significantly higher average
earnings than those associated with youth labour. Amongst full time manual
females, of 14 sectors the six lowest paying are Hotel and Catering, Clothing and
Footwear, Retail Distribution, Textiles, Professional and Scientific Services and
Miscellaneous Services. Amongst full time non-manual women the relation
between youth entry and lower paying sectors is less clear, with Professional and
Scientific Services and Miscellaneous Services both lying amongst the higher
paying of the 13 industrial sectors. However, it is amongst young men in particular
that we might expect patterns of job movement into higher paying jobs, reflecting
the accumulation of domestic financial obligations. In other words, young people
are concentrated in lower paying industries.
Whilst the association between earnings and age is commensurate with
different explanations, its very existence calls into question the treatment of youth
and adult labour markets as structurally distinct entities. The significance of
changes in the economic position of young people described by Ashton and his
colleagues, suggests a reorganisation of the labour force trajectories on which
young people embark. They argue that household circumstances relate to position
within the labour market through employers' appraisals of potential workers on
the basis of their perceived attributes. This 'gatekeeping' function shapes access
to different occupations and different career routes. However, the interest in the
salience of domestic circumstances to employment inequality might better go
beyond questions of access, which leave intact a notion of the reward structure
dictated by economic and technological exigencies, to a consideration of the
relation between the domestic division of labour and the patterning of rewards
to employment (cf. Garnsey, 1982). Rewards to employment are not independent
of the social relations of labour. If young people standardly earn less than adult
labour, yet are simultaneously partly dependent on the latter, as parents, for
resourcing their lifestyles, then changes in patterns of demand for, and rewards
to, youth labour raise questions about its relationship to adult labour. One might
expect, too, that any changes in this relationship would necessarily be reflected
in the organisation of trajectories from youth to adulthood.
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Earlier I argued that problems which characterise general labour market
segmentation theories have been reproduced in descriptions of a youth labour
market. One of the central problems identified by Humphries and Rubery was the
way in which 'cruder' versions of segmentation theory take 'pre-market' labour
supply side divisions as given, rather than as an integral aspect of employment
processes (Humphries and Rubery, 1984). However, the revised versions end by
reproducing the same divisions, accepting as given, prior, 'social', inequalities.
Thus Burchell and Rubery accept that, on entering the labour market, women are
already categorised as disadvantaged, that is, secondary, workers. Similarly,
Ashton and his colleagues accept age as a pre-given dimension of labour market
inequality. However, in so doing, they neglect to consider the ways in which
changes in age related inequalities are bound up with change in employment
structures. The framework of distinct youth and adult labour markets leads to
a position where changes in the former are assessed in isolation from the latter.
In part this is a consequence of the stress in the associated literature on the
causes of youth unemployment. Ashton and his colleagues see segmentation as a
description of the differential consequences of economic change across age
groups. The significance of change in the relative circumstances of, and
opportunities for, youth, indicated by the writers, would seem to suggest the
possibility of change in the structure of relative poverty and wealth, across the life
cycle, and between age cohorts. However, without a theory of the organisation of
relations across age groups we are left in the dark over change in youth and
transition as life cycle stages.
it Training and employment structures
As an aspect of general changes in the employment circumstances of youth
and young adults there can be no doubt that government training measures and
policies through the 1980s, which encouraged low pay for young workers, have
had a significant impact. Many see the Youth Training Scheme as part of the
more general package of measures which reduced pay amongst young people (eg.
Cockburn, 1987; Finn, 1987). Such measures included, for example, the
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introduction of the Young Workers Scheme in 1982, which paid a subsidy to
employers for employees earning less than £40 a week, and the exclusion of those
under 21 from the protection of the Wages Councils in 1986. YTS, as we have
seen, has often been characterised as a cynical measure by the government to
remove unemployed young people from the register, and as a politically motivated
measure which constructed the problem of youth unemployment in terms of the
shortcomings of youth and of the education system (Rees and Atkinson, 1982;
Finn, 1987; Benn and Fairley, 1986). After Edelman, Solomos has argued that
such measures served a symbolic political function, both in blaming the victim for
unemployment and in reassuring the public that the problem was under control
(Solomos, 1985).
YTS was always principally an employer based scheme, where trainees
were to be provided with work experience and on-the-job training, and a 13 week
component of off-the-job training. Such (Mode A) schemes, organised by
managing agents (employers or groups of employers), operated between 1983 and
1986 and were complemented by Mode B schemes, which ran as community
projects, training workshops or Information Technology Centres, where employer
based schemes could not provide sufficient training places. When YTS was
extended to a two year scheme in 1986 there was an attempt to overcome what
had become a two tier system, with the most disadvantaged youngsters
concentrated into the Mode B schemes, and new funding arrangements meant
that extra funding would be available for those trainees with particular needs, but
within a uniform system of provision.
Because of the employer based nature of the scheme, it does not seem
entirely surprising that YTS has reproduced prior patterns of entry into
employment, whether these follow patterns of gender segregation across
occupations, or post-YTS employment chances which are patterned in relation to
prior educational qualifications. As we will see, such evidence of continuities
underlies tensions in descriptions of YTS as a surrogate labour market. The MSC
estimated that 18800 young people left a YTS scheme in Scotland between April
and August 1986. Of these, 15500 had been on Mode A schemes and the rest on
69
Mode B schemes. In their survey of YTS leavers' labour force status in February
1987, the MSC estimate that 60% of those on Mode A schemes were in
employment, and 25% were unemployed. In contrast, of those who left Training
Workshops, 21% were employed and 61% were unemployed. Information
Technology Centres had a higher rate of employment placement at 50% (MSC,
Office for Scotland, YTS 100% survey).
The ways in which YTS was absorbed into employment processes, yet
replaced a wage with a low, fixed, allowance, suggests that it has been important
to changes in the relative position of young and older workers. Some writers,
however, characterise YTS as a distinct, or 'surrogate' labour market (Lee et al,
1987). Such an approach appears to be bound up with the particular institutional
features of YTS and to neglect the ways in which it has become a part of more
general processes which have undermined the expectation of secure employment
and a wage amongst early school leavers. The significance of such developments
to youth as a life cycle stage is marginal to such descriptions which, like analyses
of youth labour markets discussed above, accept 'youth' as a prior category.
Paradoxically, perhaps, such approaches may understate the significance of the
changes in the experience of youth which have occurred over recent decades.
Lee and his colleagues criticise studies of YTS for keeping too narrow a
focus on the immediate objectives of training policies, and neglecting to locate
such policies in their context of social and economic change. Through their
townwide case study of the impact of YTS, the authors argue that stratification
is an inadequate metaphor for the complexity of socioeconomic inequality.
Segmentation theory, they argue, is more sensitive to socioeconomic diversity,
where both pre- and in-market aspects of inequality interact in shaping life
chances. They maintain that age divisions constitute important axes along which
labour market segments arise. Routes into the labour market are seen to affect
young people's subjective evaluations of work and its rewards. Socialisation into
appropriate orientations is, they maintain, an essential element in the creation
and continuance of segments in the adult economy itself. They argue that
government policies in youth training and employment have restructured the
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period of transition and are essential to understanding inequality and social
divisions as a whole since the significance of YTS extends not just to the life
chances of young workers, but to their values and social perceptions. In this
argument, YTS is seen to have been imposed on employment processes and to
have an independent effect. However, YTS is also seen to be increasingly drawn
into general labour market processes:
"employer based YTS had created a surrogate youth labour market in which,
as one might expect, ties of mutual dependence with the actual labour market
were developing" (Lee et al, 1987, p. 144, original emphasis).
Lee and his colleagues attempt, then, to assess the impact of YTS on general
structures of inequality but see the former as if it were separable from those
structures. To treat YTS as a surrogate labour market suggests a distinctiveness,
but one whose parameters prove difficult to locate. For example, in the survey
conducted by Lee and his colleagues, approximately one third of the YTS intake
possessed 'O' levels. The authors note that better qualified youth had greater
choice over the occupational sector which they enter, and tended to enter firms
with a tradition of systematic training, such as in the engineering industry, or to
enter banking and insurance companies, with the possibility of access to internal
promotion ladders (Lee et al, 1987). Indeed, the partial autonomy of a 'youth
labour market' appears to be called into question by the arguments of the authors
themselves, when they recognise that:
"YTS had .. largely reproduced the segmentation of the actual labour market
in the sense that there were non-competing groups of young people recruited
to YTS and a clear, if complex, hierarchy of schemes, occupations and
placements" (Lee et al, 1987, p. 144).
Several authors have argued that YTS and other government training
schemes have not made a major impact on the number of young people recruited
nor on access to different types of jobs (Ashton and Maguire, 1986; Roberts et al,
1986; Jones, 1984). Roberts and his colleagues argue that the demand for less
qualified school leavers in the early 1980s virtually collapsed, resulting in a
polarisation of employment chances amongst youth. However, the authors argue
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that, within these general processes of change, government training and
employment measures were not altering but rather themselves shaped by these
trends and inequalities in employment (Roberts et al, 1986). For example, 23%
of the establishments in their survey had participated in the Young Workers
Scheme (YWS). This scheme, in which employers were granted a government
subsidy for employing young people so long as wages were beneath a ceiling, set
between the YTS allowance and average youth earnings, was frequently used to
employ young women in unskilled jobs. Only 6% of employers using the YWS in
Roberts' survey had qualified by lowering beginners' rates. The remainder were
already low wage companies, who were benefitting from the YWS subsidy
(Roberts et al, 1987). In general, the authors argue, firms were using or ignoring
schemes depending on their compatibility with existing recruitment and training
practices. There is some tension here with the argument they present of patterns
of change in youth employment, however, where it would seem that government
policies have indeed had some influence in shaping structural change in youth
employment opportunities. In their survey of rates of pay across over 300
employers they note a widening of youth to adult pay differentials since 1979.
They argue that the low pay 'solution' to youth unemployment by the
Conservative government incumbent since 1979 in fact aggravated the problem
of unemployment, since instead of encouraging bridges to adult rates and
occupations it provided an incentive for employers to replace one generation of
beginners with another (Roberts, et al, 1987). Therefore, they argue, low pay and
subsidies helped to retain some jobs on youth labour markets, and these came to
account for a growing proportion of employment accessible to less qualified young
people (Roberts et al, 1987). However, the evidence presented by the authors
suggests that youth training measures themselves have had a limited independent
influence on patterns of recruitment.
From a somewhat different perspective, Main and Shelley question the
extent to which YTS has improved employment outcomes amongst its participants
(Main and Shelley, 1988). The suggestion that training should improve
employment chances amongst its participants is based within a human capital
framework, and is difficult to sustain with any conviction. Through an analysis of
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the employment and earnings of school leavers, Main and Shelley suggest that
YTS increases the probability of employment amongst its participants by 20%,
although as the authors note, the displacement of some teenage jobs by YTS
training positions suggests that this figure overestimates the direct effect. On
earnings, the authors suggest the effect of YTS is 'less clear' than in the case of
recruitment. Former YTS participants earn wages on average 7% less than those
achieved by similarly employed school leavers who had not been on YTS. Wages
to ex-YTS participants were lower in most occupations than those of continuously
employed young adults (Main and Shelley, 1988). Unfortunately, the basis for
comparison between YTS participants and their non-YTS 'peers' is limited, and
because YTS has been used most extensively in lower paying sectors the authors
suggestion that further training is the cause of subsequent low pay to YTS
participants is questionable. It would seem more plausible that YTS is associated
with low paying job routes because it has become the standard route into the
labour force for disadvantaged school leavers, and is attached more extensively
to lower paying employment sectors.
Lee and his colleagues suggest that YTS and other government measures,
through lowering the wages of young people, further lower their expectations as
to what they can earn (Lee et al, 1987; see also Ashton et al, 1990). However, in
this it would be useful to look at the long term relationship between the earnings
of youth and of older workers. Such an analysis is undertaken in a later chapter.
To anticipate the argument which will be elaborated there, national level earnings
data demonstrates a decline in the earnings of young men relative to peak adult
male earnings since the early 1970s. The rate of decline was faster for men in
their twenties than for male teenagers, although post war improvements in
teenage earnings up until the early 1970s had levelled out well before the
introduction of YTS and the recession of the early 1980s. It could therefore be
argued that the context in which the government insisted that young people were
'pricing themselves out of the market' was one in which claims by youth to adult
wages were already being undermined by general processes. Whilst clearly YTS
has had far reaching implications the evidence suggests that it has been absorbed
into general employment processes and become integral to a general restructuring
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of age related claims to employment and earnings commensurate with
independent living.
Hi. YTS and the Survey Employers
The way in which YTS was taken up by different sectors in association with
their prior recruitment and employment policies is well illustrated by the
employment sectors in which my fieldwork was based. The survey of young adults
was conducted in the retailing, insurance and construction industries. As described
in Chapter One, I chose these sectors for the main survey sample partly because
of the diversity of their training strategies and the different relation of YTS to
their recruitment and training policies. In this section I describe the articulation
of YTS with the employment structures of the three sectors, to illustrate some of
the institutional continuities which, along with the processes described in the last
section, call into question the characterisation of YTS as part of a distinct, or
surrogate, labour market.
Each of the three employment sectors has held a different relationship
to YTS since its inception. In sum, construction and insurance industries are
characterised by an extensive period of training, structured around standard
career routes within the sectors. Retailing is characterised by a low level of
training, with requisite skills for performing jobs tasks learned quickly, and by
high levels of turnover and temporary employment. Construction and retailing
sectors are both very important YTS participants, while large insurance firms have
made limited use of YTS. The sectors therefore cover a diverse set of training
practices. Construction and insurance have high levels of skills training and high
and low participation in YTS respectively. Retailing has low levels of skills
training and high participation in YTS. It is suggested that the form of linkage of
YTS to these sectors is dependent upon their longer term recruitment and
promotion strategies, and their respective employment structures. Both
construction and insurance sectors have long periods of training involved in career
routes which are available to a significant proportion of workers who remain
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employed in the sector.
Clearly there is a great deal of variation in the level of promotion achieved
in insurance, especially across male and female employees. However promotion
within internal labour markets is a standard (though not uniform) employment
route for those with continuous participation. YTS has not been avoided by
insurance companies, but neither has it been taken up extensively, and interviews
with employers revealed their ambivalence towards its value. Reasons for lack of
participation were explained by different employers in terms of levels of
qualifications required for entry, set by some companies at five "O" grades or
above, by the burden of administration required by running YTS, by the desire
to offer 'real career jobs', and because of the low pay associated with YTS.
Reasons given for discontinued participation, a feature of one of the companies
in the sample, related to its administrative burden, the desire to avoid pressure
to recruit trainees, and dissatisfaction with the trainees' ability. This pattern of
temporary participation characterised a number of the companies visited. YTS
trainees could not normally progress to take Chartered Institute exams, which
require a minimum of 5 "O" grades. Whilst not explicitly raised by employers, the
structure of a one, and subsequently two year training scheme may not sit easily
with existing training practice and promotion policies within the insurance sector.
The frequent reference to the heavy administrative load associated with running
YTS suggests that it could not be incorporated within existing practices to
employers' satisfaction.
In the building industry completion of a time served apprenticeship is
prerequisite to attaining skilled craft status. Approximately 90% of apprentice
starts achieve full craft status (Construction Industry Training Board, in
discussion). YTS was taken up by the Construction Industry Training Board
(CITB) to augment their apprenticeship training programme. Immediately prior
to YTS the apprenticeship period stood at three years duration. Currently,
training for craft status begins with one year YTS which feeds into a three year
apprenticeship in Scotland and two and a half year apprenticeship in England. In
Britain 60-70% of apprentices come through the YTS route (CITB, in discussion).
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The ability to fit YTS within the apprenticeship system also met a desire by the
CITB and building employers to lengthen the apprenticeship period (CITB and
employers, in discussion).2
In the retailing sector the proportion of young to older employees has
fallen dramatically. Under 18s employed in the sector declined as a percentage
of total retail trade employment from ten to five percent between 1961 and 1981.
This change is partly accounted for by the raising of the school leaving age in
1973. Retailing is still an extremely important employer of young people, with
over 20% of school leavers entering the distributive trades in 1983 (26% of girls
and 18% of boys; figures from Distributive Trades EDC, 1985). Turnover in the
sector is very high with interviewed employers commonly reporting annual rates
of 30-40%. Moves out of the sector by young people are as typical an
employment route as internal career progression. Around 10% of the total
British workforce is employed in the retail sector, compared to around 20% of
school leavers. Of the former, 55% of employees are part time (Distributive
Trades EDC, 1985, figures for 1984) and unlikely to be attached to career routes.
It is suggested that the ease of attaching YTS as a training programme within
existing recruitment criteria (16 year old entry and limited school qualification
requirements) and existing employment structures underlies the breadth of its
take up in the retail sector.
In summary, the evidence suggests that the take up of YTS by employers
was contingent on existing recruitment strategies and employment structures. To
treat YTS as a surrogate labour market seems warranted only to the extent that
it was not directly attached to employment. However, the hierarchy of schemes
of which Lee and his colleagues speak suggests that YTS, through 'reflecting'
general processes, contributed to a general restructuring of the demand for, and
rewards to, youth labour. Theories of the youth labour market have not addressed
problems intrinsic to more general statements on segmented labour forces, and
have reproduced these problems in a new guise. The tendency of the general
segmentation literature to treat disadvantage as a homogeneous attribute of
women is not paralleled in the youth debate, where youth is understood as a
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temporary status covering a spectrum of inequality. However, "youth" is separated
from the adult, or "real" labour market as it is described by Lee and his
colleagues (Lee et al, 1987). In consequence we appear to need different
frameworks for analysing the experience of youth and adulthood. Youth is
equated with an age group yet, paradoxically, the life cycle circumstances which
make such a description meaningful are marginalised. The next section considers
the necessity of rethinking the theoretical categories and divisions through which
youth and the transition to adulthood have been defined.
Summary: Transition and Social Reproduction
This and the last chapter have traced debates which are central to
descriptions of youth and the transition to adult status and which follow two
themes. The first addressed the issue of the social, domestic life cycle
consequences of economic change, the second the consequences of economic
restructuring, and the introduction of YTS, for youth employment opportunities.
These research agendas share problematic assumptions over the nature of youth
and the transition to adulthood as life cycle stages. The research described in the
last chapter has gone furthest in questioning 'common-sense' definitions of youth
as an age category, and has emphasised the life cycle processes through which
chronological age acquires social significance. There, however, adult status is
defined in relation to economic independence. The approach leaves intact a
concept of 'normal' transitions and does not question the social organisation of
occupations and rewards other than where there is a breakdown in standard
expectations, that is, where there is unemployment. Research into youth labour
markets addresses the reorganisation of employment at a general level yet it
assumes the salience to employers of youth as an age category in the structuring
of employment opportunities and rewards. Segmentation analyses commence with
a statement of the salience of the domestic division of labour to understanding
the organisation and reproduction of employment inequalities. In associated
descriptions of youth, relations to the domestic division of labour are recognised
as having some significance to the substance of youth as a life cycle period, but
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the organisation of family relations is marginal to explanations of the causes and
consequences of change in the labour force circumstances of youth. It is argued
that in order to understand change in the organisation and timing of transitions
from youth to adulthood it is necessary to move beyond this dualism between life
cycle processes and domestic circumstances on the one hand, and labour 'market'
or employment processes on the other.
Theory which places centrally the interaction of the spheres of production
and reproduction, and consequently the relationship between labour demand and
labour supply, challenges market based explanations of inequality (Stewart et al,
1985; Humphries and Rubery, 1984). The arguments have been directed
principally at market explanations of gender inequality. Neoclassical approaches
assume that the economic system is neutral with respect to labour supply in the
creation of low paid work, and low pay amongst women is explained by their
lower productivity, imperfect mobility or forms of discrimination in revised
neoclassical formulations (Humphries and Rubery, 1984). Labour market
segmentation theories, which formalise the significance of structural barriers to
occupational mobility, argue that various, extraneous, factors determine labour
supply side inequalities, and the allocation of disadvantaged groups to
disadvantaged jobs. 'Conventional' theories of stratification have been criticised
for treating the occupational structure as a given, a system of rewards whose level
is determined by 'economic' processes, across which different labour force groups
are allocated. Such theories fail to explain how labour supply structure, and the
varying success of claims to resources by different labour force groups, are
implicated fundamentally in the patterning of access to, and rewards from,
employment (cf. Garnsey, 1982; Humphries and Rubery, 1984; Stewart et al.,
1986; Rainwater et al., 1986; Holmwood, 1991). More specifically, labour is
reproduced through the family, or through the domestic division of labour.
Individual workers are not rewarded as if they have equivalent, or even potentially
equivalent, value. Rather, the organisation of rewards to employment is structured
in relation to the costs of reproducing labour, and differing relations to household
income maintenance are important to the structure of employment inequalities.
Whilst the value of such an approach has been demonstrated in analyses of
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gender related inequalities (eg. Garnsey, 1982; Stewart et al., 1986; Siltanen,
1986) there are similarly good, and related, reasons why it is salient to an analysis
of life cycle related inequalities. Such an analysis would acknowledge the mutual
interdependence of domestic circumstances and relations to household resourcing,
and inequalities in access to, and rewards from, employment.
In discussions of domestic life cycle transitions amongst youth and theories
of change in the youth labour market, there is a general acceptance that the
problem for recent cohorts of young people has been one of access to
employment, careers and earnings sufficient to underwrite the attainment of adult
lifestyles and to furnish a decent standard of living. In taking access as the
principle issue there has been little interest in the position of young people in
employment relative to other groups. In the transition literature, described in
Chapter Two, writers have addressed the consequences of change in employment
demand for patterns of dependency and family relations but there has been no
parallel inquiry into the significance of the domestic 'sphere' to the organisation
of employment inequalities. In youth labour market research, domestic
circumstances are seen to be significant to employment inequalities, although
principally amongst women, in terms again of access and constraint to
employment and earnings opportunities, rather than in terms of the substance and
organisation of those opportunities. Neither approach has explored the extent to
which the domestic division of labour, and the resourcing of daily reproduction,
are significant principles in the structuring of inequality and change in
employment relations. Attempts to explore the effects of employment
restructuring on the organisation of life cycle transitions are necessarily partial
since they neglect the ways in which life cycle processes are integral to
employment structures.
In the following chapters an approach which moves beyond the division
between 'economic', employment, processes and 'social', domestic or life cycle
related processes, is developed. An historically rooted understanding of change
in the transition to adult status would reflect the integrated processes through
which the domestic division of labour, or family organisation, and rewards to
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employment are linked. Change in the relative rewards to young adults cannot be
separated from the social relations by which youth, and transitions to adult status,
are resourced. Researchers have neglected to locate youth adequately in terms of
these processes, beyond the question of 'independent' access to employment.
However, changes in family structure and in the family life cycle are of central
importance in shaping contemporary patterns of departure from the parental
home and of family formation. These changes are examined in the next chapter.
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4. Demographic Change and Rites of Passage: Locating 'New' Life
Cycle Transitions
Recent commentators have stressed the significance of the early 1980s to
patterns of change in life cycle transitions, yet they have been vague in their
descriptions of the historical specificity of this period. The emphasis on economic
and government policy changes of the time has been accompanied by comparisons
of recent transitions to adulthood with "normal transitions" seen to have
characterised rites of passage to adulthood during the 1950s and 1960s, and seen
to be a consequence of full employment (Wallace, 1987; Willis 1985). However,
aggregate level changes in demographic event timing, in particular ages at
household and family formation, show delays relative to previous cohorts
beginning not in the 1980s but in the early to mid-1970s. The continuity into the
1990s of trends established two decades previously calls into question the value
of seeing the recession, employment crisis and government policies of the early
1980s as a turning point in the patterning of life cycle transitions amongst young
adults. Rather, the demographic evidence points to the problems which ensue
from failing to properly differentiate hypotheses of delay in the attainment of
adult lifestyles as a consequence of the changed circumstance of the early 1980s
from the practice of delayed family formation which commenced a decade before.
Further, the appeal to "normal transitions" of the 1950s and 1960s as an
appropriate basis for comparison neglects the particular relation between full
employment and life cycle processes during this post war period. Evidence
surrounding the general patterns of delay in the timing of family formation since
the early 1970s suggests that it is necessary to move beyond approximations of
national economic prosperity or decline in order to understand the complexity of
processes underlying changes in the life cycle.
This chapter outlines the historical antecedents to post war patterns of
demographic change, and describes in some detail subsequent changes in life cycle
event timing. Patterns of historical change in the timing of household and family
formation, and explanations of such changes, have been neglected by recent
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sociological research into transition, despite the importance accorded to life cycle
event timing as a measure of change in the attainment of adult status. However,
such evidence would help not only in placing recent patterns, but also in locating
youth and transition, as life cycle stages, in relation to historical change in the
social organisation of reproduction. After describing some of the historical
evidence on change in life cycle structure and family organisation, data gathered
in the surveys is analysed in relation to aggregate level changes. Aspects of
change, in the housing market, in employment security and in the importance of
female careers, are discussed. These have all to varying degrees been identified
as salient to contemporary patterns of transition from youth to adult status.
Another set of issues, concerning resource availability and lifestyle aspirations, are
frequently invoked in explanations of historical changes in the timing of family
formation, as well as family size, but are rarely developed in detail. There is
strong evidence to suggest that the salience of the relationship between resource
availability and lifestyle aspirations for transitions to independence and family
formation is currently bound up with the significance of change in women's labour
force participation over recent decades. This relationship has been largely
neglected, yet it appears to hold a central importance to the shape of
contemporary life cycle transitions. Deserving of an extended treatment, it is
taken up in detail in the next chapter.
Demographic Change and Rites of Passage
L The Making of the 'Modern' Life Cycle
Anderson, in his description of historical change in the individual and family
life cycle, suggests that the 1960s and 1970s might be characterised as embodying
'the modern life cycle' (Anderson, 1985). However, the reversal in the 1970s of
the long term trend to younger ages at family formation gives some aspects of this
characterisation an already dated prospect. Anderson proposes that the historical
tendency towards a clustering of the ages at life cycle events across the population
is the principal feature in the emergence of the modern life cycle. For example,
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in the 1970s most people married within an eight year span, between ages 17 and
25.3 This compares with a spread of twenty years in the mid 19th century and of
seventeen years in 1917 (Anderson, 1985). Further, there has been a marked
reduction in the span over which certain life cycle transitions occur over the life
cycle of individuals. Accompanying the sharp decline in fertility from the mid 19th
century to the 1920s there was a clustering of childbearing in the early years of
marriage and a continued decline in ages at marriage and childbearing until the
1960s. As we shall see the age span over which childbearing occurs across the
population has subsequently widened. Through the 18th century until the mid 19th
century the median age of women at the birth of their last child is estimated by
Anderson to have been 39, by the 1930s to have been 32 and by the 1970s to
have been 28 (Anderson, 1985; see also Modell et al, 1976, for a similar analysis
of life cycle changes in the USA). Some of the changes in average ages at
different life cycle events are illustrated in Table 4.1.
The ages at parenthood shown in Table 4.1 hint at, but do not fully reflect
the dramatic nature of changes in fertility rates from the end of the 19th century
to the 1930s. A decline in family size occurred amongst the middle classes from
the 1870s, a pattern explained in terms of parents aspirations for their children,
in particular for maintaining customary living standards and for enabling provision
for their children's education (Banks, 1954). Significant reductions in fertility rates
became the general pattern through the first decades of the twentieth century as
working class families had fewer children. In 1860 approximately 20% of married
couples had two children or less, compared to 67% by 1925 (Royal Commission
on Population, 1949, reported by Gittins, 1982). Gittins, in her research into
change in family size and structure between 1900 and 1939, explores declining
fertility rates amongst the working classes and, in particular, the diversity of family
size and birth control across couples in different regions and occupations. In
general the improvement in infant mortality rates was significant in shaping
decisions which reduced family size. The position of mothers and children was,
Gittins argues, bound up with an increasingly elaborate 'ideology of childhood'
and with policies which reinforced the centrality of the male wage to household
resourcing (Gittins, 1982).
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Table 4.1. Estimates of the average ages at demographic events
Year of birth
Life cycle event: 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950
First marriage
Men 27 27 28 27 27 24
Women 26 26 26 25 24 22
Birth of first child
Men 29 29 30 29 28 26
Women 28 28 28 27 26 24
Birth of last child
Men 37 36 35 32 30 28
Women 36 35 33 30 28 26
Spouse's death
Men 56 60 62 64 66 63
Women 55 58 61 63 65 67
Own death as widow/er
Men 75 77 79 80 81 82
Women 75 79 81 81 82 83
(Halsey, 1986)
At a rate of 10%, fewer married women were active in the labour force
during the period 1900 to 1939 than had been in the latter half of the 19th
century (Hewitt, 1959, reported by Lewis, 1980). Pahl describes the inter-war
period as "the high water mark of the privatized little domestic unit", a situation
explained in part by the greater involvement of central government in family
related matters, including the introduction of the Marriage Bar, preventing
women in some occupations working after marriage (Pahl, 1984). In the context
of a growing concern for the health of children and fears about population decline
and national security, the child and maternal welfare movement and state policies
reinforced a model of the family where 'good mothering' was a full time home
centred affair (Lewis, 1980). It is, however, important to stress the diverse
experience of the period, and that in some regions and occupations married
women did work, particularly amongst the poorest households (Gittins, 1982;
Roberts, 1982). Also, high levels of abortion, estimated as terminating 16% to
20% of conceptions, were prevalent during the period (Inter-Departmental
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Committee on Abortion, 1939, reported by Gittins, 1982). Some commentators
have pointed to the widespread availability of The Pill from the 1960s as a cause
of recent patterns of delay in family formation but the dramatic changes in
fertility in other periods must call into doubt this sort of technology-led
explanation.
The Second World War is often seen as a convenient marker of change in
life cycle patterns, in part because of the subsequent development of the modern
welfare state but, perhaps just as significantly, because it separates the Great
Depression years from post war prosperity and growth. Linked with the latter was
a set of changes in the structure of the household as an economic unit, yet these
changes have been understated in accounts of contemporary patterns of transition
from youth to adulthood. This neglect has contributed to the incompleteness of
accounts of the relationship between resource availability and orientations in
shaping patterns of transition to adulthood. Anderson has suggested that prior to
the Second World War the contours of the life cycle were shaped in relation to
demographic and economic uncertainty. From the war to the 1970s, he argues,
improved health and longevity, full employment and the welfare state were
essential in shaping the modern life cycle (Anderson, 1985).
The historical tendency to an increasingly 'normal' pattern in the timing of
life cycle events as well as in, for example, family size, identified by Anderson, has
been equated with a rise in individualism and in the salience of social norms in
determining patterns of leaving home, household and family formation by a
number of, mostly American, commentators. Social and economic security,
concomitants of postwar prosperity, full employment and a state welfare system
are seen in these arguments to have enabled a greater degree of choice than
previously possible in the timing of early life cycle transitions. In part too, this
choice is seen as a consequence of changes in family structure, freeing youth from
obligations to their parental family. The context in Britain in the early decades
of this century, was one where young adult children were likely to have many
more obligations to their parental household, both financial and caring, than is
typical of the post-war period. Many had several siblings, and still high levels of
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mortality amongst the working class often disrupted households, and entailed the
loss of the main breadwinners' earnings (Jamieson, 1986). Hareven, writing in an
American context in the early 1980s, argues that contemporary life cycle
transitions are more strictly age related and more strictly governed by age norms
than they were historically. In the late 19th century familial obligations and duties
prevailed over age norms, and the most important aspects of the timing of
transitions were not age, but how such transitions were related to the position of
other family members (Hareven, 1981). Hareven argues that age norms have
become more important, particularly since the welfare state took over the
underwriting of various economic risks and obligations, whose previous domestic
resolution was very influential in structuring the life cycle. In the 19th century
event timing was critical to families' efforts to maintain control over their
resources, and in balancing the contribution of different members of the family
economy. Familial assistance was an exclusive source of security. The multiplicity
of obligations over the life cycle, Hareven argues, was a more complex affair, to
be worked out amongst family and kin, prior to the extension of state welfare
provision. She maintains that the decline in such obligations has led to an
increased individualism in early life cycle transitions, where the timing of
departure from the parental home, and of family formation is structured now less
in relation to the family cycle, and more in accordance with age norms. The
suggestion of a significant, yet inadequately explored role granted to normative
aspects of life cycle timing is taken up by other authors (eg. Hogan, 1981; Elder,
1978; Modell et al., 1976). The latter authors argue that there has been a
relaxation of constraints on the ability to marry, allowing its timing to be
increasingly preferential. Paradoxically, a greater uniformity of action is identified
and simultaneously explained in terms of an increased individualism. However,
patterns of event timing beg the question as to how "choices" are structured in
particular ways, and how supposedly increasingly evaluative decisions should be
located.
British writers have been less inclined to stress choices although, as we have
seen, some have been quick to define 'new' forms of constraint in contrast to the
'normal transitions' of the 1950s and 1960s. The latter, then, appear to hold a sort
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of authenticity, to suggest a 'natural' set of life cycle processes accompanying full
employment. However, reasons underlying the changed patterns from the 1960s
on have been described in rather ambiguous terms. Busfield and Paddon, in their
study of post-war fertility patterns concur with Anderson and the above authors
that the economic security and relative affluence of the 1950s and 1960s meant
that individuals were less worried about their future material circumstances than
previous generations, and were therefore less likely to defer family formation.
They argue that through the 1970s the housing market and general economic
circumstances became less favourable to early family formation and contributed
to the reversal of earlier trends (Busfield and Paddon, 1979). Similarly, Leonard
speculates that these changes were related to the recession of the 1970s, a period
where real wages levels became static and were consequently out of line with
expectations of rising living standards and increasing house prices (Leonard,
1980). In contrast, and from the more recent vantage point of the mid 1980s,
Kiernan suggests that the lower rates of marriage amongst younger age groups in
the 1970s were a consequence of greater choice than experienced by previous
cohorts as, for example, increasing proportions chose to stay at school beyond the
minimum leaving age. It is the 1980s pattern of continuing decline in marriage
rates that Kiernan identifies as a consequence of economic constraint (Kiernan,
1986). The relative and contingent nature of economic choice and constraint, and
the difficulties of addressing their relation to changing life cycle transitions are
well illustrated by the ways in which one or the other are invoked in explanations
of the experience of the 1970s depending on whether it is being compared with
the preceding or subsequent decade. This problem is taken up later. First, it is
appropriate to look in some detail at patterns of change in domestic life cycle
event timing over recent decades.
it Patterns ofFamily Formation
The long term trend to lower ages at family formation from the early part
of the twentieth century, quite marked during the 1950s and 1960s, was reversed
in the early 1970s with a significant decline in marriage and birth rates, especially
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amongst those under 25 years old. These demographic patterns are aggregate
level measures of change in domestic life cycle events, central to the recent youth
research agenda, yet they have received remarkably little attention amongst youth
researchers. This section outlines the changes that have occurred over recent
decades in ages at departure from the parental home, household and family
formation.
Full details of age at marriage were not recorded before the beginning of the
twentieth century. Estimates of the percentages of men and women married by
certain ages are shown in table 4.2. Deaths in the First World War resulted in an
imbalanced sex ratio, reflected in the contrasting proportions of men and women,
born in the early 1900s, who ever married. The twentieth century low point in
marriage rates occurred amongst the cohort born in 1905, and is explained by
Haskey as a consequence of the Great Depression (Haskey, 1987).
Table 4.2. Proportions ofmales and females who had ever married by certain ages,
by birth cohort, 1900-65.
Ace
Males Females
20 25 30 50 20 25 30 50
Birth year
1900 2 40 73 93 7 49 72 85
1905 1 31 68 91 6 44 69 85
1910 2 32 70 91 7 47 74 88
1915 2 36 69 90 8 54 76 89
1920 2 42 76 92 13 62 83 92
1925 4 47 77 91 15 67 84 92
1930 3 51 81 92 19 74 89 95
1935 3 57 83 93 21 79 91 96
1940 6 60 83 27 81 91
1945 7 63 84 29 81 92
1950 9 60 81 29 78 88
1955 10 52 73 32 75 87




The average age at first marriage amongst men rose from 26 to 27 between
the mid 1880s and the early 1900s. By the end of the First World War it rose by
a further year to 28, fell to 27 by the Second World War, to 25 by the mid 1960s
and reached a minimum of 24.4 in 1970. Since then it rose to 26.0 by 1985. Ages
of women at first marriage followed similar trends over the century with average
ages two years below those cited for men (Haskey, 1987). Increasing ages at
marriage and falling marriage rates have continued throughout the 1980s. 61% of
all women aged 15 to 44 were married in 1980 compared with 54% in 1989.
These changes were accompanied by a continued rise in average ages at first
marriage which reached 24.8 years amongst women, a rise of 22 months over the
period (Cooper, 1991).4 Whilst first marriages have been postponed and the
proportion of women who have never married has increased, so pre-marital
cohabitation has risen substantially over the last twenty years. More than half of
the women marrying in 1987 had lived with their husband before marrying,
compared with 36% of those marrying in 1980 and 8% of those marrying in 1970
(Haskey and Kiernan 1989). However, declines in marriage rates amongst younger
age groups are not a simple consequence of increasing rates of unmarried
cohabitation but part of a more general pattern of delay in the attainment of
independence and in the timing of family formation. The decade from 1971 to
1981 saw an increase in the proportion of time spent by young people aged 16 to
30 living with their parental family, or living alone, and a decline in the amount
of time spent living as part of a couple or with a child of their own. Using data
from the OPCS Longitudinal Survey, a 1% sample linking individuals enumerated
in the 1971 and 1981 censuses, Penhale estimates that over the decade the
average period spent living with one or both parents increased from 35% to
38.6% of time amongst women, and from 48.8% to 51.5% of time amongst men
aged 16 to 30.5 More strikingly, the average time spent by members of the age
group in a household of their own making (as a couple, with or without children,
or as a lone parent) decreased from 55.8% to 49.4% amongst women, and from
39.4% to 32.8% amongst men (Penhale, 1990). During the period the median age
at leaving the parental home increased by six months to 22.8 for men and 20.9 for
women. (Penhale, 1990; see also Wall and Penhale 1989).
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As well as a pattern of delay in ages at marriage from the early 1970s
onwards there has been a decline in fertility rates amongst younger age groups
and a rise in average ages at first childbirth. Table 4.3 shows the decline in
fertility rates, from the late 1960s, amongst women over 20. The small decline in
fertility rates between 1976 and 1981 shown in table 4.3 reflects a recovery
between 1977 and 1980 which has been followed by a steady fall in fertility rates
amongst women in their early twenties and a growing divergence in age specific
rates with significant increases in births to women in their early thirties (Werner,
1985; Jones, 1992). Age specific fertility rates refer to aggregate fertility within
age groups and reveal less about the specific timing of births or birth order.
Evidence on the timing of first births shows significant changes in patterns of
family formation with women born from the mid 1950s onwards delaying the
timing of their first birth, at ages over twenty, relative to previous cohorts
(Thompson, 1980).6 Birth rates continued to decline through the 1980s with the
steepest decline over the decade occurring amongst women aged 20 to 24 amongst
whom rates fell by 19% (Jones, 1992). The mean female age at first birth within
marriage was 26.6 years in 1988, the highest figure recorded since 1946
(Dollamore, 1989). Mean ages of women at first birth within marriage rose from
24.2 in 1965 to 25.5 in 1982, and from 1971 to 1981 the percentages living with
a child at age 29 fell from 79% to 69% amongst women and from 63% to 52%
amongst men (Penhale, 1990).
Table 4.3. Age Specific Fertility Rates
Birth year
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986
Age group:
under 20 37.3 47.7 50.6 32.2 28.1 30.1
20 - 24 172.6 176.0 152.9 109.3 105.3 92.7
25 - 29 176.9 174.0 153.2 118.7 129.1 78.1
30 - 34 103.1 97.3 77.1 57.2 68.6 78.1
From Population Trends, 1988, figures for England and Wales.
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The median interval between marriage and first birth increased from 19
months in 1970 to 31 months by 1978, and declined to 27 months by 1988. The
increase through the 1970s occurred alongside an increase in average ages at
marriage (Shaw, 1989). Whilst there have been dramatic increases in the
percentage of births outside marriage over recent years, this rise does not appear
to explain the older ages at parenthood within marriage. In 1964, 7.2% of all
births occurred outside marriage, rising to 10.2% in 1978, 15.8% in 1983 and
reaching over 25% by 1988. (Population Trends, 57, 1989). The increase to the
late 1970s was therefore quite gradual compared to the rapid increases over the
last decade and do not coincide with the patterns of deferral of parenthood within
marriage. Further, the upward trend in mean ages at childbirth has occurred both
within and outside marriage (Dollamore, 1989).7
Over the period 1970 to 1983 birth rates to women aged under 25 fell across
all social classes. First birth rates to women with husbands in skilled non-manual
occupations were higher than to women with husbands in other social classes. In
1970 the lowest first birth rates occurred to women with husbands in Registrar
General social classes I and II but by 1983 women married to men in skilled
manual occupations had the lowest birth rates. In part this was due to middle
class women being increasingly likely to start childbearing in their thirties. It is
amongst this age group that the most significant differences in class related
fertility trends emerged over the period. Amongst women aged 30 and over in
1970 the distribution of fertility rates across RG social classes was within 4% of
the average rate for all classes, yet by 1983 women married to men in social
classes I and II had a fertility rate 29% above the national average and women
married to men in skilled manual occupations had a fertility rate 21% below the
national average (Werner, 1985; figures for England and Wales). Class related
changes in first birth rates to all married women aged 15 to 44 are shown in
Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4. Legitimate first birth rates per 1000 married women by social class of
father
Social class of father
all I/II IIIN IIIM IV/V
Year of birth
1970 44 38 50 43 47
1973 39 38 43 38 39
1977 34 35 36 31 36
1980 38 36 43 37 42
1983 35 34 40 33 37
(Werner, 1985. The rates are based on estimated populations of married women aged 15 to
44 in each social class. Birth rates up to 1977 are based on the 1970 OPCS classification of
occupations; subsequent rates are based on the 1980 classification of occupations).
Werner suggests the possibility that childless married couples with husbands
in skilled manual occupations may be more strongly committed to uninterrupted
labour force participation than middle class women married to men whose rising
earnings through their thirties make it easier to forego, at least temporarily, wives'
earnings (Werner, 1985). The restructuring, through the 1980s especially, of
skilled manual work, with increasing casualisation and less security to workers in
some sectors, may have contributed to a greater reliance on female income
amongst affected couples. Evidence from the National Child Development Survey
(NCDS) suggests that, in the late 1970s, the men most likely to become young
fathers were in skilled manual occupations. Amongst men in such occupations at
age 26, the probability that they had become fathers by 22 was 80% greater than
amongst their contemporaries in non-manual occupations but also, surprisingly,
30% greater than amongst their contemporaries in semi- and unskilled
occupations (Kiernan and Diamond, 1983). This is contradicted by other evidence
which shows a straightforward correlation between social class and age at
childbirth, with those in the most disadvantaged circumstances likely to have
children at the youngest ages (Joshi, 1985; Jones, 1986; Werner, 1985). The
traditional expectation that the most disadvantaged will attain independence and
families of their own at young ages has not been satisfactorily reconciled with
hypotheses of delay in family formation as a consequence of 'new' forms of
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disadvantage in the labour force. This issue is taken up in detail in Chapter 6.
With respect to characterisations of general patterns of change in the latter part
of the twentieth century, it is clear that, along with new class related differences,
there is a growing diversity in the timing of family formation across the
population. The supposed tendency to an increasingly age related, 'normal'
pattern of life cycle transitions appears to reflect a temporary pattern specific to
the 1950s and 1960s. However, the suggestion that national economic
retrenchment and unemployment caused the subsequent patterns of delay in
household and family formation is too narrow a model, embodying a static and
deterministic notion of the relationship between economic processes and life cycle
structure.
Given the emphasis by youth researchers on the value of life cycle event
timing as an index of change in transitions from youth to adult status, it might be
supposed that aggregate level demographic changes, and change in the
organisation of family structure, would be central to analyses of the changing
experience of young people, yet this is not the case. Part of the difficulty here
stems from the lack of detailed work towards linking analyses of small scale
studies with analyses of macro level trends in the timing of household and family
formation. The particular findings of small scale studies have not been located
adequately with respect to general processes of change in life cycle event timing.
My own survey is clearly modest in its ability to furnish a 'quantitative' analysis,
so it is essential to locate the information gathered in the survey in relation to
more general evidence on patterns and processes of change in transitions to adult
status.
Life Cycle Event Timing and Attitudes Across Two Generations
The main survey of young adults collected information on changes in
domestic living arrangements and ages at which a series of life cycle events
occurred. Expectations of marriage, parenthood and their timing were asked of
those who were single and/or childless. Table 4.5 shows patterns of dependency
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at, and independence from, the parental home across different age groups over
the sample. The majority of male respondents were living with their parents at
ages up to 22. Half of those who were aged 22 and over had left home by age 25.
Amongst women, half of those who were 19 and over were living independently
of their parents, and around three quarters had left before their 25th birthday.8
These broad patterns correspond with aggregate level data where median ages at
leaving home are 23 for men and 21 for women (Penhale, 1990). Data from the
1981 Labour Force Survey indicates that the main period of leaving home
amongst young women is between the ages of 19 and 23 by when four fifths of
women have left home. Amongst men the main period of leaving is between the
ages 20 and 25 although approximately one fifth of young men aged 26 still live
at their parental home (Kiernan, 1986). Respondents to the NCDS were asked
their reasons for leaving home. 39% of men and 52% of women left to marry or
to live with a partner. The next most common reason for leaving was for an
educational or training course, accounting for 21% of male and 18% of female
departures, and the third most common reason was to take up, or look for, a job,
accounting for 19% of men and 11% of women. Friction with parents was cited
as a reason for leaving by 5% of men and by 6% of women (Kiernan, 1986).
There is some evidence that increasing numbers of young people are living
independently of their parents prior to cohabiting, marrying or having children
(Penhale, 1990). However, the exact nature of these patterns is difficult to specify
due to the lack of comprehensive evidence.
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Table 4.5 Distribution ofdependence at, and independence from, the parental home
by age group and employment sector.*
Age and household status
19 and under 19.1 - 22 22.1 - 25 25.1 - 28 over 28
dep ind dep ind dep ind dep ind dep ind
SECTOR MEN
construction 32 1 19 5 7 6 2 7 1 5
insurance 14 0 8 5 5 2 1 3 0 1
retailing 13 1 7 5 3 7 0 3 0 3
TOTAL 59 2 34 15 15 15 3 13 1 9
SECTOR WOMEN
insurance 13 5 9 8 2 13 0 9 0 4
retailing 11 2 6 7 4 6 2 1 1 1
TOTAL 24 7 15 15 6 19 2 10 1 5
*
Main survey; 'dep' and 'ind' refer to dependent and independent status amongst respondents)
Table 4.6 show the distribution of marital status, by age, across the sample.
Amongst men it is at ages 25 and above that marriage or cohabitation is the
majority experience, amongst women this is the case at ages over 22. Aggregate
level data shows significant changes in the timing of family formation occurring
amongst cohorts born from the mid 1950s onwards. The decline in marriage rates
at young ages through this period is shown in Table 4.2. There was a national
decline from 52% to 41% of men getting married by age 25 over this period. At
ages 22 to 25 43% (or 13/30) of men in my survey had married or were
cohabiting. Amongst women there was a national decline from 75% to 61% in the
numbers who had married by age 25, over this period. At ages 22 to 25, 72% (or
18/25) of women in my survey had married or were cohabiting.
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Table 4.6. Distribution of single and cohabiting/married status, by age group and
employment sector. *
Age and marital status
19 and under 19.1 - 22 22.1 - 25 25.1 - 28 over 28
s c/m s c/m s c/m s c/m s c/m
SECTOR MEN
construction 31 2 20 4 8 5 3 6 1 5
insurance 14 0 10 3 4 3 1 3 0 1
retailing 14 0 10 2 5 5 0 3 0 3
TOTAL 60 1 40 9 17 13 4 12 1 9
WOMEN
insurance 15 3 12 5 3 12 1 8 0 4
retailing 12 1 8 5 4 6 2 1 1 1
TOTAL 27 4 20 10 7 18 3 9 1 5
Main survey, 's' and 'c/m' refer to single and cohabiting/married status amongst survey
respondents.
The patterning of dependence and independence, and of single and married
status, by age, are disaggregated by occupational sector in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
Amongst men employed in retailing there is a higher rate of leaving home at ages
under 25 than in the other sectors, although age specific marriage patterns do not
show sectoral differences which are marked enough to warrant comment on
rather small cell sizes. Amongst women, those in insurance are more likely to
have attained independence by age 25, and to have married at ages between 22
and 25 than are women in the retailing sector. It is not immediately apparent why
women in retailing should be slower to attain independence than women in
insurance, nor why men in retailing should attain independence at younger ages
than men in construction and insurance. Rather than speculating here over
various interactions which may account for such patterns it is appropriate to
suspend judgement over the extent to which respondents' employment sectors
marks a homogeneity of experience in their labour force careers. The issue of how
best to disaggregate the survey data with respect to labour force trajectories is
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addressed in Chapter 6.
The remainder of this chapter describes some of the responses made by
members of both surveys to questions on the timing of marriage and parenthood,
and considers their relation to changes over recent decades in those circumstances
which respondents see as salient to decisions about the timing of family formation.
The first set of responses illustrate some of the stated concerns of young women
and men in their decisions about when they will marry and start families.
Unmarried respondents were asked if, and when, they expected to marry, and
childless respondents were asked if, and when, they expected to have their first
child. The reader is referred to the questionnaire in Appendix 1 for the context
and detail of these questions within the questionnaire. The questions about the
timing of family formation and reasons given were placed quite early in the
questionnaire, so that open ended responses would not be shaped in relation to
prior questions, which might act as prompts to particular types of response.
Asking respondents if they expect to marry and expect to have children may, of
course, encourage a positive response even where individuals are ambivalent
about whether or not they will marry or have children. Further, such questions
will have a differing salience to respondents depending on their current
circumstances and whether or not they anticipate a change in their household
circumstances in the short or the long term future. These issues are addressed
later in the thesis, when I will look in more detail at attitudes to family formation
and their relation to social circumstances and orientations to the future.
Within the parents' survey, respondents were asked to think about the
experience of their young adult children, in relation to leaving home, getting
married and having children, and to compare it with their own experience. They
were asked to consider a range of circumstances, relating to male and female job
security and career prospects, independent accomodation, home ownership and
savings, and to say if they felt that any of these had become more, or less,
important since the time that they married, and since the time that they had
children. They were invited to talk about their responses. Respondents in the
parents' survey were then asked to continue thinking of their children, and their
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children's generation, and to say what they thought of as sensible ages for young
men and women to leave home, marry and have their first child. I then asked
them to say if they felt that things are different nowadays in deciding when to
leave home, and in deciding when to marry and start a family, than they were
when they themselves were young. The initial questions asked of the parents were
structured, reflecting my own perceptions of the issues which would be seen as
most salient. Part of the background to this was an optimism about the value of
a quantitative form of analysis, an optimism which the final sample size did not
warrant. The quotes from parents which are presented below are drawn from the
responses to the open ended questions. The sample, of course, is small and the
responses can be no more than illustrative of the issues which are seen to be
salient to decisions around family formation.
It should be noted here that I did not tape interviews, but relied on recording
responses to questions directly onto the questionnaire schedule. There might be
slight errors, then, in the exact wording of some responses where my own
shorthand was less accurate than a transcribed tape recording of the responses to
open ended questions. I am confident, however, that most quotes are accurate,
and those that are not verbatim transcripts correctly convey the detail of the
responses given. The responses given here, and later in the thesis, I have chosen
to illustrate the sorts of circumstances and concerns which respondents held to be
important for the timing of marriage and parenthood. I lay no claim to a
sytematic procedure for deciding which responses to include and which to exclude,
but I have chosen responses in part to convey the variety in people's concerns. It
is of course tempting to choose the more articulate, and lengthy, responses, a
temptation which I have not wholly resisted at this juncture. However, a shrug and
a "dunno", whilst a rare form of response, is significant since it may illustrate the
irrelevance of the question to the respondent, a possibility which needs attention.
Later, in considering the relation between decision making issues and patterns of
event timing I pay more detailed consideration to those who, because of the
brevity of their response, are so easy to exclude from a report on attitudes. The
following are examples of responses by young adults to the questions about the
timing of marriage and family formation. Issues of change in the organisation of
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transition are returned to through a consideration of the perceptions of parents,
and continued in the next chapter.
One respondent, employed by the supermarket, was a 28 year old man,
working as a baker. He had left school at just under 16 and started a painting and
decorating apprenticeship. He left after two months and took up a bakery
apprenticeship. He qualified as a time served baker at 20 and continued working
in the bakery until he was 24. He then took a job as a baker at the supermarket
where I interviewed him, because of better pay and prospects, and so that he
would not have to work the nightshifts which, he explained, his wife did not like.
When he left school he was living with his aunt and uncle, since some years
previously family problems had led to him and his brothers being, as he put it,
split between family. At 17 he moved into private rented lodgings, because he did
not get on with his cousins. He stayed in similar accomodation until he bought a
flat with his fiancee at 23, and they married one month later. At the time of
interview she was employed as a clerk. When I asked him why he married when
he did, he replied:
"I thought it was the right time. I had enjoyed myself with my mates.. time was
getting on. We looked for a house January and February of the year we got
married. We didn't plan the wedding until about the same time. I was not
prepared to stay with family, as its the worst way to start. So we got a house. We
had decided it would be the summer [when we married] but we decided we
would make it soon after we got the house."
They do not have any children, and the respondent explained that he expected to
start a family in about 18 months time, when he would be 30. When I asked 'why
then?' he explained:
"We have discussed it quite a lot. We could have a family now but we want to
buy a bigger house, rather than the flat, with a garden, so now we are looking
for a new house. We hope to move by next January or February, and maybe be
there a year before children. We try to plan ahead rather than throw ourselves
in at the deep end."
Another respondent in the retailing sector, this time in the DIY store, was
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a female, aged 27 and a supervisor in the home decorating department. She was
living with her parents, engaged and expecting to marry the next year. She had,
she said, started work as a shop assistant after leaving school in 1976, which
would have meant she was 15 at the time. She had worked as a checkout operator
and general assistant since, until she was promoted to a supervisory position at
age 22. She had been engaged from age 24. Her partner was a technician with an
electronics company. She expected to marry at 29. When I asked her 'why then?'
she replied:
"I would get married tomorrow but I don't have the money. We need to save.
I want no hassles with bills. I want to do things now with money, I'm feeling
that when we are married we will need to put money aside to pay for bills et
cetera. I like life now how it is. I sometimes wish I had saved up, I'm starting
to save up now. We want to buy a house."
She expected that she would have children, and to start when she was 30 or 31,
after she and her husband had lived together, wanting 'a couple of years to
ourselves before children'. When I asked her for more detail about the sorts of
things she saw as important in deciding when to have children, she replied:
"I think I will be happier then to give up my time and devote it to kids. [My
partner] is younger than myself, he's 24. About my own work, I hope [my
partner] will have more money, we'll be thinking about whether we can afford
to have children. When I have them I would like to bring them up myself, and
maybe get a part time job when they are school age. I wouldn't like to be not
working at any time, I would hate to be out of a job when they are old enough".
The following respondent was on the Community Programme when I
interviewed him. Aged 25, he had left school at 15 and subsequently worked in
a number of labouring jobs, interspersed with spells of unemployment. He had
been made redundant from his labouring job at a leatherworks at age 23, and
after 18 months unemployment joined the Community Programme. He left his
parents' home at 23 and moved into a privately rented flat with his girlfriend.
They moved into council rented accomodation when he was 25, and his girlfriend
was pregnant with their first child at the time of interview. She was working as a
laundry assistant at a hospital. He explained that he had moved in with his
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girlfriend in order to get away from his parents. He was, he said, about to get
thrown out of his parents' house anyway. He said that he and his girlfriend had
no plans to marry, feeling that there was no point. He explained that the current
pregnancy was an accident. I asked him if he wanted more children in the future.
He explained that he would, eventually, when he and his girlfriend were sorted
out, that they wanted to leave the area in which they were living, and when he
had a more secure future. When I asked later what he expected to be doing in
five years time he replied that he hadn't got a clue, and that he expected his
girlfriend would not work again 'until after the kids have grown'.
The next two respondents both worked in the insurance sector. The first
provides a good example of the complexity of many life cycle trajectories, and of
the ways in which transitions are not necessarily 'cumulative' but may entail
moves back to prior living arrangements. This respondent was female, aged 29
and a junior supervisor in an insurance company. She left school at 17, planning
to work before going to university. She started working as a senior clerk in the
pensions department of a large insurance company. She left at 19, in order to
travel, and spent time working as a waitress and chambermaid. At 20 she returned
to Edinburgh, was unemployed for 7 months, and and then took a job as a bank
teller for 10 months. She then started work as a clerk at her present employer,
where she achieved promotions to her present grade, by age 27. When she
returned to Edinburgh she rented a flat, and then bought a flat at 22, where she
lived with her boyfriend. They broke up 18 months later and she sold the flat and
returned to stay with her mother (her father died when she was 20). She bought
a flat again when she was 28 and a house at 29 where she lives with her
boyfriend. They own the property jointly. She expected to marry, but was not sure
when. She anticipated it might be when she was around 35, when she thought they
might start a family. She thought 35 would be a good age to have her first child
because, she said, she did not want to be too old.
The final example here illustrates well the range of concerns which were
raised by many respondents, in particular the combination of 'personal' and
material concerns standardly seen as relevant to decisions around household and
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family formation. The respondent was male, the supervisor of the new business
policy section of an insurance company. He had left school at 17, and started
working as a junior clerk with his current employer after being unemployed for
two months. He had achieved promotion over the years and become a section
supervisor at age 22. He bought a house at 21 and moved in with his girlfriend.
She was a clerk, working in the same company. He was 22 at the time I
interviewed him, and engaged to be married later that year, shortly after his 23rd
birthday. When I asked him why he and his girlfriend moved in together when
they did, he replied that:
"We knew each other well enough, and qualified for a staff loan. I had been at
home for long enough. Sharing with someone halves the cost."
He explained that he planned to marry in the autumn. When I asked 'why then?',
he said:
"We have been living together for two years. We decided we were compatible,
and its the normal thing to do, with living together. We got engaged in
February, there's no need to save up as we have got a house sorted out. Normal
folk have to save up and have a long engagement."
When I asked if he expected that they would have children at some stage, he
replied:
"I was going to try and put my fiancee off the idea, me not liking children,
[pause] .. not in the immediate future, I may have changed my attitude toward
them. At the moment I see them as a tie. I would not want to be too old, at
about 30 would be old enough".
When I asked him to say more about why he thought 30 would be the sort of age
to start a family, he replied:
"There is certainly no way that we could afford it just now. So we would need
a lot more than now. We would need to be earning in excess, - our combined
salary is £14000 before tax, - we would need to be earning in excess of that
before even contemplating it. If we were comfortably off I might contemplate
it. [My partner] would probably stay off work with kids. We would need to be
financially secure before we even thought about it".
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It may be that, pressing the question of why people anticipate marrying or
having children when they say they expect to do so, encourages responses which
highlight material considerations, where these are not as central to patterns of
family formation as theory would suggest. Wallace, for example, argues that
whilst material considerations, particularly job security, are central to people's
statements about the circumstances in which to marry and start a family, in
practice people tend to 'drift into' marriage and parenthood (Wallace, 1987a).
However, as a general statement this is inadequate to the task of explaining
patterns of change in the timing of family formation. Below I return to the
question of change in the organisation of transitions to adult status. As we have
seen, recent research has focused on the experience of recent cohorts of youth
and young adults who have 'come of age' (or not) in the 1980s. Much emphasis
has been placed on their particular experience but, without an adequate
comparative or historical framework, it has proved difficult to locate
understandings of the consequences of economic change for the organisation and
timing of transitions. Whilst the perceptions and attitudes of contemporary cohorts
of youth must be central to an understanding of their experience, the latter is not
in itself sufficient as a framework for analysing contemporary processes. A more
adequate framework requires not only an historical 'background' but also that
contemporary experience itself be understood as part of an historical process. In
the rest of this chapter I describe some of the perceptions, of parents, of
continuity and change in the experience of youth and transition. The experience
of recent cohorts of youth in transition are then considered in relation to more
general evidence of change in the processes which are seen to be significant to
the timing of household and family formation.
Parents to approximately one third of the young adults were interviewed, one
parent in each household. The parents who completed questionnaire schedules
were born between 1920 and 1950, and apart from one who married in 1948, all
married in the 1950s and 1960s. Whilst young adults were asked their parents
ages at marriage, comparisons with self reported data by parents indicates
inaccuracies in young adults' reports of this information. It is possible that
amongst the youth sample as a whole reports on parents' ages at marriage would
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be less accurate still, so these proxy responses are not used in analysis.
Aggregate level trends in ages at family formation broadly follow a U shaped
curve from the post war period, with lowest ages occurring in the late 1960s. Since
the parents' generation were young adults over a period of decreasing ages at
family formation and the younger generation are growing up over a period of
later ages at family formation we may be agnostic about what to expect of an
intergenerational comparison of ages at marriage and parenthood across the
sample. The clearest difference between generations lies in female ages at
marriage. In the parents' survey, the twelve male respondents ages at marriage
ranged from 19 to 28, with a mean age of 24 and a median age of 26. Amongst
the 24 female respondents, ages at marriage ranged from 17 to 26, with a mean
age of 22 and a median age of 20.5. Amongst men, ages at first childbirth ranged
from 19 to 32 with a median age of 26, and amongst women ages ranged between
18 and 31, with a mean age of 24 and a median age of 23.5. Amongst men in the
main survey approximately halfwho had married did so at a younger age than did
their fathers, and half at older ages. Amongst the women there was a tendency
to marry at ages older than their mothers. Of the thirteen women who had
married three did so at younger ages, and ten did so at older ages than had their
mothers.
The structure of the sample across youth and parent generations confounds
a comprehensive analysis of generational differences in patterns of event timing
within the survey data. However, a more informal but nonetheless interesting
insight is possible through a consideration of parents' perceptions of change in the
experience of youth over recent decades. The variation of event timing across the
main sample is explored later. This and the subsequent chapter focus on general
processes underlying change in patterns of transition to adult status over recent
decades. Certain areas were identified by parents, as they have been by other
commentators, in influencing the attainment of independence by young people.
Housing costs and availability, job security, careers and, in particular, female
careers and general lifestyle orientations were seen by parents as important to
household and family formation. These latter areas have been poorly attended to
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in explanations of change in life cycle event timing, and will be taken up in
further detail in the next chapters.
In drawing up the questionnaire an aim was to see if any patterning amongst
perceptions and priorities would be apparent. There is a tendency for parents of
children working in insurance to identify several aspects of change, in particular
referring to heightened expectations amongst young people now, and a tendency
for parents of children working in the retailing sector to be more ambivalent in
identifying aspects of change, or suggest that things have not really changed.
Divisions between groups of responses are not clear cut however. The following
quotes are drawn from the sample of twenty parents who I interviewed in their
own homes. The purpose is not to be representative of the sample, some
respondents felt that little had changed in relation to these issues, but the
responses cited are indicative of the most important aspects of change which were
identified by parents.
One father was born in 1930, and had been a time served sheet metal worker
and had held a variety of jobs including labourer, bus conductor, and clerical work
prior to early retirement. His wife was unwell and had stopped working four years
previously. He married at 21, and had no children by his first marriage. His first
wife died aged 25, when he was 26, and he remarried when he was 29. He had
four children with his second wife. The son who I had interviewed was working
on the Community Programme and living with his parents in a council house.
Aged 19 he was engaged to be married to a secretary in the civil service. He
expected to marry at 22 or 23. I asked his father if he thought that things are
different for young people now in deciding when to leave home than they were
when he was young. He replied:
"We never thought of leaving home. Life was so different, it is hard to put it
into context. You were in a family unit, life was much slower... The way we
were brought up, the first time I thought of leaving home was to get married."
I asked him then if he thought that things are different for young people
nowadays in deciding when to get married and start a family than they were when
105
he was young. He said:
"To get married nowadays you've got to give it an awful lot of thought. The
attitudes of young people are entirely different. Women used to be trained for
marriage, if you couldn't do certain things you weren't fit to be a wife. Now
young men and women are much more similar. A girl in our time wasn't giving
up very much. Now a girl's got to think, .. and neither are prepared to settle
down. For ourselves, a marriage could survive through hard times. Now young
people wouldn't accept it, there would be rows."
Another, female, respondent was interviewed while she was visiting her son.
She lived abroad. She was born in 1941, left her parents to marry at 17 and
moved into private rented accomodation with her husband. She had her first child
a year later. At the time of interview she was a printer, her husband a chemist,
and they had lived outside Britain since 1972. Her son was a trainee butcher, aged
23. He had lived overseas with his parents since he was seven, and he returned
to Britain at age 21, staying with his godparents initially and then moving into
private rented acomodation. At 22 he bought a flat with his partner who he
married when he was 23. He expects to become a father at age 26. I asked his
mother to consider those circumstances, job security, housing, career prospects
and so on which might be relevant to decisions about marriage and parenthood.
I then asked if she thought that any of these have become any more important or
less important since the time that she married. She replied:
"Home ownership is more important now. Then you were just keen to rent a
place, anything to have a roof over your head."
When I asked her in general terms "Do you feel that things are different for
young people nowadays in deciding when to get married and start a family than
they were when you were young?" she replied:
"It's a lot better. They've got money to buy things now. I had second hand stuff.
The first washing machine I got was eight years ago. Its the same over the
world. [Where I live] now kids have got to have things new .. TVs, videos,
fridges, .. its a good thing."
Another respondent was the mother of a 17 year old boy who I had
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interviewed. He was on a special measures Youth Training Scheme, painting and
decorating. He was not currently engaged nor going out with anyone. He lived
alone with his mother in a council house. His father died 7 years after marrying
his mother and had been receiving hospital treatment out of the country, being
away most of the time when his son was a baby. His mother went to work when
he was 1 year old. She is currently an audio-typist in a solicitor's office. She was
born 1950, left home to marry age 20, and her son was born when she was 21. In
response to the question on what issues had changed in their importance since the
time that she married, his mother replied:
"The woman having good career prospects has become more important. I think
a woman nowadays thinks about having a career... I think the other things are
just as important as they were in our day."
I asked her then if she thought that any of the considerations had become more,
or less, important since the time that she had children. She said:
"The man having a secure job is important. There is no point in bringing kids
into the world to suffer nowadays, though other people would think differently."
I asked her: "Are there any other changes, do you think?" and she replied: "I
don't know. I think they would think twice with the unemployment, I think so,
I know I would think twice if I couldn't afford .. if I was with someone who
didn't have a secure job. I have done it myself with my husband's low income
but I think it's unfair. I think maybe being able to own their own homes as well.
I think it's more important for people to own their own house, maybe as its an
investment. Before it didn't matter so long as you had somewhere to live.
Security over the years has become more important to people, they like to, or
do, buy their own home. A lot of women have to work. I feel that's changed,
they have to work and have a secure job for example if they are married, or if
they are widowed. Money in the bank is more important now, we never used
to think about it so much."
Another father who I interviewed was semi-retired from a career in the
police, and was working half time as an office messenger. He had been born in
1930, had left home at 17 to serve National Service, stayed in the Marines for 7
years, married at 24, and was 26 at the birth of his first child. His wife was a
seamstress in a dress shop at the time of interview. Their son was an actuarial
clerk in an insurance company, aged 22 and living with his parents in their own
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home. He was engaged to another clerk, and expected to marry at 26 or 27. I
asked his father to think about the relative importance of the issues listed, in
decisions about marriage and parenthood. I asked him if he thought that any had
become more important or less important to decisions about marriage now, since
the time that he got married. He answered: "Being able to afford home ownership
is more important because of the present circumstances. Then there was no
possibility of being able to buy a council house. Now tenants are able to
purchase." I asked him if any of the issues had become any more important or less
important to decisions about parenthood now, since the time that he had children.
He said:
"I don't see any as more or less important. I would say women having a secure
job now has changed tremendously with the number of career women now. It's
maybe that women want a bit more security behind themselves now because of,
for example, the possibility of break up of marriage, there seem to be more
break-ups now. There is more emphasis now on women having a secure job
rather than an ordinary job .. as so many women are into careers rather than
marriages."
When I asked him in general terms whether he thought things are different
for young people nowadays in deciding when to get married and start a family
than when he was young, he replied:
"Generally I would suppose they are just the same. On average people tend to
marry about the same age as we did. It appears now that more are having to
get married because of pre-marital pregnancy....In my younger days ..
employment, it's a big factor, it has to be taken into consideration now, security
and prospects. Things are more expensive now, although salaries are
comparable, though things seem to be very tight, as they were in my day. As
you grow older you have more money to do things, but it must be the same
nowadays. In later life, as you get on, the amount you need to be paying doesn't
seem so difficult to be committed to than in the early days of marriage. As you
get older you get more secure in life, with promotiori et cetera... I remember
my parents always struggled in one way or another, largely due to the size of
the family. It was common then to have seven or more children, now there is
a reduced family size. Things were difficult for parents then. It doesn't seem to
be the case nowadays."
It is interesting to note the significance of relative wealth and poverty across
the family life cycle emphasised by the above respondent, and his reference to the
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way in which this pattern has changed between his own household and that of his
parents, an issue to which I shall return.
Another father I interviewed was born in 1941, was a labourer in a bakery
at the time of interview, and married when he was 22. He and his wife stayed with
his brother for two months, and then moved into private rented accomodation and
into a council rented flat in 1968, where they currently live. He became a father
at 24. His 16 year old son was on a Special Measures training scheme. When I
asked him what issues he felt had changed in their importance with regard to
having children he replied:
"Then you never thought about it. Now I'd be inclined to think before ... the
young fellows at work want savings, a house of their own, a good job. They are
all more important than when we were married ... They expect more than we
did. They expect they should be getting something better. In my day you had
kids and got a rented flat. Nowadays they want to be established."
Across the parents' responses to the questions described the most commonly
cited areas of change, all seen to have increased in their importance for
transitions to independence and family formation, were female employment and
female careers; housing costs, availability and expectations of home ownership;
job security and unemployment, and higher expectations regarding living
standards. Of the twenty parents interviewed face to face, twelve mentioned
female careers, nine mentioned unemployment and the increased significance of
job security, nine mentioned housing and six aspirations as significant to changes
in the experience of youth. The stress by some respondents on changes in the
costs of living and increased aspirations, sometimes identified together as sides
of the same coin, were not prompted in the same way as those issues which had
been identified by the preceding fixed choice question.
Aspirations, or orientations to particular standards of living, are often drawn
on in the literature in a general way in attempts to locate the inevitably relative
quality of economic circumstance and resource availability as a cause of changes
in the timing of household and family formation. Most work which draws on
109
orientations in any formal way stresses their variability across social classes. There
has been little analysis of lifestyle orientations and their relation to social practice.
In part this is responsible for a paradox at the centre of the youth debate, where
recent hypotheses of deferral in the attainment of adult lifestyles amongst young
unemployed people have not been reconciled with understandings of patterns of
early independence and parenthood as they are associated with disadvantage. The
concentration of unemployment amongst groups who would generally attain
independence and families of their own making at young ages complicates
hypotheses of delay in ways which have not been adequately addressed. A recent
study presents evidence which demonstrates that women who are unemployed at
the ages seventeen to nineteen are more likely, across all social classes, to become
mothers at younger ages than their class peers (Penhale, 1989). Evidence on the
domestic careers of young men, and on the linked domestic careers of young
couples is, as we have seen, not well established. There is, for example,
contradictory evidence over whether or not young unemployed people are likely
to remain dependent on their parents longer than their employed peers. Data
from the 1981 Labour Force Survey indicates that unemployed men and women
in their late teens and early twenties are more likely to be living with their
parents than are their employed age peers (Kiernan, 1986). Wallace presents
evidence to suggest that young adults living at home are more likely to be
unemployed than are those who have left (Wallace, 1987). In contrast, evidence
from the Scottish Young People's Survey suggests that teenagers remaining at
their parental home were more likely to be employed than teenagers who had left
home (Furlong and Cooney, 1990). Furlong suggests that this discrepancy with
Wallace's data may be a consequence of the older sample interviewed by Wallace,
where unemployed people who had attained independence from their parents had
later returned, unable to support themselves on state benefits (Furlong and
Cooney, 1990; see also Harris, 1988).
Many of the interviewed parents as well as general commentators saw
unemployment and the need for job security as holding a central significance in
the experience of contemporary youth, although it is significant that, at an
aggregate level, these issues, along with housing considerations, took second place
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to changes in women's labour force commitment. This may reflect the particular
socioeconomic composition of the sample, and the employed status ofmost young
adult respondents. With regard to unemployment and insecurity, and their
relationship to domestic life cycle transitions, it is important that theorists should
address explicitly issues of citizenship and justice in the shaping of life chances.
If a pattern of delayed transitions to independence is general over the population,
as indicated by the demographic evidence, life cycle event timing is necessarily a
poor indicator of changes in class related disadvantage. Too great a stress on the
timing of transitions to adult status as measured by particular life cycle events also
risks neglecting the plight of young families bringing up children on state benefits.
It seems probable that unemployment has a variable relationship to the timing of
family formation and parenthood, and that suggestions of uniform consequences
with regard to the timing of life cycle transitions is misplaced. For example,
prolonged dependency at parents amongst recent cohorts of youth may be as
much an aspect of relative privilege as of disadvantage. There is no simple
relationship between dependence and disadvantage or independence and
advantage.
Housing availability, too, is central to the ability to attain independent
lifestyles, and seen to be important to changes in patterns of transition. Busfield
and Paddon, in their survey of two cohorts of couples who married in the 1950s
and 1960s noted that, despite their younger ages at marriage, 29% of those
marrying in the 1960s had a mortgage on their own home, compared to 10% of
those marrying in the 1950s (Busfield and Paddon, 1977). The authors suggest that
difficulties in achieving home ownership in the 1970s, when fewer houses were
being built and prices rising, contributed to the trend to older ages at marriage
during the period (Busfield and Paddon, 1977). From 1956 to 1984 the average
house price to earnings ratio was 3.5. Over the period this peaked dramatically
at 4.95 in 1973, declined to 3.34 in 1977 and rose to 3.82 before declining to the
mid-1980s (Building Societies Association, 1985a). By 1989 a disaggregation of
rates of owner occupation by socioeconomic group of the household head
revealed that 89% of intermediate nonmanual workers, 72% of skilled manual
workers and 70% of junior nonmanual workers were owner occupiers, as were
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53% of semi-skilled manual and personal service workers and 43% of unskilled
manual workers (GHS 1989). Whilst home ownership increased dramatically
through the 1980s this was not the case for households with a head aged under
25, amongst whom 30% owned their own home throughout the decade. However,
amongst 25 to 29 year old household heads levels of ownership rose from 52% to
66%, slightly faster than overall rates which rose from 54% to 66% (GHS 1981,
1989).
In an international comparative study the Building Societies Association
presents data which indicates British levels of owner occupation amongst young
adults to be markedly different to those in other countries, with especially high
levels of home ownership amongst householders aged under thirty (Building
Societies Association, 1985b). In this context it is interesting to note that the
majority of respondents, over both generations interviewed, believed that young
adults should delay getting married until they could live independently. The
interview schedule presented respondents with a series of vignettes, which were
described in the first chapter. One of the vignettes presented to respondents read:
"Iain and Lynn intend to get married. They don't have a place of their own to
move into yet though. What should they do?". The majority of respondents, 67 out
of the sample of 92 young respondents and 24 out of the sample of 36 parents,
said the couple should delay getting married until they can get a place of their
own. 13 young respondents and 6 parents said that the couple should marry and
stay with parents until they can get their own place. Whilst having a place of their
own is not necessarily equivalent to owning it, the responses point to a general
expectation of home ownership as the principal tenure of young couples. This
pattern may be somewhat exaggerated amongst the sample given the policy of
insurance companies in which the survey was partly based to subsidise the
mortgages of its employees. However, actual rates of home ownership amongst
the sample are in line with evidence on general rates from the GHS. Table 4.7
shows first housing tenure at marriage and cohabitation amongst the youth and
parent samples. The prevalence of cohabitation prior to marriage amongst the
parent sample was negligible. Amongst young adults the distribution of housing
circumstances at cohabitation is similar to that recorded at marriage, with a slight
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increase in home ownership and a decline to a very limited number living with
parents or in private rented accomodation.
Table 4.7. First housing tenure at marriage amongst the Parent sample and first
housing tenure at cohabitation and marriage amongst the Main sample
tenure:
parents young adults at
cohabitation marriage
owner occupied 10 15 17
council rented 1 4 4
private rented 13 4 1
at parental home 4 5 2
with other relatives 4 0 0
housing association 0 1 1
other 3 0 0
The table shows general rates across both samples, so only some of the
parents are related to some of the young adults, and vice versa. Of the subsample
of youth with parents who were interviewed and who were themselves married,
four out of eight had owned their own home at marriage compared to the parents
of only one out of eight of the young adults (not shown in the table). These
changes are in general accord with aggregate level changes revealed in larger
scale surveys which demonstrate the increased prevalence of home ownership
amongst young couples. This change is reflected by several parents in their
perceptions of the increased salience of home ownership for young peoples
decisions about family formation. Home ownership, and increased aspirations in
general amongst contemporary cohorts of youth, were standard themes which
were taken up by parents. Whilst the sample of parents was to some extent self
selected and consequently may be biased to more advantaged households, the
evidence suggests that the processes identified are general to a large proportion
of the population.
The most common single aspect of change in transitions to independence
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identified by parents, more frequently than either the increased expectation of
home ownership or the significance of unemployment and job security, was the
greater salience of female labour force participation and female careers. Here the
informants appear to part company with youth researchers. The latter, as we saw
in Chapter 2, have stressed that continuities in patterns of gender inequality are
more persistent than a first reading of recent 'superficial' changes might suggest.
In such arguments, any increases in gender equality amongst young single adults
are understood to be subsequently lost at family formation, beyond which point
the 'traditional' division of labour is seen to persist. Interestly, some of the parents
who identified changes in female employment, and the importance of female job
security and earnings, related these changes to rising expectations regarding living
standards and home ownership amongst young adults and in the ability to afford
children. General evidence demonstrates that changes in gendered patterns of
employment and earnings are indeed bound up with change in household
structure and life cycle processes. These processes should be placed centrally in
understandings of change in patterns of transition from youth to adulthood.
Some of the processes operating here are caught well in the following quotes
from two interview respondents, both middle aged mothers of young adults, who
were asked, in relation to leaving home, marriage and parenthood, how they felt
things had changed since their own youth. One of the women was born in 1942,
she was a clerk in a stockbrokers, and her son who was interviewed in the main
survey was a sales assistant. She came from a family of two children, herself has
three children, the youngest of whom was born when she was 25. She returned to
work when the youngest child was three years old. She said:
"A woman needs to work a lot longer than we did to be able to afford a family.
People don't have a family so quick as we did. We made do with a lot less. I
think we were more content with less, they want a lot more now."
Another respondent, born in 1931, was head of a retail payroll department, and
her interviewed daughter was a junior supervisor in an insurance company. The
mother was an only child, and she herself had two children, the first at age 29.
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She returned to work when the youngest child was ten years old. She replied to
the question on change in the circumstances of young people as follows:
"I really don't know, the cost of living now and the standards. I would think
young people getting married today expect what to them are essentials, to us
were luxuries. Quite a few start families later now, and then again they get so
used to the good earnings the woman is making that they couldn't do without
it. When we were married my earnings were extra as opposed to bread and
butter."
The processes indicated are not uniform or universal ones, but nor are they
particular to a narrow set of 'career women'. The responses identify changes in
female contributions to household resourcing, changes which are seen to be
inseparable from changes in orientations towards living standards or perceptions
of living costs. What the respondents point to is a relationship which has not been
satisfactorily addressed in research on life cycle transitions, specifically the
relationship between resource availability and general consumption standards, and
the significance of female labour force commitment. These relationships are
explored in the next chapter.
To summarise, this chapter has described aggregate level patterns of change
in the organisation of life cycle event timing over this century, and considered
perceptions, of continuity and change in the experience of youth and transition,
amongst respondents to my survey of parents of young adults. A detailed historical
perspective is missing from recent literature on the transition from youth to
adulthood. Despite its authors central concern with life cycle event timing as an
index of change in the organisation of transition, the literature has focused almost
exclusively on the experience of the 1980s. Some have compared this with 'normal
transitions' seen to obtain during full employment in the 1950s and 1960s. The
evidence on historical change in life cycle event timing, however, demonstrates
that these decades were characterised by patterns of transition which were no
more 'normal', and no less historically particular, than are recent developments.
An understanding of such developments requires not simply an historical context
to add sophistication to our interpretation of current experience, but the
development of a framework capable of locating such experience as itself
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historically specific. This requires a more comprehensive understanding of the
processes underlying change in the organisation of transition. Youth theorists have
defined economic change in narrow terms, reflecting, in particular, a concern with
the consequences of unemployment for patterns of transition. The issue of an age
related deferral in the attainment of a 'full' wage, capable of resourcing an
independent household, has received less attention, paradoxically so, since it
would seem essential to locating the life cycle related consequences of
unemployment amongst youth. The theme of this chapter, of locating 'new' life
cycle transitions, is continued in Chapter 5, which explores historically recent
patterns of deferral in marriage and parenthood as they relate to changes in age
and gender related employment inequalities.
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5. Earnings, Gender and Reproduction
Economic processes are central to most explanations of change in the
timing and organisation of marriage, and birth of the first child, and to change in
fertility rates.9 Youth research, however, has not adequately located its hypothesis
of change in patterns of life cycle event timing in relation to economic change. To
explain the significance of material resources to patterns of life cycle event timing
necessarily requires an understanding of the ways in which life cycle stages are
resourced, and an understanding of their relation to general orientations or
aspirations to some standard of living. It is an argument of this chapter that an
adequate account of change in the organisation of the transition to adult status
requires an understanding of change in the gender and age related patterning of
rewards to employment. The neglect of such changes by youth theorists is
surprising, given the significance accorded to material resources for underwriting
'normal' transitions. However, this emphasis is typically reflected in a concern
with labour force status and class related inequalities. Discussions of economic
change amongst youth researchers have contrasted the life cycle consequences of
unemployment and subemployment with transitions which are underwritten by
'traditional' forms of employment security and continuity. The operation of the
labour 'market' is an object of analysis, then, only in relation to what is seen as
the most problematic facet of 'market' processes: that of exclusion. There has, in
consequence, been little interest amongst youth theorists in the causes or
consequences of age related change in the structuring of rewards within
employment. However, evidence of change here must speak of related changes
in the relative position of youth as a life cycle stage.
Aggregate level earnings data demonstrates that the earnings ofmale youth
increased relative to adult earnings through the post-war period up until the mid
1970s. Earnings appear to have increased quite rapidly in the early 1970s,
following the lowering of the age of majority from 21 to 18 in 1969, and the
subsequent reduction in ages at which adult rates were paid to young employees,
and with the raising of the school leaving age from 15 to 16 in September 1972.
From the mid 1970s onwards there has been a pattern of decline in the earnings
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of young men relative to those of older men. This trend has been accompanied
by an increase in the earnings of young women, relative to young men. These
developments have not been addressed in youth research, yet they are potentially
very significant, since they point to changes in the relative position of youth and
early adulthood as life cycle stages. Indeed, the trends parallel changes in the
timing of family formation, where there was a reversal of the post-war trend to
lower ages at family formation from the early to mid-1970s onwards, as described
in the last chapter. It has been argued that employment processes and life cycle
relations are interrelated. This dynamic appears to be reflected in the historical
co-incidence of change in gender and age related earnings structures and patterns
of deferral in the timing of family formation.
Evidence of change in the relative earnings of young women and men,
relative to each other and relative to the earnings of older workers, are suggestive
of changes in the organisation of resources on which young people draw in
attaining independence from their parental home, in setting up an independent
household and in commencing a family. There has, however, been very limited
research on the resources seen to be necessary to household and family formation
nor, importantly, on the organisation of resource acquisition amongst young
couples involved in household and family formation. The organisation of
parenthood, as a joint enterprise, has received limited attention amongst youth
theorists. In part this is due to an age related definition of survey samples, in
studies of transition, which fall short of furnishing evidence on patterns of family
formation. In part, too, it would appear irrelevant if we were to accept
conventional statements of continuity in the structure of gender inequalities.
However, the separate treatment of female and male transitions is theoretically
problematic. Youth research has characterised the transition to adult status
amongst women and men in terms of a divergence in employment chances, a
divergence organised in relation to parenthood and differing, gendered, childcare
obligations. As we have seen, gender inequalities are described in terms of female
exclusion from male forms of advantage. However, if the latter are predicated on
men's particular relations to household income maintenance it would be more
appropriate to consider the interrelatedness of female and male life cycle
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transitions. In this way we can see them as different facets of a single process,
rather than accept such differences between male and female rites of passage to
adulthood as an adequate description of gendered patterns of transition.
Further, arguments of continuity in gender inequalities in employment and
in household resourcing are at odds with empirical evidence. Itwill be argued that
the closing of gendered earnings differentials amongst young adults is an integral
aspect of changes in earnings relations across age groups over recent decades.
Whilst there is limited evidence available on changes in gendered contributions
to household income maintenance, there is some evidence which suggests an
increase in the importance of female contributions to the financing of households.
Such developments need to be understood in relation to orientations towards
living standards. As one of the parents quoted towards the end of the last chapter
said, 'what to them are essentials, to us were luxuries'. In other words, achieving
a level of material sufficiency prior to family formation or parenthood may be as
much to do with meeting the costs of living as with furnishing a particularly high
living standard. Further, in these quotes, there was a perception that the change
in orientations towards living standards amongst young couples cannot be
separated from the increased importance of the employment and earnings
achievements of young women. The aggregate earnings data explored in this
chapter suggests that these processes, largely neglected by youth researchers, have
a general significance to change in patterns of transition to adult status.
Transition, Gender and the Labour Force
In the last chapter, descriptions of historical changes in transition couched
in terms of greater choice and an increase in individualism were questioned for
their suggestion that values and attitudes have a greater salience now than in the
past, and a different role to play in the explanation of life cycle event timing. This
chapter continues to develop the argument begun in the last, that contemporary
patterns of event timing are organised in relation to the social and economic
resources which underwrite the attainment of independence and which structure
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its relationship to privilege and disadvantage. As Hareven argues, the
development of the welfare state and the post war organisation of resource
transfers in the public domain has been very important to the structure of the
individual and family life cycle (Hareven, 1981; cf. Mayer and Schoepflin, 1989).
The structure of social security, housing costs and availability, inter-generational
resource transfers, as well as labour force opportunities and rewards are all
essential to an explanation of life cycle structure. However, welfare provision and
changes in household demography have not increased choice in the sense argued
by Hareven, but are rather part of a changing structure of which life cycle
transitions are an inseparable part.
Arguments which posit an increase in choice amongst young adults in their
decisions about family formation, on the grounds that they do not face the
economic or familial constraints and obligations faced by earlier generations,
impose an historically relative interpretation which may have little salience for
current generations of youth. Young people do not measure their action against
that of their forebears, and few would appear to perceive a large degree of choice
in the opportunities available to them. However, there are at least two ways in
which the experience of prior generations has a direct bearing on the organisation
of transition amongst contemporary cohorts of young adults. Firstly, family
background may be significant to orientations towards living standards, although
any such influence would need to be considered in conjunction with that of other,
perhaps more salient, reference groups, such as age peers. Secondly, the
experience of the parents of young adults is significant to their particular
household circumstance, to the composition and resourcing of households. As
indicated previously, the relative freedom, amongst youth, from financial
obligations to their parental family, cannot be separated from long term changes
in family structures nor from changes in the respective obligations of different
household members to household resourcing.
It was noted earlier that the youth debate has not engaged with aggregate
level patterns of demographic change nor with the literature which addresses
these changes. Research from a different tradition, into aggregate level rates and
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timing of marriage and fertility, explains historically novel patterns in terms of
gendered changes in employment relations, in particular stressing female
employment and earnings opportunities. Economic theories explain changing
fertility patterns as a consequence of increases in female, relative to male,
earnings. Whilst theorists writing in the area take gendered earnings differences
as a starting point rather than as an explanatory issue, it is notable that sexual
inequality is central to explanations of change in the life cycle, in particular to
changing patterns of marriage and parenthood. Whilst the approach, based in
utility theory, has raised many pertinent criticisms, it is interesting since it locates
centrally the interaction of demography and economy, and identifies gender
relations as important to this process. Before examining the arguments of these
approaches, I will consider some of the developments in gendered patterns of
employment over the post war period. These developments demonstrate the
interaction of reproductive and economic processes. The dynamic is important to
contemporary household structures and to the resourcing of household social
reproduction. The interaction of supply and demand is significant to youth, not
solely in terms of late 20th century employment processes, but also through its
being embedded in current household and family structures.
Patterns of demographic change and developments in family organisation
through the twentieth century were described earlier. Below I consider post war
developments in patterns of female labour force participation, and their relation
to changes in household organisation and resourcing. The increase in female
employment participation since the war has occurred mostly amongst married
women in their thirties and forties, and largely in part time employment (Martin
and Roberts, 1984). The increased participation rate is accounted for by the
greater spread of employment amongst married women, across the population and
over the life cycle, as intervals out of work around childbearing have contracted
(eg. Main, 1988). This latter trend has continued since the war, with it being rare
now to quit the labour force prior to pregnancy, and with increasingly rapid
returns to employment after childbearing. The proportion of women who did not
work at all between their marriage and first birth fell from 37% of those with a
first birth in the 1940s, to 12% of those with a first birth in the 1970s. A
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significant proportion of the latter were pregnant at the time of marriage (Martin
and Roberts, 1984). Declines in periods out of employment during the
childbearing years are summarised by Martin and Roberts, who provide data on
the cumulative percentages ofwomen making an initial return to work after given
periods. Of women having their first birth in 1950-54 the percentages returning
to work within 1, 3 and 5 years stood at 13%, 20% and 28% respectively. Of those
having their first birth in 1975-79 the equivalent percentages stood at 25%, 37%
and 58%. Whilst 51% of women had returned to work within ten years of their
first birth in 1950-'54, by 1970-74 the proportion was 79% (Martin and Roberts,
1984).10
Other data shows particularly dramatic increases occurring during the
1970s, with increasing activity rates of 28% amongst women aged 25-29 between
1971 and 1981, and of 18% amongst women aged 30-34 (United Nations, 1985).
Although these rates seem high they are substantially lower than those of a
number of other countries. The United Nations report explains the growth in
terms of the increasing speed with which women return to work after
childbearing. They argue that this did not change significantly in Britain over the
period, where in 1979 67% of children aged three and four had mothers not
engaged in paid employment, a decrease of 5% since 1973. This change is smaller
than that identified in a number of countries which exhibit rapid growth in
economic activity rates of mothers of very young children, specifically in Canada,
USA, Sweden, Norway and Italy (United Nations, 1985). Britain has increasing
participation rates but they are relatively low where children are very young. It
is likely that another important influence on change in women's participation
rates, dramatically increasing over the "main childbearing years" as described by
UN, is the decline in fertility and the postponement of childbearing. The drop in
fertility, reductions in family size, and the increasingly compressed childbearing
period must be extremely significant to high levels of participation amongst the
age group.
A number of authors, then, cite as highly significant the relationship
between demographic and employment structures at an aggregate level. Economy
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influences the timing and level of fertility. This in turn influences potential labour
supply structure. The population which is socially 'available for work' is an
important factor in recruitment strategies. For example the availability of labour
prepared to work part time is important to the restucturing of particular sectors.
Growth and change in employment opportunities in some service sectors has in
large part been constructed around this option, retailing being the outstanding
example, where part time labour allows a flexibility and a cost efficient
employment strategy on the part of employers (eg. National Institute of Economic
and Social Research, 1986; Hart, 1988). Some employers have reassessed their
reluctance to recruit youth labour on a part time basis given the willingness of
youth, in the context of high unemployment, to accept available employment on
less than preferable terms, (eg. Ashton, et al, 1990).
In the 1950s and 1960s, as ages at childbearing fell and periods between
births decreased, and as returns to work by mothers were made increasingly
quickly, so the standard middle family cycle phase was one where household
resourcing became increasingly parent-centred. Economic growth meant that most
youngsters could firmly expect to enter employment on leaving school. The
growing affluence amongst youth underlay its new significance to commerce. The
targeting of this section of the population as a significant consumer group
reflected a circumstance where young people, with limited family obligations,
could spend their income in the market rather than dedicate it to household
finances. The general importance of parental earnings in supporting a reduced
family size contributed to the enablement of youth as an extended period of
semi-dependency. Change in household structures over the long term is important
as an aspect of contemporary economic processes. Positioning with respect to
household obligations is important to the structuring of relative rewards for
different groups within the labour force, but also in terms of how, and under what
circumstances, people organise the resources required for daily reproduction.
Whilst over recent decades young people in general have fewer financial
obligations to their parental families than did their parents and grandparents,
these changes do not equate with an increase in individualism, or a greater
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salience of norms to the timing of life cycle transitions. The suggestion of greater
choice, and of a change in the explanatory validity of norms, is problematic, and
begs the question as to how such evaluative decisions should be located.11 An
argument that social norms are historically more important, like the emphasis by
Hutson and Jenkins on nominal dig money as an exercise in money management
(Hutson and Jenkins, 1989), suggests that family, or household, structure is less
relevant now to an understanding of the life cycle than it once was. However,
changes in household structures over the long term are an important aspect of
contemporary economic processes and are inseparable from developments in
labour demand, levels of female participation, changing expectations concerning
women's employment and changes in the significance of female contributions to
household income maintenance.
Pay Structures and Household Reproduction
L Economic Models ofFertility
Unlike the youth literature, economic models of fertility patterns take as
axiomatic the interaction of economic structure and patterns of household and
family formation. Two schools dominate explanations of change in fertility
patterns: Easterlin's Relative Income Hypothesis and the New Home Economics
model of fertility. Both approaches identify significant changes in life cycle
patterns and place economic relations centrallywithin their explanation of change.
A problem for demographic forecasting has been measuring the extent to which
dramatic falls in period fertility rates signal an overall drop in total fertility, or a
deferral amongst younger age groups. The economic models are concerned
primarily with aggregate patterns of fertility but also, as an aspect of this, with the
timing of first and subsequent births. Within the models the significance of
economic change to the timing of parenthood is formalised. They present an
explanation of early life course transitions, formulated at an aggregate, national
level. Although they are concerned with similar issues these explanations have had
a negligible impact within sociological discussions of transitions from youth to
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adulthood.
Easterlin explains change in fertility in terms of aspirations towards living
standards, as these are determined by relative cohort size. The size of successive
generations is seen to affect economic opportunities, with large cohorts depressing
opportunities through increased competition for available work, and small cohorts,
conversely, experiencing more favourable economic circumstances. Fertility is a
function of relative economic status, or relative income: the ratio of young men's
earnings relative to their aspirations. These aspirations are formed during
adolescence in relation to fathers' income. Fertility is positively associated with
economic status so the model predicts a cyclical variation in fertility rates. In the
American example, the generation of childbearing age in the early post war
period were members of small cohorts born during the Depression years of the
1930s. Faced with limited competition as they entered work, they experienced
high achievement and earnings relative to their older peers. Combined with
aspirations formed during the depression, economic achievement encouraged
earlier marriage and high fertility. In contrast, cohorts born in the 1950s and '60s
grew up in a period of relative affluence and formed high aspirations, but met
with relative economic disadvantage on entering the labour force. This cohort was
therefore responsible for delays in marriage and a reduction in fertility rates.
(Easterlin, 1968; also see Oppenheimer, 1982).
In this model, incomes of young relative to older men is assumed to be a
function of relative cohort size. This, of course, assumes a perfectly competitive
labour market (or one where the aggregate consequences are the same), a finite
level of employment and an aggregate structure of rewards which accords with
aggregate fertility patterns. British evidence indicates a covariation between
relative cohort size and fertility rates, but not between relative income and
fertility rates (Ermisch, 1979). That is, the relationship between cohort size and
relative income across generations does not accord with the Easterlin hypothesis.
Easterlin has admitted that covariation of fertility and age structure may be
coincidental (Easterlin and Condran, 1976, quoted in Ermisch, 1979). This
patterning is anyway country specific, and the hypothesised relationship between
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cohort size and fertility fails to provide an adequate description of fertility
patterns across several countries (Wright, 1989).
Oppenheimer, in her analysis of patterns of marriage and fertility in the
United States, is influenced by Easterlin, but develops a more detailed analysis
of the importance of changes in female labour force participation (Oppenheimer,
1982). One of her principle concerns is to explain class related differences in the
timing of marriage and parenthood, which she explores through an analysis of
reference groups. Social classes with steep age earnings profiles form families at
later ages in part because of an 'economic squeeze', an imbalance between their
lifestyle aspirations and their current resources. Oppenheimer analyses data from
the United States Census for the period 1959 to 1969, a period which saw a
decline in the earnings of young, relative to older, men (in contrast to British
developments). She suggests that, other things remaining equal, the period would
have seen a postponement in the timing of marriage, but, critical of Easterlin, she
argues that the increasing employment commitment of young women became a
functional substitute for young men's earnings, and that female contributions to
household resourcing became increasingly significant. She challenges Easterlin's
model of a cyclical relation between economic circumstances and aspirations,
arguing that the more extensive work commitment of women, and their financial
contributions to the household economy, has been incorporated into family
strategies in the timing of parenthood (Oppenheimer, 1982).
The New Home Economics (NHE) school similarly stresses the importance
of changes in female employment participation, and claims a more accurate
description and explanation of changes in fertility patterns than that proposed by
Easterlin (eg. De Cooman et al, 1987; Ermisch, 1988). Ermisch criticises the
significance granted by Easterlin to relative economic status, since empirical
evidence suggests its failure to accord with recent declines in fertility (Ermisch,
1983, 1988). The preferred model emphasises changes in women's labour force
participation rates, and in female relative to male earnings. Here the relationship
between female and male positions and rewards in the labour market is the most
important motor of change in fertility rates and timing. As with Easterlin, the
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relationship between economic and domestic spheres is central, but here it is
articulated in terms of the gendered patterning of rewards. Based in utility theory,
the NHE model assumes that the relative disparities between male and female
earning opportunities underlie the household sexual division of labour. Marriage
is seen as a partnership whose aim is to maximise the expected well being of a
couple, where the complementarity of their time is related to differential earnings
opportunities. The gain from the domestic division of labour increases with the
disparity in spouses' wages. Rises in women's wages relative to men's therefore
reduces incentives to marry and similarly the desirability of children is inversely
related to the ratio of female to male wages (Ermisch, 1981). The probability that
a woman of childbearing age will enter the labour force is a function of her
husband's earnings and her own earnings capacity. For working wives, as their
earnings increase, so do the opportunity costs of having children. The model
predicts then, that for any level of male income, as relative female wages increase,
women will have fewer children and space them more closely. The models also
predict a delay in the timing of first births, with later marriage, and a longer
childless period in the early years of marriage (Ermisch, 1983, 1988). Increases in
earnings capacities ofwomen relative to men will increase female lifetime labour
force attachment and this, along with high income ratios, will result in lower
marriage and fertility rates, and a delay in marriage and parenthood relative to
previous cohorts. The steep decline in fertility since the late 1960s, and older ages
at parenthood are interpreted in Ermisch's argument as a consequence of
increased female labour force commitment and increased female relative to male
earnings.
Cast at an aggregate level, the NHE argument posits that increases in
female employment opportunities and earnings levels are central to an
explanation of declines in fertility rates and to deferral of marriage and
parenthood. Other factors are acknowledged as important, for example housing
costs and housing availability, the subjective costs and ease of contraception, and
lifestyle aspirations. The theory does not address women's career paths in any
detail although change in career structures is an implication of the approach. Nor
does the theory attempt to explain why later family formation should be an
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optimum strategy in relation to employment sector specific career and earnings
prospects. The argument does not predict a continuing decrease in fertility in the
hypothetical event that aggregate earnings ratios were to continue their trend to
increasing parity, but that fertility rates would follow an asymptotic approach to
a minimum level (Ermisch, 1979). There are a number of critiques of the
characterisation of individual level behaviour in these models (eg. Blake, 1968;
Turchi, 1975; Sanderson 1976; Wright, 1989). Turchi criticises the NHE models
for their assumption of homogeneous tastes across the population, and asks
whether reproduction is governed by differential social norms. It is not so much
potential parents' objective situation with respect to income and expenditure but
their subjective assessment of their current and future situation which is important
to understanding reproductive behaviour. This issue is taken up in Chapter 6.
Turchi also argues that the aggregate level data used for the models is is often
inappropriate for factors affecting individual or family decisions (Turchi, 1975).
The purpose here is not to dwell on all the standard objections but to consider
the nature of causality as it is represented in the NHE explanation of change in
fertility patterns.
it Diversity and Explanation
Models, of course, simplify complex processes, but their strength is
dependent on the efficacy with which they correctly identify and reconstruct the
most salient of these processes, and on their success in reproducing patterns to
be explained. The latter of course is no guarantee of the former, in which case
such models will mislead as to their explanatory and predictive potential. In
simplifying change in gendered earnings patterns, the economic models use
average earnings data. However, given the interrelatedness of life cycle stage and
earnings this appears to be problematic. For example, the direction of causality
implied by the NHE models is not necessarily as straightforward as it might at
first appear. Inter-cohort improvements in earnings ratios between sexes may be
a consequence as well as a cause of reduced fertility and later ages at parenthood.
Similar earnings ratios amongst male and female youth fall off with age. As a
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youth cohort ages so its working female population is increasingly divided
between those with continuous and those with discontinuous employment
histories. Further, aggregate earnings data ignore those women who are
temporarily out of the labour force. Gender earnings ratios increase with age.
This pattern reflects different earnings opportunities, and greater access to
internal labour markets and career routes for young men. However it is also likely
that the ratio of female to male earnings for those women with continuous
employment histories falls at a slower rate than the aggregate average. As cohorts
age this average will cover a great diversity of labour force experiences. With
ample evidence that female returners experience 'downward mobility' (eg. Dex
and Shaw, 1986; Martin and Roberts, 1984; Elias and Main, 1982), their earnings
average is expected to be lower than women of equivalent age with continuous
work histories. There has been limited research conducted into the patterning of
earnings amongst continuous and discontinuous workers. Better earnings ratios
amongst female continuous workers are a consequence not solely of their
continuity but also of their positioning within employment. Discontinuity is more
likely to be attached to employment disadvantage, and continuity to advantage.
A study of earnings of continuous workers is likely to select out women involved
in careers and with a better ratio to age equivalent men. There is some empirical
evidence in support of this argument. A comparative, European, study found that
in most countries across Europe, and in most employment sectors, length of job
tenure reduces the female to male earnings gap (United Nations, 1985).
The implications of this for aggregate earnings data are not
straightforward. On the one hand earnings ratios decrease as age increases. This
would suggest that the overall average might be reduced as more women at older
ages are included in a sample of the working population at any point in time. On
the other hand, it seems possible that reduced fertility amongst younger age
groups, and longer continuous periods in work prior to childbirth would inflate
a cohort's female to male average earnings ratio, relative to that of earlier
cohorts. The direction of causality implied by the NHE models is not as
straightforward as it might at first appear. Inter-cohort improvements in earnings
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ratios between women and men may be a consequence as well as a cause of
decreased fertility and later ages at parenthood.
Data from my own survey is limited with respect to these issues, but
evidence is in accord with the argument that female continuous workers maintain
a level of income more similar to their male peers than do discontinuous workers.
Individual level data on female to male income ratios is obviously restricted to
those members of the sample who had a partner. The survey did not collect
detailed income history data of partners, so amongst the sample the following
uses only the current ratio of partners' income. Dividing the sample into three
age groups each with a similar number of respondents indicates a female to male
ratio which declines over successive age groups; that is, women's earnings do not
keep pace with male partner's earnings. This pattern in shown in Table 5.1.








20-23 N 24-27 N 28 + N
MEN*
£6700 10 £8200 9 £9000 7
.99 5 .79 6 .71 4
WOMEN
£5000 8 £6400 9 £7800 6
£5000 8 £6800 7 £8700 3
.85 8 .71 5 .88 4
*
Only male retail and insurance workers are included to enable sector specific comparability with
women.
The data amongst female respondents shows no patterning of earnings
ratios over age groups. It may be that the high ratio of the oldest groups is related
to long, unbroken careers. Seven out of the eight women aged 20 to 23, a group
with very low earnings, are employed in the retailing sector. Their high income
ratios suggest that, with their partners, they are in quite disadvantaged economic
circumstances. A comparison between income for all women in this sample, and
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income for childless women, shows a higher level of earnings for the latter group.
These women have an earnings average which is much closer to the male average
amongst equivalent (insurance and retailing) sectors. Whilst the numbers are very
small the evidence corresponds with what we would expect: women with
continuous employment experience have earnings profiles which are more similar
to those of their male peers than do women with discontinuous employment
profiles.
Ermisch rejects the validity of the Easterlin Hypothesis through an analysis
of British data which indicates the earnings of young men, relative to older
cohorts, continued to rise over a period of both increasing and decreasing fertility
rates. Older cohorts' earnings are assumed to match fathers' earnings during sons'
adolescence. "Sons'" real wages are shown to increase relative to "fathers'"
throughout the period 1955-1975, although they are quite constant between 1966
and 1973. The theoretical significance of "fathers'" income at a point fixed 15
years previously does not take into account current cost of living. It may be that
it is considered to serve as a proxy for perceptions of age related distributive
justice, although this is not developed. Ermisch, in comparing fathers' and sons'
earnings, constructs a series of cohort earnings relativities by taking average
earnings for seven years before time t (to represent sons' earnings) and comparing
this figure to the average over ten years before t-5. The resulting series shows
increasing real wages of young men from 1955 through 1975, a period of both
increasing and decreasing fertility. Ermisch uses these results to reject the validity
of a relative income hypothesis. However, these results reflect the earnings of
youth to those of still quite young men. Ermisch graphs change in fertility rates
amongst 20-24 year old women, and these demonstrate the downturn in fertility
in the mid 1960s. This he uses to argue a discrepancy between fertility and (male)
relative earnings (Ermisch, 1979). Yet other evidence on the timing of first births
shows the most dramatic recent historical change to have occurred somewhat
later, through the cohorts born in the mid 1950s on (Thompson, 1980). This along
with another measure of relative earnings suggests the value of reconsidering the
relationship between youth and adult earnings in explaining patterns of
parenthood.
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It is suggested that the models of fertility described above are most
interesting for their stress on the link between female and male earnings in
relation to family formation, and their concern with gendered processes as
important to the patterning of life cycle transitions. It is possible to develop this
emphasis without adhering to the tenets of a model based in utility theory but to
develop it in a way that addresses the nature of change in the domestic division
of labour, rather than taking it as a given.
tit Diversity and Change
Models from within the NHE school were criticised above for focusing on
aggregate patterns of change without taking on their manifestation at the level of
the household, and of earnings relationships between spouses. There is some
research which has been conducted into this issue, and analyses made of the
relationship between increases in female labour force participation and financial
contributions within the household. Findings here indicate a high level of stability
in female contributions to family finances. A more detailed disaggregation of
available data suggests that arguments of stability flow from a still quite aggregate
level of analysis, one which hides important processes underlying change.
Two recent research studies argue a relative stability in the level of wives'
earnings contributions to their households. Rainwater and his colleagues, in a
comparative study of the United States, Britain and Sweden, argue there has
been continuity of female contributions over their data period from the late 1950s
to the late 1970s, with slight increases only in the Swedish case. Joshi, using
British data, argues that there was an increase in wives' income contributions in
the 1970s, and that its level stabilised thereafter. It is argued below that both
studies reach their conclusions on the basis of too general an interpretation of
their data, since a more detailed reading suggests that, contrary to their
conclusions, significant changes are occurring both in gendered contributions to
household resourcing, and in the age patterning of earnings.
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Rainwater and his colleagues criticise the "two revolution" description of
change in gender inequalities which posits that the revolution in female labour
force participation is associated with an equity revolution where women, in
consequence, become more equal partners with their husbands. They argue that
the framework treats women as an homogeneous category, and fails to
differentiate changes in participation rates amongst different categories ofwomen.
They prefer to distinguish aspects of female employment in terms of participation,
attachment, continuity and contribution to family income. Their analyses are
based on mothers' earnings, and they emphasise in particular the importance of
separating labour force participation and contributions to family income
(Rainwater et al, 1986). Thus, in the United States in 1959, 20% of mothers had
earnings. This had increased to 42% by 1969, and to 64% by 1978. Over the same
period, according to the authors, women's contribution remained quite constant
at around 20% of the total household income package.
In the analysis by Rainwater and his colleagues there is no distinction
between the different career stages of women. Given that the sample is based on
mothers, it must cover a range of different ages of children, periods spent back
in the labour force, presence in full and part time work, and of course, availability
of employment and income opportunities. Because the analysis is conducted in
cross section it tells nothing about change in longitudinal earnings contributions.
In a further analysis the authors examine mothers' earnings, differentiating by
periods of unbroken labour force attachment (Rainwater et al, 1986). Here there
is some association between level of continuity and contribution, but it is argued
to be still quite limited. The authors note the furthest progression in patterns of
continuity is in Sweden, where by 1978, 69% of women with pre-school children
were labour force participants. Here they find that there has been a substantial
rise in female contributions to family income. Yet, they argue, once continuity is
controlled for, there is no trend towards a growing contribution in either the U.S.
or Sweden. The process of change, it appears, is illusory. By standardising for
continuity the authors drop a fundamental aspect of gender inequality. What they
suggest may be important to arguments that gendered earnings differences cannot
be accounted for solely in terms of labour force discontinuity. However, it is
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surprising that this aspect of female experience and gender inequality should be
'controlled' for so readily. Continuity is extremely important to income patterns,
and is also important to contribution profiles over the individual and family life
cycle. Evidence of change in female employment continuity over the life cycle
suggests that we might be especially interested in its relation to household
resourcing.
Data on participation rates amongst American birth cohorts, presented by
Rainwater and his colleagues (Rainwater et al, 1986) illustrates the dramatic
changes over this century, with the cohort born in 1946-50 being the first to
manifest a profile involving a higher cohort participation rate amongst the 25-29
year olds than amongst 20-24 year olds. This is almost certainly a consequence of
declines in fertility and historically later ages at childbearing. However, the
analysis of continuous participation extends only to 1979. If the most
"revolutionary" change occurred in patterns of fertility amongst those born in the
late 1940s and on, for these women to fall within the analysis of mothers'
participation rates would require them to be young mothers. Included women
would, therefore, be representative of a particular subsample, and not amongst
the vanguard of "postponers". The authors' analyses of continuity, and its
relationship to contribution, do not differentiate by cohorts, and do not contain
data on those with the most historically novel fertility behaviour. Yet it is amongst
such women that more significant changes in earnings contributions are likely to
occur.
Joshi, using Department of Employment data, also notes evidence of
continuities in levels of female contribution to household finances. Whilst there
was an increase in female relative to male earnings ratios during the 1970s it was,
Joshi maintains, a one-off occurrence. The ratio amongst manual sectors rose
from 60% from the late 1960s to over 70% by 1977. This ratio has remained quite
stable since that increase which Joshi associates with the Equal Pay Act (Joshi,
1989). It is possible to reproduce this finding from an appraisal of New Earnings
Survey data which demonstrates very similar aggregate patterns of stability from
the late 1970s onwards, as shown in Table 5.2.
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Estimated from the New Earnings Survey. The ratio
of gross weekly earnings is lower, at around 60%)
Disaggregating these earnings ratios by age suggests the above figures
impose a uniformity which is at odds with the experience of different groups
within the labour force.
Table 5.3 Gross hourly pay: female as a percentage ofmale earnings by age group
(medians).
Year
1968 1976 1982 1988
Age group: % % % %
under 18 100.0 100.8 97.4 105.2
18 - 20 81.3 90.5 90.4 92.9
21 - 24 72.8 84.6 85.4 89.0
25 - 29 70.2 81.8 84.7 89.3
estimated from the New Earnings Survey.
The data shown in Table 5.3 illustrates the similarities in male and female
earnings averages at the youngest ages, and their rising discrepancy over
successive age groups as employment processes reward men more highly than
women. Joshi's data indicates a stability in average earnings ratios from 1977 to
1988. However, the age disaggregated data reveals that disparities between female
and male earnings have continued to decline throughout the 1980s.
However, while female earnings appear to be improving relative to male
ones, the data says nothing of the relative wealth or poverty of young people. It
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might hide a pattern where earnings relative to those of the general population
have declined so that young people are worse off in relation to general
consumption standards than they were say twenty years ago. This, indeed, appears
to be the case. There are no consistent data series on age related earnings
patterns across all workers throughout the post-war period. It is, however, possible
to reconstruct available data to show the trends in the earnings of youth relative
to older workers. Wells undertook such a reconstruction in his analysis of data
from the October Enquiry and the New Earnings Survey. The former is a survey
into the earnings and hours of manual workers, carried out annually from 1948,
and providing data on age related earnings until 1980, based on aggregate returns
by employing extablishments. The New Earnings Survey is based on a sample of
employees, and covers all occupations and industries, and provides a
disaggregation of earnings by age group and gender.12
Wells analyses the October Enquiry data (on manual workers) for the
period between 1948 and 1979. The average earnings of males under 21 relative
to those of adult men rose, gradually, from 41.6% in 1951 to 49.0% in 1972. The
average earnings of females under 18 relative to those of adult men remained
constant at 33-34% between 1952 and 1972, the earnings of both girls and boys,
relative to adult male workers, having fallen slightly between 1948 and 1951.
From 1972 the average earnings of young men and women relative to those of
adult males rose rapidly until the mid 1970s. After this period they remained
constant, at around 56.5% for young males under 21 and at around 40% for
young females under 18 (Wells, 1983). Wells explains the relatively sharp increase
in the earnings of young men from the late 1960s to the mid 1970s, and the
similarly sharp increase in the earnings of young women from 1972 to 1974 as
attributable to a number of factors, specifically the lowering of the age of majority
from 21 to 18 in 1969, the raising of the school leaving age from 15 to 16 in
September 1972, and as a consequence of income policies of the period. After the
lowering of the age of majority, there was a rapid decrease in the ages at which
adult rates were paid to employees. Department of Employment statistics cited
by Wells show that in 1975, 16% of young workers did not receive adult rates
until they were aged 21 or over, in contrast to 72% in 1970 (Wells, 1983).
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After the mid-1970s there was a decline in the earnings of young relative
to older workers (Wells, 1983; Black, 1990). Both of these authors examine New
Earnings Survey data up to 1982. In Table 5.4, I reproduce data from the New
Earnings Survey from the early 1970s up until 1990. Young adults earnings are
shown as a percentage of male peak earnings. The latter serves as an index of
general consumption standards, or living costs, based on the median earnings of
the highest earning age group across the population, that is of men aged 30-39 or
40-49, whichever is the higher. It might be considered as a measure of a 'full adult
wage', that is, a wage that can carry the major part of household resourcing (cf.
Siltanen, 1986). The table presents percentages derived from data on gross hourly
earnings, but an analysis of gross weekly earnings shows a very similar trend, in
the continued decline, through the 1980s, in the earnings of young men and young
women, relative to male peak earnings. I have chosen to use the measure in
preference to an aggregate average of those aged over 21. Indeed, the changes
amongst age groups in their 20s is suggestive of a general 'stretching' of age
related earnings, with an increasing differential between young male and older
male workers, where the former includes those in their 20s. Amongst men in their
20s, the decline in earnings relative to the highest earning age group commenced
prior to the decline amongst the youngest age groups. This trend is not apparent
fromWells' comparison of youth and adult earnings, and suggests that the average
of adult earnings over the period of his analysis disguises changes in the age
distribution of male adult earnings.
The earnings of young women and men relative to the full adult wage
index reveal a pattern of decline from the late 1970s onwards. As female to male
earnings have narrowed so this has been accompanied by a decline in the earnings
of young men, relative to full adult earnings, starting in the mid to late 1970s and
becoming pronounced through the 1980s. It is apparent from Table 5.4 that the
improving female to male earnings ratio cannot be separated from the decline in
young men's earnings. The earnings of teenage women and men declined relative
to adult peak earnings, from 1976 to 1990. Over this period, there was a decline
in the relative earnings of women aged 20 to 24, relative to peak adult earnings,
but it was less marked than amongst age equivalent men. Amongst women aged
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Table 5.4. Young adults' earnings as a percentage of those of the highest earning age
group. Median, gross hourly, earnings.13
Year
1968 1970 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Aee % % % % % % % % % % %
MALES
under 18 31 33 39 40 40 40 39 36 35 36 35
18-20 57 57 61 62 62 61 57 55 53 52 52
21-24 82 82 83 82 81 79 75 73 72 70 71
25-29 93 94 96 95 94 92 89 88 86 85 85
FEMALES
under 18 31 32 37 41 40 40 38 35 38 38 39
18-20 46 47 51 55 55 54 52 50 49 48 50
21-24 60 61 63 69 68 66 64 63 62 63 64
25-29 65 66 69 77 77 77 76 76 76 76 78
25 to 30, relative earnings held quite constant, even improving slightly between
1988 and 1990. The improving ratio of female to male earnings, through the
1980s, appears to be a consequence of differing, gendered, rates of decline. The
change in gendered earnings patterns amongst young adults has as much to do
with declines in young men's earnings relative to peak adult earnings as with
improvements in the earnings of young women. Among the youngest age group
the increase from 1970-74 coincided with the raising of the school leaving age,
which is expected to raise average earnings amongst the sample. Amongst males
aged 18-24, the periods of most rapid change coincided with the recessions of the
early 1970s and '80s.
From 1974 to 1982, men aged 30 to 39 were the highest earning age group.
From 1984 onwards, the highest gross weekly earnings, including overtime, fell
amongst the 40 to 49 year age group. By 1988, gross hourly earnings, as well as
gross weekly earnings, were achieved by the male 40 to 49 year age group. Black
notes the decline in the relative earnings of 20 to 24, and 25 to 29 year old males
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from 1974-'75 onwards but, like Wells, he focuses in his discussion of changing
age differentials on the experience of those aged 20 and under. He notes the
widening of the (teenage) youth to adult pay differential since 1979 which, he
suggests, may be due to increases in the relative pay ofmore highly paid workers,
who tend to be older, rather than due to a widening of age differentials per se
(Black, 1990). Given his acceptance that the age-earnings profile across the
population is a reflection of increases in human capital attributes, in the form of
skills and work experience, this argument seems disingenuous. That the highest
paid workers 'happen to be older' does not undermine the significance of age
related changes in the structure of earnings differentials.
In summary, the earnings of male youth relative to those of adult men
improved gradually through the post-war period up until 1972, and female youth
earnings remained constant as a proportion of male youth earnings. From this
year until 1975, there was a rapid rate of increase in the earnings of both male
and female youth relative to those of adult male average earnings (Wells, 1983).
Full age-disaggregated data are not available for this period. From the mid-1970s
onwards, and considering also young adults in their 20s, there was an
improvement in the earnings of young women relative to young men, and a
decline in the earnings of young men relative to the median earnings of the
highest earning age group. The increasing discrepancy between young men's
earnings and peak adult earnings from the mid 1970s on, and improvements in
young women's earnings, coincide with patterns of deferral in family formation,
relative to previous cohorts.
This pattern also corresponds with expectations concerning home
ownership, and with escalating house prices through the 1980s, and corresponds
with evidence of the current importance of joint contributions to house purchase,
and with expectations concerning women's employment continuity prior to
childbirth. The series of events which occurred in this period very probably
coincided in their influence on patterns of birth timing, so their effects are
difficult to isolate. The raising of the school leaving age in 1973, the onset of
world recession, equal opportunities and equal pay legislation are expected to
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have been important to the 'deferral' of parenthood. The male and female
earnings figures should not be seen in isolation from one another. Changes in
female and male earnings relative to general consumption standards, and their
association with changing patterns of family formation, suggest a growing salience
of female earnings to patterns of family formation as well as to household income
maintenance over the family life cycle. Improvements in the earnings position of
young women relative to young men should not be seen straightforwardly as a
positive reason for later ages at parenthood as suggested by the New Home
Economists' assumptions of opportunity cost. Rather, patterns of deferral in family
formation are inseparable from changes in the income of both young women and
young men, relative to general consumptions standards.
Contrary to arguments of continuity in gendered earnings ratios since the
mid 1970s, the empirical evidence shows that the gap between the earnings of
young men and women has narrowed, and that this pattern has coincided with an
increasing discrepancy between the earnings of young people, and those of older
age groups. In turn, these developments are associated with patterns of deferral
in the timing of family formation, relative to previous cohorts, from the mid 1970s
onwards. It is argued that declines in the earnings of young men, relative to those
of the highest earning age group, and improvements in the earnings of young
women relative to those of young men, both embody and reflect changes in the
ways young adults organise the resourcing of new households. The literature on
transitions from youth to adult status has considered the impact of economic
change on event timing or on the life cycle, but the way the research questions
have been formulated has resulted in a static notion of the life cycle, as if it were
an autonomous area of social experience. This chapter has attempted to
demonstrate the value of exploring the dynamic relationship between life cycle
processes and economic change.
It is suggested that improvements in young women's earnings are
inseparable from the general decline in young men's earnings, relative to those
of the highest earning age group. There is a restructuring of gendered earnings
patterns amongst young adults, which appears to be linked to the increased
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discrepancy between rewards to youth and full adult earnings. The latter is
considered as an index of general consumption standards. It is suggested that, in
not keeping pace with improvements in the earnings of the highest earning age
group, the earnings of young men have lagged behind increases in living costs. A
corresponding trend is the improvement in young women's earnings and, it seems
plausible to argue, these aggregate level trends reflect on changes in the
importance of young women's earnings in patterns of family formation. These
joint processes, of changes in the relative earnings amongst young adults, and
their relation to changes in the position of young adults relative to general
consumption standards, are inseparable from patterns of deferral in the timing of
family formation. In the aggregate level analysis, median earnings of the highest
earning age group have been used as a proxy for general living costs, or lifestyle
orientations, against which to appraise changes in the relative position of young
adults. Such an analysis is theoretically coherent, reflecting as it does the
inseparability of resource availability and orientations towards living standards in
decisions around household and family formation. The next chapter develops this
theme at a more disaggregated level of analysis, in order to examine social
inequalities in the organisation of transition.
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6. Lifestyles, Orientations and Occupational Careers
Introduction
Youth research, in hypothesising and exploring the possibility of an
extended period of dependency, has inadvertently set something of a riddle: why
should labour force disadvantage prolong youth dependency when traditionally it
has been associated with early independence? Research which argued the collapse
in employment opportunities, and social polarisation between those with and
those without secure employment, suggested that young people, displaced by
economic change, faced novel social circumstances as a consequence of their
labour force disadvantage. The hypothesised social disruption was set up in terms
of researchers' expectations that employment, however limited in its rewards and
opportunities, is a prerequisite to "normal" transitions from youth to adulthood.
Deferral in the attainment of independence and adult lifestyles has been seen as
a potential consequence of resource disadvantage, yet this argument has not been
located in relation to the traditional expectation that economic disadvantage is
associated with early adult status. As we have seen, conclusions have been
reached in the absence of an historical understanding of patterns of change in life
cycle event timing. Comparisons amongst contemporary cohorts have been
inconclusive. In the last chapter, a method of relating the resource circumstances
of youth to an index of general consumption standards proved valuable for
elucidating patterns of change in the position of youth and young adults relative
to the population as a whole. This chapter disaggregates the index of general
consumption or living standards, and explores the relation between inequality and
the organisation of early transitions from dependence to independence.
A positive feature of the life cycle literature lies in its interpretation of the
interaction between transitions to adult status and longitudinal, or lifetime, career
and income prospects. Through emphasising the relationship between patterns of
event timing and differing lifetime resource and income profiles, it forces
attention to prospective, as well as current and 'background' socioeconomic
circumstances. Class related differences in the timing of domestic life cycle events
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are explained with reference to future, lifetime, economic prospects. Rising
earnings over (male) middle class careers suggest that later ages at parenthood
can better accommodate the probable, if temporary, loss ofmothers' earnings and
the costs of children, relative to lifestyle aspirations. Job insecurity and a shallow
earnings gradient over working class employment trajectories, where young adults
quite rapidly attain earnings levels which they will not progress far beyond, are
seen to encourage younger ages at family formation since there is little to be
gained by delay. A class related patterning of early life cycle transition behaviour,
whose explanation invokes future careers and life chances, requires a theory of
the orientations through which such futures are rendered meaningful for
individual action. However, the structuring of orientations is rarely addressed in
detail. Models of class differences in life cycle event timing rely on rather crude
distinctions between class categories, within which orientations are deduced, and
equated with a set of attitudes and expectations. In these descriptions, class
processes are seen to underlie differences in life cycle event timing because of
differences in lifetime income profiles and life chances, where middle class
careers reward long term planning and working class circumstances render it
irrelevant (eg. Roberts, 1968; Ashton, 1975; Wallace, 1987a; Jones, 1986; Dunnell,
1979; Kiernan and Diamond 1983).
The problem, then, is one of translating the relationship between lifetime
careers and earnings profiles on the one hand and the patterning of life cycle
transitions amongst young adults. Prospective careers are standardly seen to be
significant to current behaviour through social actors' orientations to their futures.
Orientations are seen to be strongly class related. However, in studies of life cycle
event timing, particularly those using large data sets (eg. Kiernan and Diamond,
1983; Jones, 1986; Oppenheimer, 1982) orientations are rarely subject to empirical
analysis. Rather, they are deduced from a cross sectional definition of class, based
on current employment position. However, given the problems which arise from
assuming current employment position to be an adequate indicator of a 'class
career' (Jones, 1986; cf. Stewart et al, 1980) such a definition of orientations is
reductionist, and fails to improve our understanding of actors' socioeconomic
location and subjectivities. Assumptions of orientations based on current class
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location impose their authors' understandings of rational action, in the absence
of data on lifetime labour force trajectories, or empirical investigation of the
perceptions of young adults themselves. An adequate theory of orientations
requires that we locate actors' perceptions of their circumstances in relation not
only to measures of their current social location but also to the processes which
shape labour force and domestic careers over the life cycle. Indeed, standard
patterns of movement through employment over the life cycle suggest that an
adequate understanding of current class location necessarily requires a sensitivity
to potentially diverse career routes. Orientations, then, should necessarily be
integral to an understanding of class related variation in life cycle event timing.
However, it is necessary to explore the ways in which orientations are constituted
in relation to lifetime trajectories, rather than attempt to read them from cross
sectional definitions of class.
This chapter considers variation in patterns of life cycle event timing
amongst survey respondents, in relation to a measure of repondents' orientations
to the future derived from respondents' perceptions of the circumstances of others
in their employing organisation. Orientations are defined here as perceptions of
current circumstance and well being, relative to significant reference groups and
relative to associated expectations for the future. Through data gathered in the
main survey the analysis explores the relationship between employment
circumstances and life cycle trajectories and develops a theory of orientations
which makes central the perceptions, amongst respondents, of the relationship
between their current and future circumstances.
Class and Careers
Goldthorpe and his colleagues provide a succinct statement of the standard
understanding of class related orientations, an understanding which is
conventionally reflected in descriptions of class differences in the timing of
marriage, parenthood and so on (Goldthorpe et al, 1969; Ashton, 1976;
Oppenheimer, 1982; Jones, 1986; Wallace, 1987a). The 'traditional' working class
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model is one where a structured lack of opportunity corresponds with orientations
which are immediate in their outlook, "the major economic concern is with being
able to maintain a certain standard and style of living, not with the continuous
advancement of consumption norms and widening of cultural experience. -This
emphasis on the present and lack of concern for "planning ahead" are —
encouraged by the view that there is in fact little to be done about the future, that
it is not to any major extent under the individual's control. Fatalism, acceptance
and an orientation to the present thus hold together as a mutually reinforcing set
of attitudes." (Goldthorpe et al., 1969, p.118-119). In contrast and "consistently
with the notion of a social ladder that all have the opportunity to climb, wants
and expectations are, from a middle class standpoint, capable of continuous
enlargement" (Goldthorpe et al, 1969, p.120). The typical objective amongst the
middle classes then, is to make a progressive improvement in consumption
standards, social prestige and lifestyles over their careers. Goldthorpe and his
colleagues maintain that, from the point of view of the individual or family, it is
a key expectation that these lifetime advances will occur, through promotion, a
progressive income and so on.
Orientations, then, are seen to be organised on a class basis. Indeed,
general statements frequently invoke such orientations as part of class culture
which, in descriptions of transitions to adulthood, is important to understandings
of class differences in the timing of independence, parenthood and so on
(Dunnell, 1979, Kiernan and Diamond, 1983; Wallace, 1987a). Goldthorpe places
some importance on employment trajectories, over the life cycle, as part of the
substance of class inequality. This appears to be at odds with his later statements
of the lack of consequence of life cycle related processes for understandings of
class (Goldthorpe, 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). This latter position is
made explicit by Goldthorpe in his 'defence of the conventional view' of
descriptions of women's location in stratification theory. In maintaining that the
secondary earners' jobs do not make a difference to household class position,
Goldthorpe argues that such differences as do occur:
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"we should regard .. as being among those resulting from changes in
household composition - in turn often associated with life cycle stages - and,
hence, as ones which are independent of class position and which can, and
typically do, occur while class position remains stable" (Goldthorpe, 1984,
p.498, original emphasis).
However, if life cycle changes occur whilst class position remains stable
might we not just as easily see such changes as contributing to the definition of
stability? Goldthorpe refers to Rowntree's cycle of poverty model to illustrate the
logic of his argument. Exposure to threat of poverty was an abiding feature of the
class position of labourers' families. Whether or not such a family was below the
poverty line at any time was largely influenced by its composition, particularly its
balance of dependents and of secondary workers (most importantly the presence
of older children). Goldthorpe acknowledges the significance of family
composition but, he argues:
"..it would have been rather obviously unhelpful to see it as testifying to high
rates of mobility in and out of the class of labourers" (Goldthorpe, 1984,
p.498).
Indeed it would seem rather unhelpful. If the threat of poverty is seen as an
abiding feature of a particular class position why should its realisation undermine
that position? Goldthorpe appears to maintain a division between these two
aspects of social experience, but the argument of an independent life cycle
dynamic is at odds with his earlier statement of its class related reproduction.
To separate, as Goldthorpe does, the work of secondary earners, associated
with changes in household composition, or the consequences of life cycle changes,
from household class position, defined by the head's occupation, is a curious
position if we acknowledge that family structure and the family life cycle are
themselves organised in relation to class processes. They are not, however,
reducible to class. Changes in the life cycle of individuals and families have
significant consequences for the organisation of employment demand and rewards
and, by extension, might be seen to have their own consequences for class related
processes. Goldthorpe argues that married women standardly can be allocated to
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their husbands' class position on the grounds that they are secondary wage earners
(Goldthorpe, 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). However, this neglects the
significance of changes in female, relative to male, earnings. These changes,
described in the last chapter, are bound up with life cycle changes, such as
changes in patterns of childbearing and in returns to work, changes in the
organisation of households: their formation, structure and resourcing, and changes
in the relation of members to household income maintenance. To accept the
employment position of the household head as an index of inter-household
inequalities would, quite inappropriately, place such changes outside the concerns
of theories of class and stratification.
The division between life cycle processes and definitions of class is echoed
by Jones in her study of class reproduction and transitions from youth to
adulthood (Jones, 1986; 1987). She argues that conventional models of
stratification are inadequate for describing the experience of youth and early
adulthood, a period characterised by high levels of occupational mobility.
Transitions to adulthood are stratified by class, but current socioeconomic position
is a poor indicator of future class location. Jones proposes that the class position
of young people is best defined by the class of their families of origin. Relations
to fathers' social class is considered a better indicator of class position than
current occupation, since the latter is only 'a stepping stone in a class career'
(Jones, 1986, p.78). Over time, as young adults attain a more stable occupational
identity, class is better defined by their own occupational position. An
understanding of class arrangements amongst youth, then, needs to take account
of current class position but also, importantly, the life cycle trajectory on which
it is situated (Jones, 1986, 1987). However, whilst such an approach suggests the
value of treating life cycle processes as integral to class careers, Jones accepts the
validity of prior class categories, without discussion of their relation to
longitudinal, life cycle, processes.
In her analysis of patterns of transition based on General Household
Survey (GHS) and National Child Development Study (NCDS) data, Jones
develops a typology of youth classes, based on a comparison of occupations across
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generations.14 This typology forms the basis for comparison of life cycle event
timing amongst young adults. The stable middle class and stable working class are
those who 'reproduce', on entry into the labour force, their fathers' current
position in non-manual and manual work. Between these two extremes lie youth
who are described as upwardly mobile from a manual background into non-
manual jobs and those who are downwardly mobile from a non-manual
background into manual jobs. Of the latter, those who 'regain' a middle class,
non-manual position are described as counter-mobile. Jones argues that:
"inter-generational stability is not a matter of simple and direct class
reproduction, but may be achieved through mobility on an intra-generational
basis. Intra-generational mobility is therefore important not only as a means
of achieving upward mobility for those from working class backgrounds, but
also a means of achieving class stability, through counter-mobility of the
middle class. A surprisingly high proportion of the early school leavers among
sons and daughters of middle class fathers are downwardly mobile on entry
into the labour market" (Jones, 1986, p.505).
Jones' youth classes are defined in terms of occupational mobility vis-a-vis
fathers' social class. This shades the complexity of inequality within the youth
classes. For example, if working class respondents are not upwardly mobile to
non-manual employment they remain classified as a single group, and variation
in the experience of those in skilled, semi- and unskilled work is occluded.15
Despite her acknowledgement of the problems of accepting current employment
position as an adequate description of class position amongst youth, Jones accepts
as an appropriate index for defining youth classes a cross sectional measurement
of class background: fathers' current employment position. There is no description
of fathers' own employment careers. Evidence from my survey, however, suggests
that where young adults' social class is compared to fathers' social class position
where the latter were themselves young adults, there is a much greater level of
inter-generational stability than suggested by Jones. This suggests that those
occupational trajectories which she describes as counter-mobile, where a 'lost'
position is regained, might be better described as reflecting inter-generational
class stability, where occupational mobility is a standard career over the life
cycle.16
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Jones is right to pause over the appropriateness of assigning a class
position to youth on the basis of current occupation, but the problem of cross
sectional definitions of class inequalities is not confined to the particular
occupational circumstances of youth. Jones' study falls short of defining life cycle
processes as part of the substance of class related inequality. This problem echoes
that of studies, important to the debate on stratification, of the class position of
clerical workers. Male clerical workers appear to occupy a contradictory class
location, where their earnings are low in relation to those of manual workers, and
out of line with their educational level and occupational status compared to other
occupations. Accounts of this situation which accept the apparent discrepancy as
a valid description of the location of clerical workers in the class structure,
because they accept clerical work as a unitary category, fail to analyse the diverse
career routes into and out of clerical employment. Stewart and his colleagues
argue that through such an analysis the 'discrepancy' between class and status
disappears:
"The mistake implicit in the general formulation is one which identifies the
market circumstances of individuals with the particular occupations they hold.
Individuals at very different career stages may be gathered under one
occupational title and, in addition, many different types of career may be
developed from some general occupations" (Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn,
1980, p.201).
Stewart and his colleagues demonstrate the strength of an occupational career
approach, sensitive to the precise nature of the relationship between occupations
and their incumbents. In their distinction between occupational categories and life
cycle stages the authors demonstrated an integrity in career experiences lost or
mishandled by a series of studies assuming the unity of occupational and social
location (Stewart et al, 1980). So, in the case of social mobility:
"rather than seeing individuals as moving between positions in a fixed
structure, crossing and re-crossing boundaries as they change occupations, we
need to look at occupations and incumbents together. It is not a matter of
one's position at a given time, but of that position in relation to past and
anticipated future experience. Thus, typical patterns of occupational movement
represent not change, but stability" (Prandy, 1986, p. 146, my emphasis).
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Here, then, statements of 'downward mobility' on entry in the workforce,
or of counter-mobility, where a 'lost' position is regained, are argued to be an
artefact of a measurement procedure which neglects to analyse the processes by
which occupational routes, over the life cycle, represent standard, class related
careers. Stewart and his colleagues have been criticised for overstating the
strength of standard processes through which individuals move into promoted
positions and higher status occupations as they age (Erikson and Goldthorpe,
1992). The latter authors stress that by no means all sons who are downwardly
mobile achieve counter-mobility, and they maintain that a higher degree of
uncertainty characterises individuals' worklife mobility chances than suggested by
Stewart and his colleagues. This uncertainty, they argue, is not likely to be
unappreciated by the individuals involved. Nevertheless, the authors also point to
the significance of counter-mobility in creating inter-generational stability in social
class arrangements. It should be noted, too, that 'downward mobility' on entry into
the workforce, where this is defined in relation to fathers' current class position,
is not likely to be interpreted by those involved as a 'loss' of position, as it
appears to be by its theorists.
Clearly, that which Erikson and Goldthorpe describe as mobility strategies
may be undertaken, yet the distribution and propensity to take, for example, a
part time education route to occupational mobility is hardly, itself, incidental to
the class structure. Further, the 'loss' by sons, relative to their fathers, of position
on entry into the workforce, is a misnomer if the standard expectation is one of
economic and status improvements over their working lives. Erikson and
Goldthorpe, in their cross-national comparative analysis, assess mobility rates
against fathers' class at the time of respondents' early adolescence. It seems
implausible to suppose that young adults expect to achieve the occupational
position of their fathers, at the time they enter their first permanent job. It also
seems unlikely that, if young adults leave their parental home to set up a
household and commence a family, they should expect to reproduce the living
standard currently achieved in their parental home. This is not to say that they
are uninfluenced by customary living standards in their orientations to adequate
standards in new households of their own making. No doubt this dynamic may
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contribute to a secular increase in levels of expectations about 'adequate' material
standards for resourcing new households. However, the life cycle dynamic of
earnings and familial obligations, and the expectation of relative wealth and
poverty over the life cycle, is no more likely to be lost on young adults than that
which Erikson and Goldthorpe see as the uncertainty of their class position. In
fact, available evidence, explored in the next chapter, suggests that there is a
perception of fairness in societal resource allocation where higher rewards accrue
to those with greater material obligations to dependents, that is, resource
adequacy is seen to have an important life cycle element.
Both Goldthorpe and Jones see life cycle processes as having some
relevance for understandings of class but for both it is only a partial statement.
For Goldthorpe, different lifetime opportunities obtain across different social
classes, yet by arguing that class related patterns of job mobility, at an individual
level, are irrelevant to class location, he appears to argue also that the life cycle,
and family related processes, are irrelevant to the reproduction of class related
inequality. For Jones, patterns of job mobility are problematic for describing the
circumstances of youth, but not of adults. However, a trajectory, or life cycle,
approach to understanding inequality is salient not because life cycle processes
sometimes encroach on the efficacy of measuring inequality, but because they are
integral to its organisation. The operation of these processes is taken up in detail
in the next chapter. Here I will be concerned principally with the relation between
socioeconomic inequality, orientations and patterns of early life cycle event
timing.
Occupations are inadequate as measures of inequality where they are not
analysed in relation to the particular circumstances and material obligations of
their incumbents. For example, just as we may accept that a female part time
shop assistant married to an unskilled manual worker has a differing class position
than one married to a manager (after Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992), so it would
be curious to suppose that a young single man and an older married man with
dependent children, working in an identical occupation, necessarily share more
than do the female shop assistants. We should be cautious too, in supposing that
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similar entry occupations will channel their incumbents into similar employment
careers. Clearly there is a need for caution over straight divisions, based on
current occupation, as a basis for assuming homogeneity and difference in social
action. In the case of young adults we do not know the precise shape of their
future careers, and to group them on the basis of conventional class divisions
would impose a homogeneity of experience which may be inappropriate. A
preferred approach is to develop a means of identifying social groups which are
cohesive with respect to the processes which structure and differentiate the
attainment of adult status, rights and obligations. Individuals within similar
occupations may be on different career paths and have differing social reference
groups. To explore the orientations and expectations of these young adults will
not allow a privileged understanding of their future but it may accomodate a
more detailed understanding of their current social location. In this way it is
possible to explore event timing in relation to prospective careers, as they are
reflected in the perceptions of the respondents, rather than assume the shape of
future careers on the basis of current occupation. Such an analysis is undertaken
in the subsequent sections, and patterns of actual and anticipated life cycle event
timing amongst respondents are considered in relation to an index of social
location which includes prospective careers as well as current occupation.
Gender and Careers
In Chapter 5,1 argued that there has been an increase in the significance
of female financial contributions to household resourcing and that, in recent
decades, this trend is integral to patterns of deferral in the timing of family
formation. The trend is suggestive of a change in the gendered division of labour
in the reproduction of households and family formation, that is, in the
reproduction of a new generation of children, as well as in the maintenance of
day to day living standards. Female earnings within conjugal households generally
comprise a secondary, component, wage, but it is one that appears, for many,
increasingly necessary to resource an 'adequate' living standard. This dynamic
appears to call into question the adequacy of measures of household inequality
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based on head's occupation (cf. Goldthorpe, 1983; 1984) for elucidating changes
in the organisation of inequality. It is, however, still clearly the case that male
earnings tend to contribute the major component of household financial
resourcing. Nevertheless, a consideration of careers and orientations, and their
relation to patterns of family formation, require a greater sensitivity to the
necessarily joint nature of female and male decisions around marriage and family
formation than is conventionally the case in studies of the transition to adult
status. It would be valuable to compare gendered earnings relativities, at the
household level, prior to the birth of the first child, across generations. To my
knowledge there is little data available on this. In this and the subsequent section,
I address gendered relations to career routes, amongst the respondents, and
across their employing sectors more generally, and explore respondents'
perceptions of gendered responsibilities for household income maintenance.
The youth sample covered respondents aged between 16 and 35. Whilst
there is a corresponding variation in the career stages of the respondents, the
most difficult issue to establish is the extent to which they are embarked on
significantly different career trajectories. The sectors within which the survey was
based serve as rough indicators, but they are approximate and may cover a wide
range of circumstance in respect of income and career expectations, marriage and
parenting patterns and social networks. The most obvious dissimilarity here is with
respect to the gendered variation in such circumstance, since young men and
women in the same occupations are not necessarily social peers. In this section
I consider gender and the distribution of promotion chances and expectations
across the insurance and retailing sectors. In the subsequent section I develop an
analysis based on an index of the circumstances of reference groups, in exploring
the timing of, and attitudes towards, family formation. Rooted as it is in a
measure of material resources, the index reflects a gendered pattern of inequality
in the level of resources associated with married status amongst women and men.
In consequence, reflecting a greater salience of male earnings than female
earnings to household income maintenance around family formation, it is more
effective as a framework for exploring the expectations of young men than of
young women. For this reason, some of the female responses to questions about
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family formation are considered separately, below.
Table 6.1 Perceptions of choice as reflected in respondents' stated reasons for




construction 10 14 9
insurance 2 7 5
retailing 4 7 3
WOMEN
insurance 6 5 7
retailing 10 3 0
Respondents to the main survey were asked why they decided to work in
their employing sector. The distribution of responses is shown in Table 6.1. The
male respondents show some similarity in their responses over all three sectors,
although clearly men in insurance are the most positive about their reasons for
entering the sector. Twice as many men than women saw their current
employment situation as the outcome of a positive choice on their part, rather
than as a constrained choice, or one forced by circumstance. The percentage of
women in the retailing sector who saw their circumstance as the product of a
"constrained" choice is particularly high. These gender differences may reflect
differing expectations concerning employment prospects.
All respondents were asked what work they expected to be doing five years
hence. Of the thirteen men interviewed in insurance, eight named an internal
occupational grade which they expected to achieve. In seven cases this involved
promotion to at least one grade up the career ladder. Of the men interviewed in
retailing two were butchers and two were bakers. These trades were better paid
than any other jobs held by age equivalents in retailing, and held a different
relationship to the career structure than sales and supervisory jobs, but they could
still feed into managerial positions. Of the fourteen men in retailing, nine named
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a retail occupation they expected to hold in five years, the remainder either
naming different types of work they expected to hold or not able to say what they
expected to be doing. In contrast, of the fifteen women in insurance, three named
an insurance related grade they expected to achieve within five years, of which
two expected promotion, seven expected to be full time parents and five said they
did not know what they would be doing. Of the thirteen women in retailing only
one named a (promoted) grade she expected to achieve within five years, two
expected to be full time parents and ten said they did not know. Amongst those
in insurance and retailing the oldest current age of male respondents who said
they did not know what they would be doing was 24, whereas amongst women it
was 32. The level of uncertainty amongst women is substantially related to their
expectations of departure from the labour force during family formation but even
amongst those who do expect to be in the labour force in five years there is a
high level of uncertainty.
These figures compare with those of two other studies which addressed
expectations of promotion within the same occupations. Amongst male workers
in my own survey 8 of 14 (57%) sales workers and 9 of 13 (62%) insurance
workers expected to remain in their sectors and to achieve promotion. In the
"Young Adults in the Labour Market" survey conducted by Ashton and his
colleagues, the authors found that 75% of men in both sales and clerical
occupations responded affirmatively to the question 'are there any chances of
promotion in your current job?' (Ashton, et al, 1990). The higher figures of their
study may be a consequence of the relative openness of the question, which by
focusing on the chances of promotion would seem to invite a larger positive
response than a question on expectations of its achievement. Amongst women in
Ashton's study 41% of sales workers and 63% of clerical workers responded
affirmatively to the question on promotion chances.
Crompton and Jones presented data on expectations of promotion amongst
men and women in clerical work. From their interview data they found
expectations of promotion to be especially high amongst younger age groups,
ranging from 77% amongst men aged under 25 to 87% amongst men aged 25 to
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34 (Crompton and Jones, 1984). This figure presumably increases between these
ages because younger men not expecting promotion may have less commitment
to the sector, and those with higher expectations would still be found there in the
higher age group. In Crompton and Jones survey, of the 85% of men (overall)
and 62% of women who expressed interest in promotion, 79% of the men but
only 47% of the women expected to achieve it. The authors suggest that this is
partly a consequence of the gendered age differences in their sample, and of
women's higher concentration in jobs with fewer promotion prospects. However,
in general, women at the beginning of their working lives are argued to be
positively oriented to promotion and a career but, controlling for domestic
circumstances from marriage onwards, the authors note a decline in complaints
of sex discrimination and in the level of interest in promotion, "particularly when
aspirations at work are perceived as being in conflict with domestic
responsibilities" (Crompton and Jones, 1984, pp. 163-4)
Census figures reflect the gendered pattern of inequality in promotion
chances in the retailing sector. Of all women in retailing employment in 1981
14.4% were shop managers and 49% were sales assistants. In contrast 39.1% of
men in retailing were shop managers and 12.6% were sales assistants (Distributive
Trades EDC, 1985).
The stark gender differences in expectations described above reflect
general sexual inequalities in promotion chances. Significant promotions are
frequently made at the ages at which women are either out of the labour force,
rearing children, or constrained to taking part time jobs for the same reason.
Expectations of domestic time commitments amongst women, by employers, and
the failure of institutional support for a career which can accomodate these terms,
severely compromise women's promotion chances (cf. Craig et al 1983). It is
possible, of course, that some women will ascend career ladders and there is
evidence that women who have limited domestic commitments through their
labour force histories may follow career routes more similar to men. This is not
to say that continuity of employment allows women to realise the promotion
expectations which are held for men, but it does improve their chances. For
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example, Stewart and Greenhalgh, in their study ofwork history patterns amongst
women surveyed in the National Training Survey, in 1975-76, found that 25% of
women aged 45 to 54 with an unbroken employment record were in managerial,
professional and technical occupations, in contrast to 13% of the age group with
two or more breaks from employment (Stewart and Greenhalgh, 1984). Dex and
Shaw, in their analysis of the Women in Employment Survey, traced patterns of
occupational movement over women's work histories, focusing in particular on the
consequences of breaks from employment around family formation. The common
pattern of downward occupational mobility following parenthood is explained by
the significance of part time work for female returners, and its prevalence in low
paying and low status occupations, and by length of time spent out of
employment. Recovery of pre-parenting employment status may be achieved but
it is only the standard experience amongst professionally qualified women (Dex
and Shaw, 1986).
The following quotes, drawn from the main survey, illustrate some
perceptions amongst female respondents of their particular relations to
employment and family formation. Such statements of course are illustrative, but
they indicate the significance of relative female and male earnings in decisions
about family formation, and differences amongst women in their expectations
about squaring the commitments of childcare with employment. The responses to
the questions about family formation which were cited earlier, in Chapter 4, are
not repeated but are similarly illustrative of the variety of concerns, including joint
strategies for household resourcing, identified by the young adult respondents.
One of these was a female senior clerk in an insurance company, aged 26. She
had lived with her partner since she was 21, and married him at 25. Her husband
is a supervisor in an insurance company. She earns an annual salary of £8500
before tax, her husband earns £12000 before tax. She expects to have her first
child at 28 or 29. She explained the reasons for this:
"My husband is a bit older than I am. He doesn't want to be too old before
having another kid. He has a son already. Financially, in a year or so, we will
be a lot better off and it will make it easier for me to stop working. I couldn't
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stop working now as we would not be able to manage. We couldn't manage
on one salary and with him being married before and paying support for his
son.."
When I asked what she expected to be doing in five years time she replied:
"I expect hopefully to not be working and be at home with a child. I would
take a part time job if we needed the money, but I wouldn't like someone else
to look after the child all day."
Another senior clerk in insurance appeared to have more mixed feelings
about the conflicts she felt over parenthood and a career. She was 25 and living
in a flat she bought at 23, cohabiting with her partner, although he is in the navy
and often away. Her annual salary is £7400 before tax, and her partner is earning
("probably") £8000 gross. She plans to marry at age 26, and expects to have her
first child at about 28. She explained:
"I think I will be ready then, I would have the time and patience. We would
be financially stable. I don't know that I would give up work, I suppose I am
quite selfish.. I hate housewife type things. I would like to do part time work,
and to keep the cars that we've got. I wouldn't want our standard of living to
drop, I think that's the reason for the later age."
I asked her when she expected to return to work after having children. She
replied:
"Waiting until I am 28 .. I would worry about cheating on a kid a bit, by saying
that my career comes first.. But I would come back part time as soon as time
allows. Not full time but the minute it gets into school I would be straight
back into full time work."
The following account is by a female retail worker. She was a checkout
operator, aged 23 and living with her parents. She got engaged at 22, and plans
to marry at 24 and to buy a flat or house. She works a 32i/2 hour week but does
up to 15 hours overtime, and earns £80-90 weekly net earnings, including overtime
payment. Her fiance is a security guard, on £84 weekly net earnings, but he is
looking for another, better paid, job, preferably as a heavy goods vehicle driver.
She explained the reason for the timing of their forthcoming marriage:
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"Just really that we are not getting any younger". She anticipates having her
first child at 25 or 26. When asked to explain her reasons she replied "I don't
know. I wouldn't like to be 29 say before the first as I think it is too old."
When I asked what she expected to be doing in five years time she replied:
"Not working anyway. I suppose I would still be here in five years. About
children, if (her partner) has a good job I wouldn't work, if not I suppose I
would have to come back. I would work anyway until I have children. If [he]
is on a decent wage, say £150 to £200 a week, if he's a long distance driver,
if he is earning that I can just retire."
In descriptions of patterns of household and family formation, there have
been few analyses of the integrated structure of gendered relations in the
organisation of household resourcing. In part this is a consequence of the young
ages of respondents to small scale surveys set up to investigate patterns of
transition to adulthood. Analyses of large data sets tend to consider male and
female transitions separately. General statements of gender inequality in
transition, as described earlier, have stressed the gender specificity of adult status
at the expense of an analysis of the interrelatedness of male and female relations
to employment and parenthood. The necessarily joint and gendered enterprise of
family formation, reflected in the above quotes, is taken up in detail in the next
section.
Occupations, Careers and Adult Wage Jobs
This section addresses the relation between respondents' current social
location and the patterning of their actual and expected ages at family formation.
The description of social location attempts to move beyond a simple, cross-
sectional measure of class, derived from current occupation, by incorporating an
index of respondents' orientations to the future derived from their perceptions of
the circumstances of salient reference groups. It therefore allows us to dispense
with the crude assumptions about class differences in orientations to the future,
which characterise descriptions of class related patterns of transition to adult
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status. The questionnaire was not designed with this sort of analysis in mind, so
certain assumptions need to be made, but, as a bottom line, the framework
developed is a useful one for ordering some of the attitudinal data collected.
However, the index developed is more effective in predicting life cycle event
timing than are occupational divisions because, it is argued, it builds in a measure
of potential careers which is derived from the perceptions of respondents. The
index, which I call the adult wage index, is drawn from a series of answers by
respondents to questions about the earnings structure of their employing sector,
and about the marital status of typical incumbents in differing occupational
grades. It turns out that the distribution of respondents' perceptions of 'the
normal' economic circumstances under which to be married, indexed by their
perceived 'adult wage' adheres roughly to their employment sectors, but that the
perceived adult wage index is itself a much more effective means of ordering the
available data on the timing of family formation.
The index is influenced by Siltanen's work, outlined in Chapter 2, on the
structuring of positions and rewards in employment in relation to household
financial obligation. Siltanen demonstrates the theoretical incoherence of
undifferentiated gender categories in explanations of gender inequality in
employment. A more effective explanation recognises such inequality as a
standard but not general nor uniform feature of employment processes. The
distribution of people (within particular socioeconomic strata) to jobs with
differing levels of reward is patterned in relation to financial need and obligation.
In classifying the relationship between rewards to employment and household
circumstances, Siltanen distinguishes full and component wage jobs, which reflect
the differing obligations of their incumbents to household resourcing. Full wage
jobs are ones which enable their incumbents to take principle responsibility for
household income maintenance, in contrast to component wage jobs, whose
incumbents contribute, but cannotmaintain a household single-handedly (Siltanen,
1986). Anyparticular definition of the level of a full and component wage would,
then, need to be derived from the circumstances of people within similar
socioeconomic strata, who can be grouped in relation to a broadly similar level
of consumption at a household level. In the following analysis, however, I am
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using a measure akin to the concept of a full wage in order to index relative
differences between socioeconomic groups in their evaluations of the adequacy
ofmaterial resources for family formation, evaluations which are expected to vary
in relation to social location and perceptions of life chances. The adult wage index
provides a measure of the earnings associated with married status, amongst men
and women, derived from respondents' perceptions of the circumstances of
incumbents in a range of occupations in their employing companies. Consequently
it allows for differing perceptions of "a normal" level of earnings which attaches
to adult status, without making prior assumptions about class related orientations
to future earnings prospects, of the middle class deferred gratification, and the
working class fatalism, kind. The aim of the following analysis is to explore the
relationship between individuals' economic and employment prospects and the
way they organise early life cycle transitions. Orientations and lifestyle aspirations
are integrated within the analysis through a framework which utilises reference
groups, in differing life cycle stages, and which considers perceptions of "normal
behaviour" and potential employment prospects amongst respondents.
In the youth interviews a set of questions concerning the structure of their
employing companies were asked of respondents. A series of job grades between
junior and managerial levels were named to each respondent who was asked to
identify, for each grade in turn, the attributes of a typical employee.18 For each
job named respondents were asked whether it was done mostly by men, mostly
by women, or by both. Then, for each grade and sex, respondents were asked
what age groups(s) that employee would fall into and what their marital status
would be: whether they would typically be single, married or either. Respondents
were then asked what they considered to be the earnings bracket associated with
each job. The midpoint of the first earnings bracket associated with sex specific
married status provides the adult wage estimate for each respondent. For
example, if the grades named were clerk, senior clerk, supervisor and so on, for
each of these the respondent would be asked to identify the attributes of a typical
employee in each of these grades. In the resulting data, at the lowest job grade
associated with married status, say clerk for a woman and supervisor for a man,
the corresponding earnings bracket is used as an index for the adult female wage
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and adult male wage. Both measures were calculated for all respondents and
represent the earnings they perceive to be associated with early married status,
for women and men, within their employing sector.
The adult wage index does not resolve some of the problems of other life
cycle studies. By tying the question of earnings levels and married status to career
structures within current employment sectors, the adult wage index assumes the
salience of this structure to the respondents, both as a referent for their prospects
and for their older, but socially similar, peers. The measure will be most
meaningful for those who expect to progress through the specified career routes.
Further, because male earnings become increasingly important to household
income maintenance where women leave employment to have children, so a
measure rooted in relation to employment and earnings is less useful for
identifying the relationship between women's employment position, their
orientations and life cycle transitions. It might be objected that the adult wage
index assumes too much about the significance of employment over and above
other salient circumstances, for example, obligations to family of origin, access to
resources more generally, other significant reference groups, relationship to social
networks and so on. However, whilst not all the respondents expected to remain
in their current employing sector, the adult wage measure proves effective as a
way of disaggregating the sample in relation to life cycle transitions.
Standard processes which move individuals across occupations and earning
levels have clearly gendered consequences, with a divergence of male and female
rewards to employment structured in relation to the division of labour within the
household. The pattern is reflected clearly in respondents' expectations of
earnings associated with male and female married status. Aggregated over all
respondents the distribution of these perceptions is shown in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2 Distribution of adult wage estimates made by all respondents to the main
survey.
Respondents estimates of adult wage
male adult wage N female adult wage N
£5500 or less 31.0% 27 54.4% 31
£5501 - £7500 23.0% 20 28.1% 16
£7501 - £9500 21.8% 19 15.8% 9
over £9500 24.1% 21 1.0% 1
N 87 57
The distribution of adult wage estimates shown in Table 6.2 reflects a
division in expectations over gendered earnings levels at marriage. While 54% of
respondents suggest a man might be married at an income of £7500 or below
(1988 incomes), 83% suggest that a woman would be married at below this level.
A disaggregation of these estimates by sex and sector is shown in Table 6.3, which
considers employees in insurance and retailing only, in order to compare male
and female responses.19
Table 6.3 Distribution of adult wage estimates disaggregated by sex and employment
sector.
Male respondents Female respondents
male adult female male adult female
wage adult wage wage adult wage
INSURANCE
£5500 and under 2 4 4 10
£5501 - £7500 4 6 6 4
£7501 - £9500 4 3 5 2
over £9500 3 1 1 1
RETAILING
£5500 and under 9 9 6 8
£5501 - £7500 0 2 4 4
£7501 - £9500 2 3 2 1
over £9500 3 n 1 o
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The majority expectation amongst respondents, in both the insurance and
retailing sectors, is that womenwill be married at lower than male earnings levels.
The lowest grade in retailing is sales assistant and given its standard incumbency
by married women it is not surprising that the 'female adult wage' is so low in this
sector. It is interesting that the male adult wage is similarly seen to be so low, and
by a majority of male respondents in the sector. Whilst responses vary across the
sectors in fairly predictable manner, it is clear that within the sectors there is a
good deal of variation in expectations of the typical earnings which attach to
married status.
In studies of the gendered patterning of employment the expectation is that
men in white collar work are attached to career routes which underwrite an age
related progression and promotion through occupational categories. In retailing
with its high employment levels of young people and its reliance on high turnover
to maintain flexibility, many of its young incumbents will leave the sector. Sales
work is low paid and its attachment to career routes is more tenuous than in
clerical work. Young people in retailing are likely to hold a very diverse set of
careers. It may or may not be a starting point of a 'progressive' career. Ashton
and his colleagues identify the risk of unemployment associated with early starts
in this low paying sector and illustrate the high levels of movement between jobs
in the 'lower segments', training programmes and unemployment (Ashton et al,
1990). Whilst the survey on which their mobility analyses are based is limited to
18-24 year olds, and therefore a narrow slice of their respondents' early careers,
it also demonstrates the uncertainty of their position.
The main survey questionnaire collected responses to a series of attitude
statements which interviewees were asked to read and to indicate whether or not
they agreed or disagreed with them. Interpretations of this sort of data tend to
assume that the statements invoke a common interpretation, but it is important
to exercise caution about the nature of variation in meaning. In response to the
statement "earning a wage makes a young person independent", 66% of male
respondents agreed, in contrast to 90% of female respondents. The breakdown
by sector is as follows: of men, 70% in construction, 79% in insurance and 43%
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in retailing agreed. Amongst women, 89% in insurance and 92% in retailing
agreed. The relatively low level of agreement amongst men in retailing is
suggestive of an inadequacy of earnings in supporting early independence. The
high level of affirmation amongst construction workers is consonant with the
expectation that manual workers standardly achieve independence at an early age.
However, the even higher agreement amongst insurance employees, many of
whom expect promotion within the sector and would, at young ages, still be some
way from achieving their potential earnings expectations, suggests that the
question may have been interpreted with an emphasis on independence in the
more personal sense of autonomy from parents, and novel social freedoms.
Responses to a statement which is more explicit about independence as a
resource related status shows a different patttern of responses across construction
and insurance sector employees. In response to the statement "by the time you are
19 you should be able to support yourself financially", 42% of male construction
workers agreed, as did 29% of men in insurance and 14% of men in retailing.
22% ofwomen in insurance, in contrast to 85% ofwomen in retailing agreed with
the statement. A disaggregation by level of qualification, shown in Table 6.4,
indicates an association between no or low qualifications and a positive evaluation
of financial independence by the age of nineteen, an association that is
particularly clear cut amongst women.
Table 6.4 Attitudes towards independence in relation to qualification level attained





% N % N
none 100 5 46 13
CSE 100 4 31 10
'O' level 46 13 30 26
Higher 0 9 25 12
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Amongst men in white collar occupations the relatively low levels of
agreement might be seen as a consequence of their expectations of increasing
income over the life cycle and the perceived inadequacy of earnings at the age of
nineteen relative to advantaged employment careers, but this appears to hide an
important source of heterogeneity. The particularly low figure amongst male
retailing employees, in conjunction with their low qualification levels, suggests that
resource constraints to independence are not uniform, but rather entailed by
differing life cycle trajectories and thereby suggestive of differing social location
and life cycle behaviour. The socioeconomic indices above do not coincide exactly
with employment sector and ostensible social peers may be on differing lifetime
career and resource trajectories. It is these trajectories which are essential to
understanding patterns of household and family formation, and 'adult' forms of
inequality. These trajectories are explored using the adult wage index in the next
section.
Employment Trajectories, Orientations and Transitions to Adult Status
It is useful to combine the available survey data in order to achieve a
summary measure of the timing of marriage and parenthood without breaking up
an already small sample. Only some respondents are married or cohabiting, and
only some are parents. To combine expectations about the timing of marriage and
parenthood amongst some respondents with their actual timing amongst other
respondents is not an ideal solution. However, it is worth recalling that
expectations do not need to be accurate predictions for our purposes here. Rather
the point of including expectations is to obtain a better understanding of current
circumstances and orientations of the respondents. What is important is that there
is no systematic bias across respondents in the accuracy of their prediction. Only
respondents aged 19 and over are included in the following discussion since
amongst the youngest groups the questions on marriage and parenthood clearly
had less salience.20
The distribution of current household status by whether or not the
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respondent has achieved his or her adult wage shows a clear patterning across
male respondents. Amongst both male and female respondents there is a greater
probability that those who are independent and living with a partner are at or
above their 'personal' adult wage. As we have seen, the divergence in earnings
between women and men over the life cycle is associated with the particular
relations of each to household resourcing and childcare. The perceived adult wage
index is more strongly associated with domestic circumstances amongst men than
amongst women. This may be a consequence of the greater importance of male
earnings to household income maintenance at the point at which couples become
parents. The association between respondents' household circumstances and the
relation of their current earnings level to their 'adult wage' is shown in Table 6.5.
Their association illustrates, particularly amongst men, that those earning less
than their adult wage are much more likely to be single and dependent than to
be independent.




less than adult wage
at, or above, adult wage
less than adult wage









Of the parents amongst the sample, four of the six fathers had children at
an earnings level below their adult wage level, as did one out of the four mothers.
(This analysis excludes members of the pilot survey). The circumstances of these
parents will be discussed later on. In general, their circumstances are
disadvantaged. The salience of consumption aspirations implicit within the
hypothesised association between adult wage levels and the timing of family
formation appears to be lower amongst these men. For the moment though it is
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useful to broaden the sample under consideration to include those who are not
yet independent nor parents. The rest of this section considers only male
respondents, since here the adult wage index is more strongly associated with the
timing of family formation than is the case among female respondents. It is
apparent that the adult wage index is more effective in differentiating the sample
with respect to ages at parenthood than ages at marriage. The questionnaire did
not collect data on perceptions of employment structure and attributes of
incumbents in respect of parenthood. Whilst the adult wage measure is related
directly to married status it is treated more generally as an index of the earnings
associated with family formation. A more sophisticated measure would be one
that could differentiate the different stages of family formation and allow for
differences across groups in the relations between these stages.
The average expected or actual age at independent cohabitation (referred
to as marriage whether or not this is formally the case) is very similar in both
white collar employment sectors. Actual and expected age at the birth of the first
child amongst men varies very little across the white collar employment sectors,
yet for the reasons indicated we should be suspicious of a conclusion of similarity
in respondents social position and circumstance.21
Table 6.6Average ages atparenthood (actual and expected combined), amongstmen
aged 19 and over, by employment sector (means and standard deviations).
employment sector mean N s.d.
insurance 28.3 9 4.2
retailing 28.1 8 4.5
Average ages at actual and expected ages at parenthood together are very
similar across the two employment sectors. This is illustrated in Table 6.6.
However, a very different pattern is revealed where these ages are examined in
relation to the perceived adult wage measure. Summarising the latter into a
dichotomous variable reveals a diversity which is lost to the employment sector
168
disaggregation, and which is shown in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7Average ages atparenthood (actual and expected combined), amongstmen
aged 19 and over, by male adult wage (means and standard deviations).
male adult wage: mean N s.d.
£7500 or less 26.9 11 3.7
over £7500 31.9 5 3.4
The patterning over the adult wage brackets indicates a diversity of
experience and expectations which cuts across the employment sectors. There is
a relationship between the adult wage index and respondents' current ages. Those
whose adult wage estimate is £7500 or under had an average current age of 23
and a half, those with the higher adult wage an average current age of 26. Whilst
the older men who are without children may have higher expected ages at family
formation simply because of their age, there is no solely age related reason why
they should provide higher adult wage estimates. The pattern suggests that the
relationship between the adult wage and ages at family formation is a substantive
one.
The tables presented above suggest an association between the timing of
family formation and the adult wage estimates. Whilst the latter assumes much
about respondents' perceptions its principal objective is to incorporate an index
of career trajectories. It still assumes the salience to respondents of sector specific
occupational career routes, and that others within the employing sectors provide
reference groups which are salient to the respondents. Despite these assumptions
the index appears more effective in differentiating the sample with respect to
household circumstances than other, 'cross-sectional', measures of current
socioeconomic location. The adult wage measure is used below as a way of
ordering responses to open ended questions which addressed respondents'
expectations and attitudes towards marriage and parenthood. Part of the strength
of the index, albeit as a proxy, was that it appeared to be patterned also in
relation to this 'qualitative' information. Responses to the questions on why
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respondents thought they would marry and become parents at the ages they
specified, as well as retrospective questions on the same issues were diverse, and
indicated different levels of decision making and planning around family
formation. An examination of responses of those who were married, cohabiting
or engaged to be married, and those who were parents, reveals an association
between the apparent salience to respondents of decision making and the
proximity of their current earnings to their adult wage. Where they have achieved
a level of earnings close to their adult wage and the level of both is low, so this
associates with a lower reported relevance of planning, and with early ages at
marriage and/or parenthood. Where the adult wage is higher and respondents
have not achieved a proximity to it, so planning and longer term orientations
appear to be more salient.
The following two quotes are from two men who married at a level of
earnings below their adult wage. They both refer to income and living standards
in their plans for family formation. The first respondent was a senior insurance
clerk, aged 26, who married at 24 on an annual gross income of £6500 and bought
a flat on getting married. His partner is a shop assistant on an income of £5500.
His current annual income is £8000 and his adult wage estimate is also £8000.
When asked why he married when he did he referred to a desire for
independence, and said he found it hard to articulate other reasons. I asked him
when he thought he would have children, and he was ambivalent. I asked him
then what he thought a good age would be:
"About 30; to be financially stable. Maybe my wife would not be able to work.
These days when you are working off two salaries and got a bit of money ... if
that is halved I would want my own salary to be reasonable to pay the
mortgage and bills, and other luxuries .. if you are used to them."
The second respondent was a retail store department manager, aged 34,
who married at 27 on an income of £6600, living in private rented accommodation
for a few months before and two years after they were married and then bought
their own house. His wife is a clerical assistant earning £8000. His current annual
gross income is £7800, and his estimated adult wage is £10000. This 'shortfall'
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parallels a perceived gap between his current household living costs and
aspirations for a living standard he wishes to achieve for his future children.
Reasons for the timing of living with his partner he related to inconvenient living
arrangements prior to getting independent accommodation. He thought he would
have children from the age of 36, explaining:
"The biggest reason I haven't started yet is money and the commitments I've
got with the house. You have to take into account whether you can afford to
start a family. I would expect, then, in a few years time to have a promotion in
hand and maybe afford to start a family. We probably could afford them now
... I keep being told that, but I'm not one hundred percent sure myself. It is
whether you can bring them up in the fashion you want them brought up in."
The following quotes are from respondents who were engaged to be
married. Of six engaged men in the sample, three were on incomes above their
adult wage and three on incomes below it, although of the latter, two were on the
Community Programme, and therefore on particularly low earnings. The adult
wage estimates are not cited since, as labourers, the assumption of an apprentice
route to craftsman status is inappropriate. The apparent lack of salience of
decision making for the following man corresponds with his disadvantaged
circumstance. A labourer working on the Community Programme, aged 20, his
fiancee is a secretary earning an annual gross salary of £6700. He is earning an
income of £4500. He expected to get married when he was 22 or 23 and when I
asked him why he replied:
"I don't know. We'll wait until she gets a better job. I'm a bit young now, I like
going out with my mates at weekends." He was similarly reticent about when
he expected to have children.
The next two quotes are from men who both expected to marry within a
year, and were both on earnings over their adult wage estimates. They were in
very different employment positions, yet they were both making trade offs, their
relative "needs" being structured within very different resource circumstances. The
first, on a low income and with a low adult wage is uncertain over his plans for
children. He was a sales assistant, living with his parents, and he expected to be
married at 21. His fiancee was an assistant manager at a cafe on an income of
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approximately £4000. He was 20, on an income of £5400, with an adult wage
estimate of £5000. When asked what sorts of things were important in the
decision to marry (at 21) he replied:
"We both decided by that time we would have saved up quite a bit of money.
We want to try and get a mortgage for a house and get it done up before with
any luck."
I asked him if he expected to have children at some stage, and he replied:
"She says yes. I'm not a parent. I would like to later on." I asked, then, "When,
would you say?, and he said: "I've no idea. I would like to be in my thirties.
It will probably happen sooner."
When I asked, later on, whether he and his fiancee's joint income had
affected their decision about when to marry, he described how they were going
to buy a flat the previous year but could not afford the surveyor's fee, and also
that he was now selling his car as he could't afford to keep it. In contrast, the next
respondent was a supervisor in an insurance company, who was living with his
parents, and who expected to marry at 26. His fiancee was a bank clerk on £6000.
He was 25, earning £10500, his adult wage was low at £4500. He is therefore on
an income substantially above his full wage, but in what he says it is apparent that
he feels relatively well off: "...I was always quite highly paid in relation to what I
did, that is, outside of work, it was easy to go abroad on holidays". He expected
to have his first child at 28:
"Money is only important when you haven't got any. I am aiming to be
financially stable so I don't have to change my way of life". Asked whether he
and his fiancees' joint income had affected their decisions he discussed their
plans for children: "...in say three years my wife can pack in working and start
a family. Over the next three years my salary will increase, maybe not up to the
£6000 she earns at the moment but by enough so that we can live comfortably
on my individual salary".
In contrast to the apparent significance of the question to the above
respondent was that of a sales assistant, engaged to be married and living with his
fiancee at her parents, he was hoping to buy a house after learning of the waiting
list for council housing. His partner works part time as a demonstrator in a retail
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outlet. He was 21 and on an income of £5500, aged 21 at the birth of their child
and on the same income. The pregnancy, he said, "just happened, it wasn't
planned or not planned." He expected to marry later in the same year. When
asked why he replied: "I couldn't say. Why not?"
The fact that the question seemed impertinent may still be revealing. It is,
of course, difficult to distinguish whether it is the case that decision making had
no particular relevance, in the experience of this respondent, or whether he simply
wished to retain his privacy. It is interesting to note the correspondence between
his earnings and his low adult wage. When asked what he expected to be doing
in five years time he replied that he would probably still be working for his
current employer. He currently expected to be promoted to a supervisory position.
There is, then, some evidence from the responses that the salience of planning
relates to the gap between current earnings and respondents' adult wage
estimates. If the gap is large, and respondents are earning substantially less than
their adult wage, there appears to be a greater salience of long term planning,
and a relatively late age at family formation. In constrast, low earnings and a low
adult wage tend to correspond with relatively young ages at family formation and,
at least as reflected in the responses, a lower perceived salience of planning. What
is clear from the responses is the variety of levels of resource adequacy seen as
appropriate to family formation, and the variety of orientations towards the
salience of long term planning.
To summarise, the adult wage measure has been designed and used as an
index of the 'normal' circumstances under which to be married, as these are
reflected in the experience of 'typical' workers, as seen by the respondents, within
their employment sectors. The adult wage is drawn from the data available on
repondents' perceptions of the structure of their employing companies, and
assumes the relevance to respondents of the associated career structures. It is for
this reason that the index reflects more accurately on male, than on female,
experience. As we saw earlier, it was the expectation amongst the majority of
male respondents in insurance and retailing, that they would remain in their
current employment sector for at least the next five years, but clearly this is not
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the case for all respondents, some of whom were placed differently in relation to
internal career routes. A more sophisticated index would require more detailed
study of salient reference groups. Thus, the adult wage index provides a rather
rough proxy for orientations to the future, for what respondents saw as the
'normal' circumstances under which to be married. However, it is a step forward
from assuming that orientations attach simply to current occupational class. It also
builds in an understanding of norms as these attach to variable material
circumstances and prospects, rather than assume that norms and values about the
'appropriate' age at which to marry and parent are more relevant to patterns of
event timing in the latter part of the twentieth century than they were hitherto (cf.
Hareven, 1981). It is clear, from the respondents descriptions, that patterns of,
and decisions about, life cycle event timing reflect the salience of material
resources and employment prospects, and any statement about the importance of
age norms in life cycle event timing can be made meaningfully only in relation to
the material circumstances through which transitions to adult status are organised.
In the context of the above discussion on orientations and their relation to
social circumstances, it is appropriate to comment again on recent research into
the life cycle related consequences of particular groups facing new forms of labour
force disadvantage. Studies which have addressed the relationship between
unemployment and the transition to adult status (eg. Wallace, 1987a; Hutson and
Jenkins, 1989) have failed to locate the experience of particular groups in relation
to general processes of change. Part of the problem, identified at the start of the
chapter, is the difficulty of reconciling the traditional expectation that the most
disadvantaged groups will attain independence and become parents at the
youngest ages, with the hypothesis of deferral as a consequence of 'new forms' of
disadvantage, particularly mass youth unemployment. The latter hypothesis
suggests that societal developments are at odds with individual expectations. Thus
the youngster expecting to get a secure job at 16 will be quickly disenchanted of
this notion on leaving school. If he or she holds on to prior expectations, however,
a 'deferral' in the timing of independence and family formation may be a
consequence. The difficulty here, of course, lies in knowing what would have
happened otherwise: the question of deferral, relative to what? (Amongst youth
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researchers the answer seems to be relative to what an age equivalent peer would
have done in the context of full employment. However, since deferral relative to
previous cohorts is a general trend there is no constant basis for comparison). If,
for the youngster leaving school at 16, employment seems a distant and uncertain
prospect, there is little to distinguish 'new' from 'old' forms of disadvantage, and
no reasons why the former should lead to early adult status and the latter to a
deferral in its attainment. In short, it is not plausible to expect any single general
consequence of unemployment, say of deferral in the timing of family formation,
for the simple reason that we cannot treat unemployed youth as a uniform group.
Any specific consequence of unemployment for the organisation of life cycle
transitions will reflect the diverse experience of those affected.
The significance of class related lifetime income and employment prospects
for the organisation of transitions to adult status requires an understanding of how
orientations 'translate' potential future careers into class related patterns of event
timing. An understanding of the structure of orientations may itself enable a more
sophisticated understanding of the particular social circumstances of youth than
do assumptions of a determinate relationship between current class and the
salience, or otherwise, of planning for the future. An understanding of
orientations would allow a more complex understanding of class location than that
achieved by equating it with current occupational position. This, then, has a
bearing on the argument that life cycle processes are important to understanding
inequality because standard, occupationally based measures of class are insensitive
to those lifetime careers which move people across occupational categories.
However, as I suggested earlier, life cycle processes are also important to
understanding the reproduction and restructuring of inequality across generations.
In conventional statements of class related inequality, life cycle related processes
tend to be seen as a distinct micro-level concern, if they are acknowledged at all,
which are contained within, and have little bearing on, the macro-level issues of
class and the reproduction of social inequality (Goldthorpe, 1984; Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1992). Erikson and Goldthorpe maintain that life cycle processes, like
issues of gender inequality, are marginal to the concerns of stratification theory,
at the level of analysing and understanding macro-level, historical changes in the
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class structure. However, what is not addressed in their replies to the criticisms
of their treatment of gender, is the issue of the adequacy of treating the
occupational structure as 'the backbone of the reward system' (cf. Garnsey, 1982).
This criticism, however, would seem to present a fundamental challenge to 'the
conventional view'. It suggests that the latter, by marginalising issues of gender,
and, it should be added, life cycle processes, fails to explain the dynamics of the
occupational structure, as a system of rewards, in relation to the organisation of
social reproduction. As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, there is strong evidence to
suggest the salience of the latter, through gender and life cycle related processes,
to inequality in employment and to the historical reproduction and restructuring
of social inequality. These processes are explored further in the next chapter.
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7. Age Related Distributive Justice
Introduction
A number of writers have identified age related social processes and the
succession of generations to be increasingly salient to the structuring of
socioeconomic inequality, and to present a challenge to theories of class and
stratification (eg. Foner, 1974, 1988; Kohli, 1988; Riley, 1988; Turner, 1989). Age
related social claims and conflict are seen in such arguments to underlie a new
dynamic of social change. Several authors, in identifying the variation in resource
availability and political power across different age groups, have emphasised
dimensions of injustice, and social conflict, actual or potential, along age related
lines (eg. Preston, 1984; Thomson, 1989, Turner, 1989). These arguments appear
as an aspect of the more generally perceived crisis in the welfare state. Two
characteristic concerns of the literature addressing 'the problem of ageing' are of
interest here. The first issue concerns the relationship between age, or life cycle
related processes, and theories of class and stratification, a problem seen to be
increasingly salient to sociological theory given the growing numbers of those,
particularly the aged, and the unemployed, who cannot be straightforwardly
classified by occupational schema. The second issue concerns the definition of age
related interests and associated theories of the nature of conflict over the societal
distribution of resources.
Some versions of the age stratification approach entail an understanding
of conflict over welfare which operates around the perimeters of the productive
sphere. Excluded groups appear to be at odds with one another and with the
working population, as they make their own claims over welfare resources, claims
which in the case of the elderly are argued by some to be successfully achieved
to the detriment of other age groups, particularly the young. The division between
the working population and a dependent 'welfare' population is stark in this
argument, where the latter struggle over their share of the welfare pie. The
welfare 'crisis' is seen to lie along conflict axes running between welfare groups
and between these and the working population. The claims, then, of particular
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(welfare) groups appear as problematic while other aspects of resource
distribution (rewards to employment) do not.
The division between work and welfare in these arguments is only
sustainable because of the conceptual separation of class and age related
processes. Whilst class theories are criticised for their partiality, and the failure
to elucidate the experience of those outside paid employment, the age
stratification framework sets up as supplementary a set of social relationships
which leave intact the premises of production based theories of inequality. It is
an argument of this chapter that age related processes do not "add on" to
socioeconomic inequality but rather, like gendered processes, are an integral part
of it. Age and gender related processes should be central to explanations of the
structuring and reproduction of inequality.
As argued earlier, poverty and inequality amongst 'dependency' groups, and
the structuring of dependency itself, cannot be separated from the social
organisation of access to, and rewards from employment for different social
groups. The age stratification literature neglects the way in which these processes
are themselves the outcome of social claims (cf. Peattie and Rein, 1983;
Rainwater et al, 1986). So, for example, as argued previously, claims to economic
resources by women and young adults cannot be separated from the historical
'success' of claims to a family wage by adult men. Differing rewards to men and
women in employment, including claims to forms of welfare protection and
pension rights, are very important to patterns of inequality in old age (eg. Arber
and Ginn, 1991; Falkingham, 1989). The relationship between experience in, and
outside, employment speaks of a structural coherency which is lost in the
particularism of the conflict models.
The authors of the age stratification and generational conflict approaches
share the assumption that contemporary changes in the population structure and
the organisation of resource distribution to the 'dependent' population are
polarising the well being of different age cohorts and consequently feeding a
nascent sense of injustice which will crystallise into novel dimensions of social
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conflict. These writers fail to describe the processes by which they insist that the
changing demographic structurewill engender increased age related conflict. They
point instead to aggregate level changes in the welfare of different age groups,
and assume that the combination of demographic change and economic
retrenchment will increase age related inequality, that this in turn will be
perceived as unjust, and that conflict will ensue, jeopardising the stability of a
welfare project which requires a contract of reciprocity across generations.
However, authors of the age stratification framework have not demonstrated that
members of age cohorts share interests which are consonant with their cohort
experience, or perceive their interests to be at odds with those of members of
other age cohorts or generations. As it is, we appear to know more about these
writers' views on distributive justice than we do about the views of their subject
populations. The literature offers little evidence on social actors' perceptions of
inequality over the life cycle nor on their evaluations of just claims by different
age groups. Age, as we have seen, is a proxy for more fundamental sets of social
relationships, importantly for life cycle stage and domestic circumstances. My
survey included a number of questions designed to elicit attitudes towards the
appropriate distribution of economic rewards in relation to domestic
circumstances. In respondents' perceptions, claims to resources are bound up with
the organisation of household resourcing, and the associated division of household
labour, between men and women and across generations. Evaluations of claims
reflect the salience of life cycle stage and domestic circumstance to perceptions
of distributive justice. This evidence is discussed in the latter part of the chapter.
The structure of perceptions of distributive justice indicates that age
inequalities are a stable aspect of social relationships. Social change may entail,
and be entailed by, a reordering of age inequalities, but the latter do not drive
social change in a zero sum game of age related conflict. We have seen, in the
example of change in the relative earnings of young men and women and new
patterns of family formation, evidence of the ways in which a restructuring of age
inequalities are bound up with broader social changes. The complexity and
coherence of these processes is occluded by models which assume that inequalities
straightforwardly engender conflict.
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Age Stratification and the Question of Generational Conflict
The debate on age stratification has grown over the last decade, reflecting
increasing concerns about the social problems expected to ensue from a growing
non-employed population. The relative position of the young and the elderly has
been particularly important in discussions about the changing age profile of well-
being. Some writers maintain that changes in the circumstances of different age
groups are directly linked, and that conflict will ensue as a result of historical
changes in their relative social position (eg. Turner, 1989; Thomson, 1989).
Theories of change in the age profile of well-being would appear to have
potentially important consequences for 'conventional' (production based) theories
of class and stratification. This section commences with a discussion of the
arguments of two writers, Turner and Foner, who have made this issue central to
their descriptions of age related processes and social change (Turner, 1989; Foner,
1974, 1988).
Turner points to the absence of a coherent sociological theory of ageing
and age groups as aspects of social stratification. In developing an argument of
the significance of age related processes to the organisation of inequality, he
proposes an alternative approach which relies on a model of conflict between age
groups:
"Given the current recession which characterises the world economy, the
ageing of the human population poses not only serious economic implications
for economic growth, but also raises the spectre of significant political conflict
between age groups .. we can refer to such struggles as a politics of resentment
between welfare clients". (Turner, 1989, p.603).
The politics of ageing is conceptualised here as a series of conflicts around
economic class, political inequality and cultural lifestyles (Turner, 1989). The
stigmatisation of the elderly, a state of affairs which he takes as axiomatic, is to
be understood in terms of an age related model of varying reciprocity and social
exchange over the life cycle. In this argument, stigmatisation is a consequence of
a lack of social reciprocity and long term dependency. Turner's initial assumption
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of age as a meaningful dimension of social and welfare antagonism is reified in
a model of direct conflict between the young and the old:
"Because compulsory retirement creates a condition of extended and in
principle probably unlimited dependence on welfare, the aged become
stigmatised as parasitic recipients of social benefits in a situation where they
are forced to compete for scarce resources with unemployed youth" (Turner,
1989, p.600).
Turner argues that the problems of ageing cannot be analysed
independently of their economic context, but he argues simultaneously that age
groups, as status blocs, cannot be assimilated analytically to economic class
analysis. The question of the relationship between age strata and conventional
understandings of socioeconomic stratification is set up in terms of conflict
between the old and the young as 'dependency' groups. Turner's argument of
stigmatisation may speak more of the evidence of poverty amongst the elderly
than a politics of resentment. The argument of stigmatisation as a consequence
of 'low reciprocity' is merely postulated by Turner, and is at odds with the
arguments of others writing on age and inequality, studies which are not
addressed by Turner (eg. Taylor Gooby, 1985, and those reported by Preston,
1984; Minkler, 1986). These studies suggest that claims by the elderly achieve a
high level of popular support, for a variety of reasons, and will be addressed later
on.
Others writers also maintain that age inequalities will engender conflict
over the societal distribution of resources (Johnson, 1989).22 This model, of latent
antagonism, or overt conflict between age groups, appears to stem from an
analogy between age inequality and class inequality:
"Age inequalities occur because age is used as a criterion for assigning people
to roles that are differentially rewarded. 'Age strata' are formed as people of
similar ages fill similar sets of age related roles .. In this sense, age forms the
basis of a stratification system" (Foner, 1988, p. 178).
Like Turner, Foner argues that conventional theories of inequality pay insufficient
attention to age related processes. She maintains that:
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age inequalities cannot be understood solely in class terms because dynamic
processes related to age contribute directly to age inequalities; and, therefore,
understanding how these age processes operate is important for grasping the
roots of inequality" (Foner, 1988, p. 176).
Class analysis, Foner argues, is inadequate for dealing with the structuring
of inequality outside the occupational sphere. She suggests that scholars interested
in age and class stratification have tended to focus on the impact of class on age
stratification and on class differences within age strata but not on the impact of
age stratification on the class system. This argument is important, yet it has not
been developed very far in the literature. Foner poses two questions: do age
inequalities lead to age conflicts and, if so, how do they affect the relationship
between classes? Part of the significance of a theory of age stratification is seen,
by Foner, to lie in its emphasis on a structural potential for political conflict
between the young and the old. However, whilst such age groupings may be
important to conflict over 'idealistic' issues, she argues, political conflict over the
distribution of material resources, implicit in the structure of age inequality, is
defused by "age conflict reducing mechanisms", specifically 'age mobility' (ageing)
and socioeconomic heterogeneity within age groups, (Foner, 1974), both
somewhat begging the question of whether conflict is an appropriate model with
which to approach these issues. In her more recent paper, Foner returns to the
question of why age is not a standard dimension of social conflict. However, she
attempts to reclaim the argument that age stratification affects class relationships
by pointing to specific examples of age related behaviour or conflict which she
sees as undermining class cohesion, such as youth subcultures diverting working
class youth from class related activities, or age related disputes within the
workplace reducing class solidarity (Foner, 1988).
Kohli suggests that the relationship of the age stratification approach to the
question of class is mostly metaphorical (Kohli, 1988). I would suggest further that
the age stratification model rests on an analogy with class divisions, an analogy
which is overdrawn. "Age mobility", for example, is a cumbersome term for
ageing. Why should it be presented as a 'conflict reducing mechanism' given its
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uniformity and inevitability? Foner recognises that career trajectories are bound
up with class, but sees the latter as constraining the way in which social benefits
change over the life cycle rather than seeing this ordering of resources and
opportunities over the life cycle as part of the substance of class related
experience. Her general argument fails to demonstrate, indeed points to evidence
against, a systematic patterning of age based conflicts over material resources. By
adhering to a theory of age based conflict despite her difficulty in demonstrating
its validity in practice, class takes on a static quality. Age related processes may
be as much an aspect of confirming class identity as undermining it, but more
important is the possibility that age related processes influence patterns of
socioeconomic inequality, with ensuing consequences for class processes. There
is a potentially productive parallel here with gender theorists' critiques of
stratification theory described earlier: that age related processes are central to the
reproduction, and restructuring, of socioeconomic inequality. Theories of
stratification which are rooted in a narrow conception of the economic sphere are
not simply incomplete, they misrepresent the processes by which unequal rewards
accrue to different social groups (cf. Garnsey, 1982; Humphries and Rubery,
1984). Before returning to this question it will be useful to consider further how
issues of resource distribution and inequality in societies with ageing population
structures have been constructed as a problem of age, and generational, conflict.
A great deal has been written on 'the problem of ageing' in the United
States where there has been something of a backlash against the perceived success
of the grey lobby. Similar arguments have been published in Britain, however,
suggesting an unfair redistribution by the welfare state in favour of the elderly.
In the United States, Preston argued that the relative well-being of the young and
the elderly have diverged over recent decades. Transfers from the working age
population to the elderly are, in effect, transfers away from children and youth
(Preston, 1984). Preston maintains the significance to this pattern of, for example,
the rise in numbers of lone mother headed households, and cutbacks in federal
expenditure on welfare which benefits the young, for example in entitlements to
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and he argues that a series
of public and private choices have dramatically altered the age profile of well-
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being (Preston, 1984). In 1970 the incidence of poverty among the elderly in the
U.S. was twice the national level, but by 1982 the proportion of elderly living in
poverty had fallen below the national average. Over the same years the incidence
of poverty amongst children aged under 14 increased from 37% below that of the
elderly to 56% above (Preston, 1984). The success of the elderly in pressing
welfare claims appears, in his argument, to have undermined the position of the
young, a group with little political support or leverage. There is a suggestion here
that the young are relatively weak as a political group, and the elderly relatively
strong, but the structural relation between these groups is acknowledged to be
more complex, and less direct, than that posited by Turner (1989). In Preston's
argument the success of the elderly is born of their numbers and consequent
political influence, and further by a wide constituency of support, comprising the
elderly themselves and the working age population favouring public welfare for
the elderly who might otherwise need family support, and simultaneously voting
on behalf of themselves when they reach old age (Preston, 1984).
The publication of the argument of Preston, then President of The
Population Association of America, and a report by the U.S. President's Council
of Economic Advisors stating that the elderly were financially better of than the
general population, and the accompanying media attention in the United States
have been cited as part of the background to the development of 'AGE', or
Americans for Generational Equity, an organisation which attacked the U.S.
government for creating a situation in which "today's affluent seniors are unfairly
competing for the resources of the future elderly." (Hewitt, quoted in Minkler,
1986; p.541). This statement assumes that increased poverty amongst children and
youth is directly related to improvements in the relative economic standing of the
elderly population. Entitlement programmes for the latter are seen, consequently,
to "mortgage our children's future", to jeopardise their life chances as a
consequence of meeting 'excessive' claims by the elderly population (Minkler,
1986). Such arguments are criticised by Minkler as a new form of victim blaming.
According to Thomson, who focuses on New Zealand but claims his
arguments to have a much wider salience, ".. a prevalent image of the elderly is
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still of impoverishment, but in the 1980s this no longer accords with the facts"
(Thomson, 1989, p.52). He argues that there will be a change in perceptions of
the affluence of the elderly, as the members of the first welfare generation, now
approaching retirement, reach old age. This generation have been the prime
beneficiaries of the welfare state through their adult lives. As they have aged the
welfare state shifted from one that was oriented to programmes benefitting the
young to one that favours the elderly. By cutting welfare expenditures to the
young in the 1970s and '80s, the state has, he suggests, undermined the incentive
to maintain the implicit social contract between generations on which the welfare
system largely depends, since welfare insurance is underwritten by an
intergenerational contract in which current pensions are financed by current
employee taxes. Why, Thomson asks, should today's young people honour a
welfare contract that has not benefitted them and which will require them
increasingly to subsidise the 'welfare generation' in its old age? (Thomson, 1989).
In the United States, whilst it appears that the elderly have defended their
position more effectively than other welfare claimants, it is not clear that their
claims have undermined the position of those other groups. Pampel and
Williamson, in their study of the determinants of social welfare spending across
18 advanced industrial nations, argue that population age structure has been
largely neglected in studies of welfare state development, yet, they suggest, the
strongest influence on the rise in spending from 1950-1980 has been the size of
the elderly population, whose political efficacy has resulted in increased
expenditure per head of the elderly population. However, the authors also argue
that the percentage of elderly in the population has no effect on age standardised
spending for programmes not directed to the aged, such as public assistance,
family allowance and unemployment benefits (Pampel and Williamson, 1989).
The generational equity framework, and the theory of competition between
generations from which it derives, have been strongly criticised for presenting a
new form of victim blaming, and for advocating cuts in support to the elderly to
restore justice between generations. Minkler outlines her objections to the
generational equity arguments in terms of the implied homogeneity of 'the
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elderly', in terms of the measures of poverty used and through survey evidence
which suggests cross-generational consensus rather than conflict in attitudes
towards government spending.23 However, the latter point, critical of arguments
for reduced expenditure for the elderly, appears to sidestep Preston's point that
this consensus is part of the problem in so far as it is not matched by support for
the young. Minkler does not directly address the possibility that a large cohort
with a broad constituency of support and political power may detract attention
from the extent of poverty elsewhere. Most authors appear to concur that the
elderly are well placed with respect to popular affirmation of state expenditure
and pension maintenance, achieving a level of support not attained by some other
'dependency' groups. However, this situation is simultaneously described as unjust
because of a public failure to acknowledge the legitimate claims of the young.
This raises questions concerning the structuring of evaluations of justice. There
is evidence that the processes underlying such judgements are more complex than
suggested by arguments of age related self interest.
With respect to claims amongst the non-working population, Heidenheimer
points to an historically clear demarcation in the United States between social
insurance and welfare programmes. He argues that the concept of contributory
insurance benefits has permeated the politics of social security so that any
alterations to these programmes are resisted since they represent individually
earned rights to income. In contrast, public assistance programmes have no
similar legitimacy and consequently are much more vulnerable to demands for
public spending cuts (Heidenheimer, 1990). Taylor Gooby notes a similar
distinction in Britain, where his survey evidence revealed general support for
services directed towards the elderly, sick and disabled, and education and the
National Health Service, and much less general support for benefits for the
unemployed, low paid, single parents and children (Taylor Gooby, 1985). This
evidence suggests that children and young adults are not so well placed as the
elderly in general perceptions of the legitimacy of their claims. However the
relationship between the young and the elderly does not hold the symmetry which
is implied by a theoretical dichotomy between work and welfare, where the young
and the old are seen to hold a parallel social location simply on the grounds of
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their exclusion from the productive sphere.
The emphasis, by class theory, on employment based relationships has
neglected the structuring of rewards and life chances over the life cycles of men
and women, and neglected patterns of continuity and change as people move
through different life cycle stages (Arber and Ginn, 1991; Rainwater et al, 1986;
Kohli, 1988). Writers on age stratification have argued that inequalities across age
groups present a challenge to class theory, and have substantive consequences for
social change. By extending this analogy between age and class they suggest that
age divisions, in conjunction with a growing welfare burden, also entail age
related conflict. In turn this is seen as significant to class theory. In Foner's model
age related conflict undermines the potential for conflict between classes; in
Turner's model age conflict appears to be fought out around the perimeters of
the productive sphere. Claims in the latter are not treated as problematic, but
'problem groups', dependent on state or family, struggle over their rights to
welfare resources. Questions about distributive justice then, appear as claims
about welfare distribution, but not about the distribution of well-being more
generally, and not about the relation between the experience of 'dependency'
groups and the productive sphere (cf. Holmwood, 1991, Arber and Ginn, 1991).
In the next section some of the problems which arise from separating claims by
the 'dependent', or non-employed population from claims to rewards in
employment are discussed.
Age, Cohort and Inequality
It has been an argument of this thesis that explanations of the historical
development of the modern life cycle require an understanding of its social and
economic construction, and that access to, and rewards from, employment do not
operate independently of more general social relationships. Rainwater and his
colleagues similarly criticise the autonomy of 'market' processes in explanations
of inequality, and develop a conceptual framework around claiming, partly in
order:
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to reject the placing of claims from work ('earnings') in a special status
given by national economic processes, but rather to develop a language within
which 'earnings' may be seen as quite as institutionally determined as claims
on consumption arising out of kinship relations or through the welfare system"
(Rainwater et al, 1986, p. 12; see also Peattie and Rein, 1983).
The following considers some problems which arise from theories of age
stratification and conflict which separate the claims of welfare groups in the
'political' arena of redistribution from claims to rewards in employment. The
examples point to the joint nature of life cycle and class related processes in
ordering resource distribution and in the reproduction of inequality.
The intersection of biography and history is frequently documented and has
been the subject of research into the life chances and experiences of broadly
adjacent birth cohorts (eg. Elder, 1974; Hogan, 1981; Riley, 1988). The
convergence of severe economic recession in the early 1980s and entrance into the
labour force by cohorts born in the 1960s had not only dramatic age related
consequences, manifest in the level of youth unemployment and in related
government policy, but may leave a substantial proportion of people in affected
cohorts disadvantaged over their lifetimes, relative to previous and subsequent
cohorts. The experience of the 1980s suggests that such a convergence is
inseparable from the incidence of long term unemployment and socioeconomic
polarisation. The intersection of life cycle stage and economic slump, where
employment structures heighten the vulnerability of youth, is an aspect not simply
of age inequality but of lifetime opportunity and constraint. Youth employment
could not be so disrupted at no cost to the future absorption of a large section of
the population into 'standard' employment trajectories.
The representation of unemployed youth as a group located in a
structurally determined antagonism with the elderly (eg. Turner, 1989) appears
to be a consequence of the perception of their joint claims on a finite level of
welfare resources. This is a peculiar argument given that the issue for
unemployed youth is more fundamentally an issue of employment! Claims to
security amongst young unemployed adults and retired workers are quite distinct
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elements of the welfare project. Social security amongst the unemployed is about
underwriting the risk of insecurity in the labour force. The British obsession with
scrounging and work disincentives, seen as particularly problematic for young
unemployed adults, is significant in setting benefit levels and rights of entitlement.
Many arguments about restructuring the social security system are principally
concerned with the issue of work incentives amongst unemployed people (eg.
Cooke, 1987; McLaughlin, 1989). In contrast pensions to retired people are
organised precisely to be a disincentive to employment. It is therefore not clear
how claims amongst these groups can be construed as antagonistic.
Age inequalities hold contrasting meanings over differing, class related,
life cycle trajectories. Greater income inequality over an individual's life cycle is
a standard aspect of white collar careers, where expectations turn on job security,
promotion and a rising earnings profile at over the life cycle. A flatter, and
possibly interrupted, earnings profile attaches more clearly to male manual work
and female employment trajectories. In the context of individual life cycle
trajectories, age equality is an aspect of relative disadvantage and age inequality
an aspect of relative advantage. It would seem extraordinary, then, if age
inequalities were to engender conflict between young adults and older workers.
The separation of claims to welfare from employment processes further
neglects the ways in which inequalities amongst the non-employed are structured
in relation to claims to rewards in employment. The claims of children are
entailed in adult claims to a family wage, and in gender inequalities in earnings.
In turn these relationships are essential to understanding patterns of poverty and
inequality in old age. The description of structured dependency of the elderly has
been criticised for suggesting an unwarranted notion of independence during
their working years. The elderly with the lowest pensions are typically those who
held low paid and precarious employment careers. Retirement means more
control over their incomes than such individuals may have experienced for large
parts of their economically active years (Kohli, 1988). To this can be added the
gendered pattern of employment rewards, economic dependency within the
"economically active" years, and differences in pension rights and in life
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expectancy. These are fundamental to the gendered patterning of poverty in old
age (Arber and Ginn, 1991; Ginn and Arber, 1991). A pensioner who lives alone
is at higher risk of poverty than pensioner couples, and is more likely to be
female than male (cf. Millar and Glendinning, 1987).
Heidenheimer presents data describing the risk of poverty amongst
different household types over a number of countries. Examples of some of these
international differences are shown in Table 7.1. All countries except Sweden
show a higher risk of poverty amongst lone elderly women. Such women in Britain
are at a particularly high risk of poverty, although Britain is also unusual for the
extent of poverty amongst elderly married couples, a circumstance which
Heidenheimer explains as a consequence of minimum, uniform levels of income
security in Britain (Heidenheimer, 1990; see also Hedstrom and Ringen, 1987).

























(Heidenheimer, 1990, after Palmer, 1988).
The gendered patterning of poverty in old age has several causes: the
longer life expectancy of women, diminishing savings over the post retirement
years, and the greater probability that a female pensioner will be living alone than
her male counterpart, in a situation where risks of poverty amongst the single
elderly are much higher than amongst elderly couples. Pensioner couples comprise
9.7% of all households and 14.7% of all poor households, single male pensioners
comprise 2.7% of all households, and 4.9% of all poor households, and single
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female pensioners comprise 10.9% of all households and 23.6% of poor
households (Millar and Glendinning, 1987; their poverty line is set at 140% of
supplementary benefit levels).
The poverty of the elderly is clearly partly rooted in their employment
experience. Whilst this continuity in inequality is broadly recognised (eg. Pampel
and Williamson, 1989; Kohli, 1988) it does not sit comfortably with a model of
conflict between welfare 'dependency' groups. The salient issue for claiming seems
more appropriately addressed to inequalities in retirement as these are rooted in
the organisation of income support on the basis of past employment contributions.
These inequalities cannot be reduced to claims in employment, but nor should
explanations neglect the extent to which such claims are significant to the
structuring of poverty and inequality in old age.
Table 7.1 also shows the risk of poverty amongst single and two parent
families. Heidenheimer argues that the differences illustrated in the table are
consistent with the structure of income maintenance programmes, it is the high
minimum benefits and broad entitlement approach of Sweden, for example which
is consistent with the low poverty rates amongst children and the elderly there.
Presumably this can only be the case if employment policy is considered to be an
aspect of income maintenance policy. In Sweden the labour force participation
rate of lone mothers is 85% in contrast to 67% in the United States and 39% in
Britain (Lewis, 1989). Lewis suggests that the high rate in the United States is a
consequence of many states treating lone mothers as workers under their
workfare programmes. In Britain, changing patterns of household dissolution have
contributed to the significant rise in the number of lone parent families, from
570000 in 1971 to 940000 in 1984 (Lewis, 1989). The history of policy debate and
formulation has been characterised by uncertainty over the treatment of women
heading such families as workers or mothers (Lewis, 1989; see also Lewis, 1980).
The comparison between Britain and Sweden illustrates the constructed nature
of the division between work and welfare statuses, and the range of experience
which characterises 'dependency' statuses as these relate to structures of claims
to, and within, paid work.
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Evidence of change in these claims structures has been demonstrated in
earlier chapters, importantly the restructuring of female employment over the life
cycle, and of claims to employment by youth. Another problem for the age
conflict models is the failure to take on issues concerning the changing
employment composition of the population aged 16-64, with respect to levels of
unemployment and to changes in female labour force participation, especially the
extension of labour force continuity over the female life cycle. These changes are
not addressed in any detail in accounts of the impending "demographic
timebomb". The dependency ratio has been widely quoted in relation to this
problem, and used in guiding pension policy formulation. It measures the ratio of
the population of non-working age to the population of working age and does not
take into account changes in levels of unemployment and non-employment
amongst the latter, nor does it consider the relative value of social activity which
is not accorded a market value, nor the level or structure of private transfers
across the population (cf. Falkingham, 1989, Arber and Ginn, 1991). Changes in
the patterning of female employment have been discounted as unimportant for
the dependency ratio because they are equated with the growth of part time work,
a situation seen to have negligible consequences for the system of tax accounting
and social transfers (eg. Thomson, 1989). However, changes in the lifetime
participation of women in employment must be significant to the balance of the
dependency ratio. As we have seen such changes appear significant to extended
periods of dependency amongst youth. Furthermore, they may be important to
the resources that families accrue and carry into old age. The lifetime experience
of different cohorts is essential to understanding the resourcing of those outside
paid employment, and changes in living standards amongst the elderly, children,
youth and the unemployed.
The age conflict approaches focus attention on distributive justice, yet their
emphasis on the circumstances of age groups and 'welfare' or 'dependency' status
neglects the historical structuring of claims in the 'productive' sphere, and the
relationship of the success of failure of such claims to people's circumstances as
they move between work and 'dependent' statuses. In consequence, the arguments
of the conflict theorists tend to understate the significance of inequality within age
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cohorts and overstate the extent of shared interests on the basis of cohort
experience (cf. Ryder 1965). The attempt by Foner to move beyond this
aggregation of cohort experience by considering the articulation of age and class
presents the related processes in terms of distinct dynamics. Class factors
'constrain' the way in which benefits vary with age (Foner, 1988). This position
maintains some autonomous basis for age related rewards, yet offers no
independent explanation of their dynamic. As we have seen age has limited
meaning outside its social context. The age stratification approach distinguishes
the experience of dependency groups from the structures of access to, and rewards
from employment, and from the structuring of dependency itself. The division
reifies the tendency to present issues of distributive justice around the fringes of
employment. Questions are raised about where the boundary should be drawn
and 'what counts' as social participation (eg. Turner, 1989; Minkler, 1986) but
they are still framed in a way which encourages a view of welfare, and processes
of secondary redistribution as political, in the realm of claiming and distinct from
processes of 'primary allocation' seen to reside within a distinct economic sphere
(see Holmwood, 1991).
Arber and Ginn have also suggested that age conflict models fail to take
into account the social and economic value of unpaid work (Arber and Ginn,
1991). They emphasise the ways in which dependency is a socially constructed
and, importantly, gendered, concept. Like Land (1989) they suggest that
interdependence is a preferable framework for understanding social interaction,
although they stress how only certain forms of dependency (those typically
associated with women, children and the elderly) entail a loss of power and status,
in contrast to other forms of dependency (for example, of men on women, for
caring services). I will return to this question of dependency and independence,
and the division between them, as value laden concepts, in the final chapter. It
is, however, clear that social evaluations of dependency and independence are
reflected, and embodied, in the structuring of rewards to different types of labour.
The next section considers the relationship between claims to employment and
earnings, and domestic divisions of labour, as it is reflected in perceptions of
fairness across the life cycle. Data from my survey is consistent with more general
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evidence, and suggests that the patterning of inequality over age groups is an
aspect of stability in the social structure, rather than its undoing.
Attitudes to Dependency, Independence and the Resourcing of Households
L Life Cycle Structure and Claims to Employment
The definition of transitions to adult status in terms of the interrelatedness
of claims and obligations has been discussed in detail. This section explores this
relationship through empirical evidence concerning obligations in the resourcing
of dependency, the attainment of independence, and gendered responsibilities in
household income maintenance and childcare. Whilst empirical evidence is short
on these questions of distributive justice, and much of the literature on age
related conflict has turned more on speculation than on empirical analysis, some
questions, relating to transitions from youth to adult status, can be explored
through data collected in the main survey. In order to locate these questions it is
useful to address empirical evidence from other, secondary, sources.
In a study of perceptions of distributive justice in the United States, Jasso
and Rossi make a distinction between distribution rules, which refer to 'what is',
or the current structure of resource allocation, and their legitimacy, or perceptions
of 'what ought to be'. They question whether judgements of justice relate to actual
distributions of resources or some Utopian referent. (The relationship between
actual distributions and perceptions of distributive justice is an important issue,
to which I will return). In their survey the authors required respondents to rank,
on a scale of over- or under-payment, a series of individuals with various
attributes: sex, marital status, number of children, education and occupational
level, and earnings, as described in a series of vignettes. The authors conclude the
salience of both need and merit to their respondents' justice evaluations (Jasso
and Rossi, 1977). In a similar, but larger scale, survey, Alves and Rossi revise the
earlier argument of the existence of a consensus over just distribution rules. In the
modified argument need and merit aspects are again demonstrated to underlie
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evaluations of just earnings, but respondents' own social location influenced their
relative importance (Alves and Rossi, 1978; cf. Stewart and Blackburn, 1975).
Higher occupational status groups placed greater emphasis on merit, proposing
higher earnings for those with higher qualifications or occupational position, and
lower status groups placed greater emphasis on need considerations, proposing
more earnings for households with more children (Alves and Rossi, 1978).
Evidence from my survey suggests that there is a patterning also of attitudes
towards claims which relates to respondents' own life cycle stage. Before looking
at this evidence it is of interest to examine the patterning of inequality by
household type. Table 7.2 compares the average total income of different types
of household (after Rainwater et al, 1986), and Table 7.3 reproduces an analysis
by Millar and Glendinning (1987) on the relation between household
circumstance and risk of poverty.
The data presented by Rainwater, reproduced in Table 7.2, is aggregated,
and it is therefore not possible to distinguish in detail the contributions of
different household members, or family life cycle stage. 'No children', for
example, includes young couples prior to family formation and older couples in
the 'empty nest' stage of the family life cycle. Married couples without children
presumably comprise two wage earners, whereas those with children are probably
more reliant on male earnings. Rainwater points out that in families with children,
husbands contribute a higher proportion of aggregate household income than is
the case for couples without children. The median reliance on husbands' earnings
for couples with children in Britain is 85%.24 However such families still have an
average income slightly above the national mean. This pattern reflects not only
the particular significance of male earnings to such familes but also a structure
of earnings which rewards men with dependent children more highly than other
groups. This pattern of earnings over household types is reflected also in the data
presented in Table 7.3, which demonstrates a similar structure of inequality, with
respect to risk of poverty. Married couples without children, in both sets of
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Table 7.2. Inequality by household stmcture
household type
Ratio of mean household income








Rainwater et al, 1986; estimated
from 1973 General Household Survey.
evidence, are the best placed in respect of household income, followed by couples
with children, and lone female parents are the worst placed (Millar and
Glendinning, 1987).
The patterning of varying needs and claims over the life cycle is broadly
reflected in responses to two questions in my survey where respondents were
asked to assess claims to resources by people in different household
circumstances. In a question concerning access to employment, respondents
prioritised the claims of adults with dependent children over the claims of young
single adults without similar obligations. Respondents were asked to imagine
that there is a job vacancy for which six different people apply, to assume that
they are all equally qualified, and to rank their preferences of who they would
most like to get the job. The potential worker 'types' were defined in terms of
household circumstance. The question, therefore, assumes the legitimacy of need
and the salience of circumstances of dependency and obligation in ordering claims
to employment, and describes individuals only in terms of domestic circumstance.
The respondents were asked to rank all six individuals described. The question
was designed in part to examine the hypothesis that youth would be more inclined
to favour their age peers. Within the confines of a fixed choice question this was
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couple 9.7 14.7 42%
woman 10.9 23.6 61%
man 2.7 4.9 51%
non-pensioners
single women 3.9 4.6 33%
single man 5.1 5.5 30%
couple, no 17.2 7.3 12%
couple, children 28.2 20.7 20%
lone mother 3.6 7.7 61%
lone father 0.4 0.6 43%
Poverty is measured as net weekly income minus net housing costs below 140% of ordinary
rates of supplementary benefit; Family Expenditure Survey data. After Millar and
Glendinning, 1987.
the minority response and most gave priority to those with family obligations. The
majority of respondents ranked first either the married man with dependent
children or the single mother. Only 9 out of 92 young respondents ranked first any
of the young single adults as described in the exercise. The incidence of first and
second place ranking is shown in Table 7.4.
The lower preference given to young single people in the responses
suggests the salience of household obligations to perceptions of the value of
differing claims to resources. The low number of respondents prioritising youth
over and above adults with dependent children may in part attach to the voluntary
nature of residence in, or departure from, parental homes amongst the majority
of respondents. It is clearly 'non-standard' household transitions which are the
most problematic, transitions which are not well represented in the data, and
which might encourage a higher level of preference for young, single adults. Age
conflict models posit self interested claims made on the basis of age, but this sort
of age related identification of interest is not evident in the structure of responses.
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Their pattern is consistent with the findings of those studies reported above which
suggest that perceptions of earnings justice involve judgements about relative
need. The ranking, by respondents, of the relative claims to the job by the
individuals described in the 'vignette' suggests the significance of social obligations
and responsibilities towards dependents in perceptions of distributive justice.
Table 7.4. Ranking of claims to work amongst individuals in differing household
circumstances .25'26'27
Rankings given to vignette
individuals
individual described young adults parents
in vignette: 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
young single man, living at
home 5 5 2 2
young single man, living away
from home 3 5 0 5
young single woman, living
away from home 2 8 0 3
married man, young, with
children, wife not working 48 28 29 4
married women, no children
at home, husband not working 3 21 0 6
women with no husband,
young children 33 23 4 13
There is some evidence of a relationship between responses and
individuals' own household circumstances. Amongst the older generation, of
parents to the youth sample, there is a strong majority preference for the married
man with a young family. The limited priority for single mothers amongst the
older generation is not necessarily evidence of an historical change in preference
for positive discrimination for this group however, since amongst the youth sample
those who were themselves cohabiting or married favoured the married man more
than the sample as a whole. The division between dependent young adults and
those who are independent and cohabiting is strongly associated with the division
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of preference for the married man and the lone mother, a division which is quite
clearcut amongst the male sample.






Respondents to Main survey
men women







Table 7.5 shows the patterning of first preferences for the individuals
described by respondents' own household circumstance. 'Youth' groups the three
young and single individuals described because of the small number of
respondents giving them top priority. Where the relative ranking of the single
mother and the married man are considered, regardless of their relationship to
the other individuals described, the ratio of the former to the latter is 18:22
amongst dependent men and 4:15 amongst family men. Amongst women the
equivalent ratios are 6:9 and 5:11. That is, and especially amongst men, their own
life cycle stage appears to be quite strongly associated with their responses.29
There is no similar relationship apparent over employment sector or qualification
level. This pattern of responses is associated, not directly with age, but with
household status, an important distinction which is often conflated in age
stratification theories. For example, 47 male respondents are aged 25 or below,
ofwhom 7 are independent and living with a partner. Whilst those who are young
and single are evenly divided in their giving priority to the single mother or
married man, all 7 of those aged 25 and under who live independently with a
partner favour the married man. The questionnaire did not ask respondents the
reasons for their preferences, although some explicitly stated that 'positive
discrimination' lay behind their prioritising the lone mother. Across the sample,
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those who are themselves independent and living with a partner are more likely
to favour the married man over the single mother. Relatively high levels of need,
or anticipated need, characterise the family formation period as households face
higher costs, and the probability of losing much, if not all, female earnings
contributions, at least in the early years of childrearing. The significance of male
earnings to family living standards at this stage in the life cycle is reflected in the
stronger preference by similarly placed respondents for the 'male breadwinner'
claim to employment.
The majority of cohabiting men and women, like the parent sample,
prioritise the claims of married men over those of single mothers. The sample size
is very small here, but it is worth noting that a more substantial minority of young
adults favour the claims of single mothers than do respondents amongst the
parental generation. It is an interesting question whether in later years, in a more
affluent stage of the family life cycle, members of the younger generation would
reveal a different structure of priorities.
The lower priority given to the claims of young, single adults deserves
comment. Millar and Glendinning's data demonstrates a higher risk of poverty
amongst single adult households than is the case in families with children or, by
extension, the circumstances of young adults living with their parents. It is clear
in the case of married men with young children that not to give them work would
probably drop their families into poverty. This would not be a standard
consequence in the case of young adults dependent at their parents. Some
comments made by respondents in the course of answering the question indicated
an expectation that young adults living away from home had attained their
independence voluntarily. This suggests that the claims of young men living at
home were ranked first more than any other group without obligations to
children, because they were seen to hold a particular form of personal, as
opposed to household, disadvantage, as might be entailed, for example, in being
unemployed and (still, perhaps) dependent on their parents.
The significance of respondents' own life cycle stage is associated not only
200
with claims to work amongst different groups, but also with stated preferences for
organising family formation decisions around earnings and career opportunities.
Respondents were read the following vignette: "John and Maggie are a young
married couple, and are both working. Maggie is offered another job which pays
less than the one she has now, but it has better prospects. However, they hope to
have children over the next few years. What should she do?" Of the 92 young
adult respondents 37 replied 'she should stay in the old job'; 36 that she should
'take advantage of the potential career prospects and delay having children', and
13 that she should 'take the new job and quit when she gets pregnant'. Amongst
the 36 respondents to the parents' survey, the corresponding responses were 9, 15
and 8. The other respondents suggested some alternative course of action. Again,
amongst the youth sample, domestic circumstance is strongly associated with the
pattern of responses, which are shown in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6. Preference for career and family decisions, as described in vignette,
amongst respondents to the main survey






dependent 7 18 30
married 6 19 6
The different salience of the question to young adults in different
circumstances may be important to the pattern of responses. However, the greater
preference for the woman described in the vignette to remain with her old job,
amongst cohabiting respondents, appears to reflect the importance of earnings in
a period of relative need. A substantial proportion, over one third of the sample
of those who are cohabiting, suggest she should take the new job. That a minority
advocates delay does not contradict the evidence that contemporary cohorts of
young adults are deferring parenthood relative to previous cohorts. Such delay is
not necessarily a consciously formulated decision, but rather it is embedded within
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contemporary social relationships. Amongst parents it is notable that a higher
percentage advocate moving to the new job than staying in the old, and as in the
youth sample around half advocate delaying the start of childbearing. This
relatively high sympathy to female claims to careers cannot be separated from the
older generation's perceptions of better employment opportunities for
contemporary cohorts of young women (described in Chapter 5).
To summarise, the evidence presented in this section suggests the
significance of life cycle related circumstances, specifically relations to household
resourcing, are reflected in respondents' attitudes towards the relative strengths
of employment claims by different groups. Further, the perceived salience of
particular needs itself varies in relation to respondents' own household
circumstance. In Chapter 2, we saw how some researchers maintain that the
attitudes of their respondents are often at odds with their behaviour (Wallace,
1987a; Cockburn, 1987). Cockburn looked specifically at gender role attitudes and
suggested that 'liberal' attitudes were taken over by 'traditional' employment roles
(Cockburn, 1987). However, the evidence presented here suggests that people's
attitudes are not at odds with their circumstances, so long as the latter are located
within a longitudinal, life cycle perspective.
it Claims to Independence and the Patterning of
Social Obligation.
In Chapter 6, a set of interview questions were described, where
respondents were asked to describe the attributes of a typical employee in a series
of job grades and to indicate the earnings they thought to be typical of each
grade. Respondents were also asked whether or not they would choose to reward
any job grade more highly (even though it would mean rewarding another one
less), or whether they would reward any grades less. Considering here only the
lowest grade, that is the ones associated with the youngest employees, the majority
of respondents said they would keep the earnings level the same, that is not
reward it more highly at the expense of higher paid jobs further up the career
202
ladder. This result was the same across all companies. Unfortunately, for those
men interviewed who are perhaps the worst placed in respect of potential
employment chances, on the Community Programme and Special Measures YTS,
there is no question on earnings which relates directly to their own experience,
rather than apprentice based career routes. In general such men kept the level of
apprentice earnings the same in this exercise. In the other two sectors, women
were more inclined to increase the earnings of the lowest job grades than were
men. 13 women suggested the lowest grade should be paid more highly, whilst 15
said they would leave it the same; amongst men the respective figures were 8 and
18. There is no clear association of responses with qualification level, employment
sector, company or respondents' age, or expectations concerning their own
employment circumstance, including promotion, five years hence. Men were less
inclined than women to alter the age structure of earnings in their sector. The
higher level of dissension amongst female respondents may reflect the lower
salience to them of an age graded earnings profile which is a standard aspect of
male white collar career structures. However, it is worth underlining that the
majority of respondents, and over two thirds of male respondents, did not
rearrange the age structure of earnings, which were uniformly seen to have an age
graded profile.
Harris, in his discussion of the dependency assumptions built into social
security policy, suggests that families now desire and expect young people to have
more independence than they did in the past (Harris, 1988). Responses to the
attitude statements in the survey suggest however that whilst the ability to achieve
independence is viewed positively, the expectation of parental obligations to
youth is also high. Rites of passage to adulthood are partly structured by the
expectation that the underwriting of continued dependency is more a family affair
than a public responsibility. The statement "it should be easier than it is for
young people to get their own place and live independently" revealed a high and
almost identical pattern of agreement amongst parents and youth: 52/69 young
adult respondents agreed, 22/28 parents agreed (21/28 young adult children of
interviewed parents agreed). However, in response to statement "young people
should be content to stay with their parents until they are earning enough to
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support themselves financially", the majority also agreed (60/79 young adults;
24/34 parents and 23/34 young adult children of interviewed parents).30
Most of the young adults in the survey were either living at home or had
left voluntarily. The majority of parents with young adult children at home
indicated that the dig money they received from their children at most covered
costs and was rarely seen as a significant contribution to household resources.
Most parents accepted their role in supporting their young adult children as a
'natural' thing to do. Again this may in part be a consequence of the relative
advantage of those parent-child pairs interviewed, but it is consistent with other
evidence, including the experience of many unemployed youth (see Hutson and
Jenkins, 1989). Both of these examples, where parents support young adults who
are working but living at home, and where parents help to carry the costs of
unemployment even though they may be poorly placed to do so, suggest that the
structural relationship between generations is one of mutuality and not one of
conflict.
Another set of cross generational comparisons reveals interesting
differences in attitudes towards gendered divisions of responsibility in household
income maintenance. Responses to a series of statements relating to such
divisions are shown in Table 7.7. The table includes only independent, cohabiting
young adults since the statements may have a different, and abstracted, meaning
to youth who are single or living with their parents. The majority of young
respondents disagree that 'a husband works to support his family and a wife works
for the extras'. These responses suggest the salience of female earnings to
household income maintenance and contrast with the responses of the parental
generation. These differences are consistent both with a life cycle effect and with
structural changes through the post war decades in female contributions to
household resourcing. The majority of respondents believe that both partners
need to work to keep up with the cost of living. The higher level of disagreement
that 'a wife works for the extras' suggests that more respondents see a woman's
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a husband works to support disagree 21 11 2
his family and a wife works
for the extras agree 10 23 10
a husband and wife both disagree 12 13 4
need to work to keep up
16 19with the cost of living agree 7
a mother of young children disagree 7 13 3
should work if the family
8needs the money agree 25
19
('paired young adults' refers to respondents to the main survey whose parents were
interviewed)
wages as significant to maintaining lifestyles than necessarily to 'getting by' as
implied by the cost of living statement. The similarity of responses over the
generations with respect to employment and the cost of living, and the
generational difference in responses to the statement concerning whether or not
a wife works for extras is consistent with a life cycle interpretation. 'Extras'
amongst the older generation may contribute to the ability to sustain a particular
lifestyle. Young adults, most of whom are in, or entering, the family building
stage, are likely to interpret female financial contributions as more basic to
household resourcing than to describe them as 'extras'. The structure of responses
is suggestive of the greater value to young adults of female contributions to
household income maintenance.
The available empirical evidence points to the significance of both life
cycle and period effects in structuring attitudes. There is no evidence, however,
that standard processes place different age groups or generations in an
antagonistic relationship to one another, or that age related claims engender
conflict. Relationships over the life cycle and between age groups and generations
are essential to explanations of structures of inequality, but the organisation of




This chapter has described some of the processes which give coherence to
the relationships between age groups and between generations. These processes
point to problems which ensue from supposing that the relationship between those
in paid work and those who are not so employed is one of structural antagonism.
One such problem which is embedded within age stratification and conflict
approaches is the conceptual distinction between claims amongst different age
groups, or between the claims of work and 'welfare' groups. It is as if thought
becomes trapped in the particularity of the experience of different social groups.31
The organisation of social claims is central to understanding the mutuality
of relationships between 'dependency' groups and those in paid employment. For
example, the claims of children and dependent youth cannot be separated from
the high rewards of adult men relative to other groups of workers, nor from
gendered inequalities in rewards to employment and ensuing patterns of
inequality in old age. The extent to which financial rewards are structured in
relation to economic and social obligations, as these are standardly carried by
certain groups, underlies the material problems which characterise the experience
of 'non-standard' circumstances, for example amongst lone mothers and their
children, and amongst dependent youth with unemployed parents. Either way the
structuring of rewards to different groups are inseparable from the relationships
through which these groups are linked in the resourcing of individual and
household reproduction.
The stability of 'horizontal' inequality, that is intra-class inequalities over
the life cycle and across different household structures, is reflected in perceptions
of distributive justice. The empirical evidence on attitudes to this inequality
suggests that people perceive it to be just, partly because it reflects differing levels
of need over the life cycle. Most respondents prioritised the claim to work
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amongst individuals with dependents over the claims of individuals without similar
obligations. The majority of young adults preferred not to rearrange the age
hierarchy of earnings in their employment sector. These responses suggest that a
profile of earnings graded in relation to age and domestic responsibilities is seen
as a legitimate ordering of claims to economic resources. Evaluations of claims
amongst different age groups appear, then, to incorporate understandings of
horizontal equity, where some continuity in living standards is seen as appropriate,
yet where the burden of household income maintenance is spread unevenly over
the life cycle. These evaluative judgements are made in relation to a structure
which rewards certain groups more highly and regards others as, at least partially,
dependent. In this sense fairness judgements, or evaluations of claims, are
structured in relation to "what is", to an actual rather than a Utopian referent (cf.
Stewart and Blackburn, 1975; Alves and Rossi, 1978). Age related inequalities
cohere with expectations of varying economic obligations over the life cycle.
Changes in the structure of inequalities between age groups are seen in age
stratification and age conflict models to engender a restructuring of social claims.
These claims are simultaneously assumed to result in conflict between different
welfare groups or between welfare groups and the working population. However,
the claims of 'dependency' groups are not separable from the experience of, and
rewards to, those who are active in paid employment. Perceptions of fairness
reflect the stability of these processes, and the coherence of age related processes
and social structure.
Stability, however, is of course commensurate with social change. The
reorganisation of life cycle processes, as we have seen, reflects changes in the
relative position of different groups in the resourcing of social reproduction. In
this way, the processes shaping 'horizontal' inequality and 'vertical' inequality are
not distinct. For example, the incidence of economic vulnerability, such as
unemployment amongst youth and amongst workers approaching retirement, and
amongst single mothers, has significant implications for general structures of
inequality. The undermining of claims by youth to an adult wage, and to
independence at early ages, may exacerbate the risks of poverty amongst those
who are poorly placed to make claims on other family members. The convergence
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of life cycle related vulnerability with economic insecurity and recessionary and
structural economic change may result in some groups being permanently
disadvantaged relative to others, and relative to their age peers in other cohorts.
Locationwith respect to the organisation of social reproduction, then, is of central
importance in the distribution of risks of poverty, and in the structuring of
inequality. Change in the ways in which reproduction is organised, and the
position of different groups in relation to these processes, is essential for
understanding the organisation of inequality. Proponents of the age stratification
framework claim to challenge economically based stratification theories by
pointing to their partiality, specifically their failure to take on issues of inequality
outside the 'economic' sphere. However, a more convincing challenge to
stratification theory lies in recognising the ways in which age, and gender, related




The transition from youth to adult status, or from dependence to
independence and obligation, and change in its social organisation, is integral to
the arrangements through which society is reproduced. I suggested earlier that it
may be appropriate, finally, to characterise this life cycle transition as having a
moral character. This is because the organisation of social reproduction embodies
evaluations of the social worth of different groups, different circumstances and
different activities. In this concluding chapter I summarise the main arguments of
the thesis, and discuss their implications for understandings of life cycle processes,
social inequalities and social change.
Through an analysis of data collected in a survey of young adults and their
parents, undertaken in conjunction with a critical appraisal of more general
evidence on the organisation of employment and life cycle processes, the thesis
has explored change in the transition from youth to adulthood, as an integral part
of more general changes in the social organisation of obligation and dependency.
The 1980s saw a growing interest in the consequences of economic change for the
transition to adult status. In part this was a reaction to the employment crisis at
the start of that decade. Some writers explored the question of whether
employment restructuring has disrupted the attainment of adult lifestyles, and
citizenship rights, amongst recent cohorts of young people. Their research,
however, reached contradictory conclusions over the significance of economic
change for the organisation of the transition to adulthood. It has been criticised
recently for failing to locate 'youth' as a group, within the structures and values
of society (Jones, 1988; Ashton and Lowe, 1991; Chisholm, 1990). The difficulty
in so locating youth, and the transition to adult status, is principally a consequence
of the general theoretical framework in which 'social', domestic, circumstances,
which are central to definitions of life cycle trajectories, are conceived of as
autonomous, or distinct from employment processes and employment related
inequalities.
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The division between 'the social' and 'the economic' is reflected clearly in
models of parallel trajectories through domestic careers and labour force careers.
There is no consideration of the ways in which employment processes, and the
organisation of rewards to employment, are themselves shaped in relation to
individual, and family, life cycles. The question of the impact of economic change
on a particular life cycle transition is itself less straightforward than it might at
first appear, because life cycle related processes are themselves significant for
patterns of demand for, and structures of rewards to, different labour force
groups. Further, the composition and relative position of such groups are not
constant. Long term changes in the organisation of household and family
structure, and changes in the contributions of different members to the resourcing
of households, are essential to understanding change in the shape and substance
of life cycle trajectories. In conjunction, changing relations to household
resourcing, the reproduction of households, day to day, and through new
generations, cannot be separated from changes in the structure of employment.
These processes are central in shaping the circumstances of any particular
life cycle stage, and are essential to understanding contemporary transitions from
youth to adulthood. For example, the current position of youth cannot be
understood in isolation from a knowledge of their family circumstance, of, for
example, their parents' own family formation activities, the age difference
between themselves and their parents, their parents' employment status and
relative earnings, the presence and age of siblings, and the division of
responsibilities for household resourcing over the family life cycle. Patterns of
demand for, and rewards to, employment are shaped in relation to these
processes. There are two principle, and linked, ways in which these processes
underlie change in the transition from youth to adulthood. Firstly, over this
century there has been an increase in the affluence of families with children
approaching adult status which has been increasingly independent of the material
contributions of young adult children. There is a sense, then, in which young
adults in such family circumstances can 'afford' not only to stay in full time
education to older ages, but also to take relatively low paying jobs. Secondly, the
available evidence suggests that the general patterns of delay in household and
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family formation by young couples are, in part, a consequence of the increased
importance of the earnings of young women, relative to those of young men, in
resourcing new households and becoming parents at a standard of living
commensurate with orientations towards general, societal, levels of consumption.
In tracing the mutual interaction of 'productive' and 'reproductive'
processes I have stressed the importance of the social organisation of dependence
and obligation. The latter term has been a device for exploring the social
construction of 'independence', challenging its taken for granted nature as a
consequence of employment security. Dependence and independence, or
obligation, refer to different circumstances in the resourcing and organisation of
social reproduction. They simultaneously provide a framework for exploring
employment inequalities as social processes. Some writers, however, maintain that
dependence and independence are value laden concepts, and prefer to replace
them with a theory, and terminology, of interdependence (Land, 1989; Arber and
Ginn, 1991). This preference is part of an attempt to foreground the social and
economic value of unpaid, particularly domestic, labour. Whilst my own
terminology, of the interaction of dependence and obligation, is a little clumsy,
the more 'streamlined' concept of interdependence would not necessarily add
anything to the analysis, and risks taking away something valuable. In part, the
objective of its proponents is no different from my own, where the concern is to
explore the social construction of differing forms of obligation and dependence,
and the ways in which their organisation reflects the social nature of all human
activity. However, it is important to retain dependence and obligation as distinct
concepts, whilst acknowledging that both refer to financial and care related
resources, precisely because through them it is possible to articulate broader
social evaluations of the worth of different activities. That some work is paid, and
other work is unpaid, could not provide a clearer reflection of such evaluations.
To speak of interdependence then is appropriate at one level, but as a general
concept it is not detailed enough to elucidate how different values are accorded
to different activities. It is important to maintain distinctions which are fine
enough to reflect the complexity of evaluations of different activities, to elucidate
the arrangements by which different social value and the activities of different
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groups are associated, and to analyse the processes underlying continuity and
change in such arrangements.
As we have seen standard arrangements place groups differently in the
resourcing of their daily livlihoods. Some are dependent on other family members,
or on the state, for maintaining themselves; others have 'independent' access to
earnings from employment, themselves patterned in relation to claims for
resourcing dependents. There is, however, no straightforward relationship between
dependence and disadvantage, or between independence and advantage. In
assessing particular arguments for a more equitable distribution of social
resources and opportunities it is useful to distinguish between two different
aspects of inequality, although they are closely related, one shaped by the other.
The distinction I wish to draw is between inequality and poverty as a consequence
of non-standard circumstances, which place people at a particular disadvantage,
and inequality as implicit within the arrangements by which social reproduction
is organised. The former might be seen as a particular instance of the latter, that
is, standard arrangements place particular groups at risk of poverty, and at risk
of social exclusion. Examples of the former, non-standard circumstances, are
unemployment, and single parenthood. Examples of the latter can be seen in
claims which counter standard arrangements, such as arguments for resources
sufficient to support independent living amongst young people, and wages for
housework campaigns. Youth research has been conducted in relation to the
latter, particularly in its arguments of an undermining of 'traditional' claims by
youth to independence and employment security. However, its methodological
focus has been with the former, that is with youth in particular, and often
problematic, circumstances. In short, it has failed to locate its arguments in
relation to general processes of change in the arrangements by which youth, and
transitions to adult status, are reproduced.
This thesis has analysed changes in the social processes through which the
transition from youth to adult status is organised. Any concern with the claims of
young people must be placed against an understanding of such processes. That
over the long term many households are better placed to support their dependent
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young adult children clearly means that those which are not so placed face
particular problems, especially where government policies are encouraging greater
'privatisation' in the resourcing of material dependency. Any claims by, or on
behalf of, young people, or other groups without independent access to material
resources, are claims against the relations of dependency and obligation through
which social reproduction is organised. Potentially, then, such claims would be
part of a more general challenge to the practices, beliefs and policies which place
particular groups at risk of, or in, poverty, and at the margins of society. The
circumstances of such groups speaks about the broader social morality.
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Notes
1. There are parallels between this critique and Garnsey's critique of
conventional approaches to class analysis which treat the occupational structure
as 'the backbone of the reward system'. Proponents of the 'conventional view' see
the problem of class analysis as an issue of how labour comes to be allocated to
particular positions in the reward structure, an approach which Garnsey criticises
for seeing the reward structure as determined by economic and technological
exigencies (Garnsey, 1982).
2. None of the building workers interviewed in the survey were self employed,
but the significance, and recent growth, of labour only subcontracting on the
structure of the industry has been an area of some concern, particularly in
industry specific research on labour force segmentation (eg. Winch, 1986; Moore,
1981; Bresnen et al, 1985. See also Austrin, 1980).
3. This estimate is drawn from ranking the marriage ages of the population and
removing the youngest and oldest 10% of the distribution and measuring the
marriage timing of the central 80% of the distribution.
4. These cross sectional rates will underestimate the cohort average.
5. The percentages are calculated as sum of proportions in the relevant category
by single years of age 16-29, thereby eliminating the consequences of any
imbalance in the age distribution (Penhale, 1990).
6. Thompson's data refers to births within marriage because detail on birth
order and mothers' ages was not available for births registered outside of
marriage.
7. It seems likely that this late twentieth century turning point in trends from
lower to higher ages at family formation will not be superceded by a new
demographic transition for some time. OPCS projections of fertility, made in the
mid 1980s, assumed that falling rates for women in their early twenties and rising
rates for older women would level off. This had not happened by the end of the
1980s and OPCS now predict that the overall mean female age at childbirth will
rise from 27.3 years in 1989 and to 28.7 years by the end of the century and will
fall back to 27.8 years by 2015. The mean female age at birth of the first child is
predicted to continue to rise from 25.3 years in 1989 to 26.5 years by 2000 before
beginning to fall (Shaw, 1990).
8. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 treat the sample as a synthetic cohort (cf. Penhale, 1990),
that is, cross-sectional evidence of age related experience is compared over age
groups as if they formed a single cohort. The experience of older respondents at
younger ages is treated as equivalent to the contemporary experience of younger
respondents. Younger respondents, of course, are not bound to repeat the
experience of older respondents.
9. As we have seen this is the case amongst recent youth theorists. It is also true
of historical studies of demographic change and the timing of marriage and
parenting (eg. Hajnal, 1965; Gillis, 1985; Banks, 1954, Gittins, 1982) and amongst
economists' explanations of fertility patterns (eg. Easterlin, 1968; Ermisch, 1983).
10. A recent survey estimates that of women who leave work to have children,
almost 50% return to work within nine months, and that more than 20% of
women who were full time employees at the time of pregnancy went back to work
fulll time, compared to 7% in 1979 (McRae, PSI survey reported in The
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Guardian, 21.11.1991).
11. Another version of the significance of norms to employment patterns is
provided by those interested in gender role attitudes and labour force
commitment. Again, however, the significance of such norms is not located
adequately with respect to material changes and, in consequences, norms and
expectations acquire a static, ahistorical character. For example, Mott and his
colleagues explore inter-generational influences in female labour force
commitment (Mott et al, 1982). In their comparative analysis of mothers' and
daughters' employment participation rates in the United States, they argue that
the probability that young women work has a stronger statistical association with
the attitudes of their mothers, described as gender role traditional or gender role
liberal, than to their mothers' own experience of limited or extensive labour force
participation. The writers argue that as gender role attitudes become more liberal,
so women will be able to make more economically rational decisions about
whether or not to work. They neglect the possibility of a 'reverse' form of
socialisation, where mothers are more liberal in their attitudes to women working
precisely because of the experience of their daughters. Neoclassical theory, they
suggest, will become increasingly appropriate as a framework for analysing female
employment participation, as attitudes become less constrained by traditional
gender role expectations (Mott et al, 1982).
12. The NES has been carried out in its current form since 1970, although the
method of estimating average weekly earnings differs slightly from subsequent
years. Also, from 1974 onwards, age was measured in the survey in terms of
completed years at the 1st January. For 1973 and previously, age was measured
in terms of completed years at the time of the survey.
13. Data are not available from NES prior to 1968, and age disaggregated
earnings data was not included in the 1972 NES data.
14. The GHS is a national survey of households in Britain, from which Jones
derived a subset of data on 12000 people aged 16 to 29, combining the 1979 and
1980 surveys. The NCDS is a cohort study of all people born during one week in
March, 1958, with a current sample size of 12500. Jones analysed data from the
1981 Sweep of the survey, whose respondents were then 23, and which gathered
information for the period since they were 16 years old (Jones, 1987).
15. Further, one might question the definition of youth classes in relation to
fathers' occupation in the absence of a theory of the salience of gender processes
to the reproduction of class inequality (cf. Garnsey, 1982). Heath and Britten
point to the inappropriateness of the Registrar General's social class groupings
for classifying female non-manual jobs. Looking specifically at female clerical
workers and shop assistants they argue that the manual/non-manual division is
not a major break in the class structure and that women in sales work share more
with female manual workers than they do with their relatively advantaged "peers"
in clerical jobs (Heath and Britten, 1984). The problems with the RG scale
however are far more serious yet. In a comparison of occupations' RG
classification and their scores derived from the Hope Goldthorpe scale, Bland
examined the degree of overlap between classes, using this as a measure of their
failure to meet the OPCS claim that each category is homogeneous. Rearranging
the cross classification to remove all overlap it is necessary to change the RG
class definition for 33% of the male population. Whilst the manual non-manual
distinction works more or less effectively in aggregate comparisons, within class
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Ill the division is ineffective, with only a 61% probability that any randomly
chosen skilled non-manual occupation is ranked higher, on the Hope Goldthorpe
scale, than a similarly chosen skilled manual occupation (Bland, 1979). He argues
that inferences made on such a distinction should be avoided.
16. The following two tables illustrate patterns of class mobility amongst the
fathers and mothers of respondents to the Main Survey. Their class position is
based on their occupations as reported by their young adult children.
Fathers to all respondents
social class current social class
at marriage: I II IIINM IIIM IV V
I 1 1
II
IIINM 4 2 1
MM 2 5 4 13 1 1
IV 1 2 3
V 1 2
Mothers to all respondents
social class current social class
at marriage I II IIINM IIIM IV V
I
II 1 1
IIINM 5 9 3 1
IIIM 1 3 1
IV 1 4 1 2 4
V 1 1 1 2
Both men and women experienced quite a high degree of occupational mobility
over their labour force careers. Of 44 fathers, 21 are in the same class now as
they were at marriage, 4 were 'downwardly mobile' and 19 'upwardly mobile'. Of
42 mothers, 14 are in the same class now as they were at marriage, 10 were
'downwardly mobile' and 18 'upwardly mobile'. A comparison of children's social
class and that of their same sex parent now contrasts with a comparison based on
parents' social class location at their marriage. Of the 30 father-son pairs, 10 sons
are occupationally stable vis-a-vis their fathers, 9 are 'upwardly mobile' and 11 are
'downwardly mobile'. However, the comparison with fathers' social class at his
marriage shows a greater degree of stability, with half of the respondents in the
same social class (10/15 being in skilled manual work), and only 3 out of 30 being
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downwardly mobile. All daughters are classified as skilled non-manual. The
comparison with mothers' social class shows that of 11 mother-daughter pairs, 3
daughters are occupationally 'stable' vis-a-vis their mothers, 1 is upwardly mobile
and 7 are downwardly mobile. The comparison with mothers' social class at
marriage shows 6 out of 11 daughters to be in the same social class, and only 2
out of 11 to be downwardly mobile.
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Inter-generationalMobility: sons' class by fathers' occupational social class at his own
marriage
Father's social Son's current social class




IIIM 1 6 10 2
IV 1 1 1
V 1 2
Inter-generational mobility: daughter's occupational social class by mother's current




Mot rer's current social class
I II IIINM IIIM IV V
7 3 1
Mother's social class at marriaue
I II IIINM IIIM IV V
2 h 2 1
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17. Reasons for entering current employment sector were classified as follows:
negative: better than unemployment/the dole; I needed the money; it was all I
could get (I did not have the qualifications for anything else); it was the first job
I was offered/it came up; respondent under pressure from 'Restart'; and positive:
wanted to work in sector/area (interested in work); I wanted to get a
trade/apprenticeship; I wanted to further myself (or any reference to prospects
and future); better money; job seen to be more permanent, secure, better paid
than previous job or alternatives. Missing values were assigned where answers
were too vague to usefully classify, or where a combination of positive and
negative reasons were given.
18. I am grateful to Sandy Stewart for providing me with a questionnaire
designed by him and his colleagues at the Cambridge School of Applied
Economics, and from which I adapted this set of questions.
19. The male adult wage distribution amongst construction workers was 6
responses to each of the lower three adult wage brackets, and 13 responses to the
highest (£9500+) bracket. Tradesman was the status most typically associated with
married status, and because this occupation is a standard long term employment
position for many men in the building industry, with highly varied incomes,
respondents in this sector are excluded from subsequent quantifications using the
adult wage index.
20. Nobody under 19 at the time of interview was engaged, married or a parent.
21. What is known about respondents' educational backgrounds is sufficient
cause for caution in assuming similarity on the basis of current occupational
location. It should be noted that there is no straightforward patterning of life cycle
event timing in relation to level of educational qualification amongst respondents.
22. Riley provides a slightly different description of the relationship between
age related processes and social change (Riley, 1988). She distinguishes between
ageing within cohorts and changes in society as cohorts move through historical
time. Historical changes mean that cohorts age in different ways (eg. through
increased longevity), and in turn these changes drive changes in the social
structure (eg. as people press for re-evaluations of age related social roles).
However, Riley maintains that a lack of synchrony between processes of ageing
and social change results in a disruption, and 'structural strain', as age related
roles and institutions outlive their original (positive) functions. Like the conflict
theorists, Riley stresses inherent tendencies to disintegration within the social
system. The third element in her argument, of asynchrony, appears to contradict
her notion of a dialectical interplay between age related processes and social
change.
23. Two separate poverty lines were used in the U.S. for those aged 65 and over
and those under 65. The 1984 poverty line for the latter group was 8.5% higher
than that used for the elderly. If the same poverty cut off had been used for both
groups, 15.4% of the elderly would have fallen below the line, giving the aged a
higher poverty rate than any other group except children (Minkler, 1986).
24. The summary measure hides sources of variation. Rainwater notes that
around one quarter of their sample families have non-head earners, and in Britain
such earners contribute 28% of their family's income. The analysis is based on
1973 data and subsequent changes in structures of household income
maintenance, as described in Chapter 5, suggest that reliance on husbands'
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earnings may have declined, particularly at some periods of a households' lifetime.
Such reliance, however, remains particularly high where the arrival of children is
accompanied by loss of female earnings.
25. The term 'parents' refers to the older generation, of parents to the young
adults interviewed, unless otherwise indicated.
26. The ideas informing the questions on claims to work by individuals in
different household circumstances were adapted from the Cambridge
questionnaire (see note 18).
27. Two respondents in the main survey made a joint first ranking which are
included, so the first column sums to 94, not 92.
28. The definition of young adults as dependent includes those who are living
with their parents and those who are independent, but single. The description
of young adults as married refers to those who have left their parental home
and are living with a partner.
29. This compares with the evidence described in Chapter 6 where earnings
levels manifest a stronger relation to patterns of family formation amongst
men than amongst women, and is explained by the higher financial
contribution of male earnings to household resourcing.
30. The denominator in these figures is the total number of respondents who
agreed or disagreed. Those who said they neither agreed nor disagreed, or who
responded 'don't know', are excluded here. These latter two options were grouped
together in the questionnaire, although it would be better to provide for these
responses separately, given their differing meanings.
31. A similar process appears to characterise recent discussions of an underclass
in Britain (eg. Runciman, 1990). The problems of understanding the experience
of the unemployed through conventional class theory leads not to a challenge to













YOUTH AND ADULTHOOD: A SURVEY OF YOUNG ADULTS
IN EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING
Emphasise:
I am an independent researcher from Edinburgh University.
All information will be treated confidentially and that
respondents identities will be kept anonymous.
SECTION 1.
1 . What is your current job/training scheme title?
2. Please describe the work that you do.
I'd like to ask you now about educational qualifications,
you tell me first:
3. When did you leave school? (month and year).
Could
4. What qualifications did you get at school?
no qualification j
SCOTVEC National certificate (modules)...
SCOTEC/SCOTBEC certificate,
SNC, ONC or equivalent [
SCE 0 grades or GCE 0 levels I
CSEs r
SCE Highers .;
Certificate of 6th year studies (CSYS)..J
GCE A levels j
■ 1
5. Have you ever started any courses after leaving school?
6. Please describe these





8. What is your date of birth?
2
SECTION 2.
I am interested in your experience of work and training from
when you left school to the present. You said you left school in
.., can you tell me what training schemes and jobs you have done
since then, and the pay that you received in each one? Say if
there were any periods when you were unemployed. I would also
like you to tell me the dates that you were doing each of these
things. So, starting with when you left school, when did you
start your first training scheme, job or apprenticeship?
(establish if unemployed before that)
(TABULATE ON SEPARATE SHEET)
then
9. Do you work any overtime? How much? Why?
10. Do you get any company perks? (describe)
11. Do you do any other paid work?
Now I would like you to think over the period 3ince you
left school again, and tell me about your household circumstances
during this time, and if and how they have changed. I want you to
tell me about whether you have ever moved where you live, if you
are engaged or in a steady relationship, or if you have ever
married or had a child.
Starting off with when you left school:
where were you living then?
(if not with parents establish background and situation)
Who else was living in the house at the time?
Did your parents own the house or rent it ?
IF RENTED Did they rent it from the council or was it private
rented?
Have you ever left your parents home?
TRACE THROUGH IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER,
CLARIFY DATES,
ESTABLISH WHO LIVING WITH AND HOUSING TYPE.
(TABULATE ON SHEET)
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IF IN FIRST JOB OR TRAINING SCHEME CONTINUE, IF NOT GO TO 13.






told about it by relative or friend
13. Why did you decide to do this particular scheme/job? / work
in ( sector ) ?
14. Did you have any alternatives?
(Please describe these)
I would like you to think back to when you started on YTS/ your
first job after leaving school. (IF YTS + JOB ASK ABOUT BOTH, IN
SEQUENCE).
15. Did you feel any different about yourself after you started
your first scheme/job? (Both if relevant)
In what ways?
16. Did you feel that people treated you any differently since
you started your scheme/ apprenticeship /working? (eg.
parents, friends, adults in general). (scheme + work if
relevant).
Did your social life or your personal circumstances change




IF STILL SINGLE/NOT LIVING WITH PARTNER/LIVING IN PARENTAL HOME
GO TO PART A
IF MARRIED/ LIVING WITH A PARTNER/DIVORCED GO TO PART B.
PART A
If living with parents
17. Do you pay any money for your food and keep?
18. How much do you pay?
Do you help out with other things at home, eg.(looking after
anybody?)
continue
I would like now to talk about your ideas on marriage and
having children.
19. Firstly, could you tell me if you think you will marry at
some stage? (if no, ask why not)
20. How old do you think you will be when you do get married?
21. Why then?
(probe with: what sorts of things do you think are important
in deciding when to get married?)
Now, thinking about children:
22. Could you tell me if you expect that you will have children
at some stage? (if no, ask why not)
23. How old do you think you will be when you first child is
born?
24. Why then?
(probe with: what sorts of things do you think are important
in deciding when to have children?)
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25. Are you currently engaged or going steady with someone?
(IF NO, GO TO PART C, IF ENGAGED CONTINUE)
26. Is your fiance working?
27. What does s/he do?
What are his/her earnings?
28. Do you think that your (joint) income has affected or will
affect your decision about when to marry?
GO TO PART C.
PART B IF MARRIED/LIVING WITH A PARTNER / DIVORCED
29. Why did you marry/ move in together when you did?
30. Have you had any children? (How many?)
IF MARRIED AND CHILDLESS GO TO 40.
IF HAS A CHILD, CONTINUE:
31. Did you plan when to start having children?
IF YES, (IF NO GO TO 34):
32. Why did you have your first child when you did?
33. Would you say that you were financially prepared for having a
child at that point? (detail)
GO TO 35.
IF NO:
34. Did having a child then make thing difficult for you?
(if yes) In what ways?
(if no) Did you have to adapt your lifestyle in terms of
work, housing or organising your finances in any way?




36. Do you have any plans to get married?
IF YES,





40. Do you expect to have children at some stage?
(if no, ask why not)
41. What age do you think you will be when have your first
child?
42. Why then?
43. How many children do you expect to have?
44. Is your husband/wife/partner working?
IF YES:
45. What job does he/she do? (detail)
46. What is his/her pay?
(ask if its full or part time)
47. If he/she were not earning do you think you would look for
a different job?
Why?
Did your social life change in any way after you got
married/ moved in together?
7
PART C
Thinking now about your work and the future, could you tell me




iii. partner to be working?
iv. What do you expect your joint
income to be?
49. How would you compare it with what you are doing now?
(probe: will this level of income allow you to do things you
can't afford to now?)
Now I would like to ask you some questions about your family:
50. How old were your mother and father when they left school?
51. How old are they now?
52. Were they both working when they got married?
What were they doing?
53. What year did they get married?
54. Are they working now?
What are they doing?
55. Do you have any brothers or sisters?
56. How old are they?
single or married/age?
57. (When) Did your mother go to work after having children?
Did she work between children? What as?
Full or part time?
if she worked after children:
58. How old were you/your youngest brother/sister
when she started working again?
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SECTION 3.
Now I would like us to think generally about employment.
43. Can you imagine there is a vacancy for a job and 6 people
apply. Assuming that all are equally qualified, which of the
people on these cards would you most like to see given the job?
Who would you next most like to see? (can rank 3ide by side)
Young single man, living at home
Young single man, living away from home
Young single woman, living away from home
Married man, young, with children, wife not working
Married woman, no children at home, husband not working
Woman with no husband, young children
I would like you to answer the following questions thinking about
work in construction.
First I would like us to consider the ages of people doing jobs
in construction. Some jobs are done by people of any age, some
are usually done by younger people, some by older people and
others by those in the middle of their working lives. I am going
to name some jobs and ask you to say whether you think the job
would be done by men of all ages or men in particular age groups
















Are there any jobs where a man doing the job would be more likely
than usual to be single? Are there any where he would be more
likely to be married? (say if equally likely)
Job f 1 3 4 ~s _• 7
single
married
Could you tell me how much you think an average person in each of
these jobs earns? (CARD) (ask for pay/week if uncertain).
T
Job / • 1 lb -j- 1
Less than £ 4000
t 4000 - l5000
t. 5000 - t 6000
t 6000 - ^ 7000
fc 7000 - A 8000
t 9000 - tz 11000
i 11000 - fc13000
Over .113000
Thinking through these jobs again, could you consider whether
there need to be such differences in earnings or, on the other
hand whether they need to be greater in particular cases?
a. Are there any jobs which you think could be paid more,
assuming that others would then have to be paid less?
b. Are there any that could be paid less?
^ t








People tend to think of different things as being important in
their decisions about when to get married, have children and
so on. Here are some cards - which of these things would you say
is the most important to achieve before getting married? Which is
the next most important? (Rank ail)
Having a secure job.
Having a place of your own to share with your spouse.
Your partner having a secure job.
Having some savings put aside.
Having good career prospects.
Your partner having good career prospects. <i ilVMM
Being able to afford home ownership.
Thinking through these again, which would you say is the
most important to achieve before having children? Which is the
next most important? (rank all)
I would like you now to think of four friends. I will ask
you some questions about them - what they are doing, how old they
are, what their living circumstances are and so on. So, thinking
of the first one,
Are they male or female? ~
How old is s/he?
What does s/he do?
Who does/he live with?
As relevant:
How old was s/he when s/he
i. left school?
ii. got a place of his/her own?
iii. got married?
iv. had his/her first child?
1 2
SECTION 5.
I am now going to read out some dilemmas that people might find
themselves in, and ask you to say what you think they should do
under the circumstances.
Iain and Lynn intend to get married. They don't have a place of
their own to move into yet though. What should they do?
A. Marry and stay with Lynn's parents until they can get a
place of their own?
B. Delay getting married until they can get a place of their
own?
C. Do something else, (what?)
Why?
John and Maggie are a young married couple, and are both working.
Maggie is offered another job which pays less than the one she
has now, but it has better prospects. However, they hope to have
children over the next few years. What should she do?
A. Should she take the new job and quit when she gets pregnant
B. Stay in the old job
C. Take advantage of the potential career prospects and delay
having children.
D. Do something else, (what?)
Why?
Duncan and Sue have two children aged 1 and 3. They do not intend
to have any more. Duncan is working, and Sue is offered her old
job back, which she can take on a full or part time basis. Her
mother has offered to look after the children while Sue is at
work. Should Sue:
A. Go back to work full time?
B. Go back to work part time?
C. Stay home and look after the children full time?




Sue actually decides to go back to work part time. Things work
out well for a year and Sue's boss has told her that if she was
available to work full time she can expect good career prospects.
Then Duncan loses his job. Sue's mother has become ill and
cannot look after the children now. What should they do:
Should
E. Sue give up her job and look after the children so that
Duncan is free to look for work?
F. Sue work full time, and Duncan look after the children?
G. Do something else, (what?)
Why?
Jean is 19, unemployed and pregnant. She intends to keep the
child. She is not seeing the father of her child and she lives
with her mother, two sisters and a brother in law. If she stays
at home her mother can help with the baby. However, she will get
a council house now if she applies for one, but it will be in
another part of town.
Should she:
A. Get a council house and have a place of her own in which to
bring up her baby, by herself?
B. Stay at home and have her mother help with the baby?
C. Do something else? (what?)
Why?
SECTION 6
I should now like to ask your opinions on a number of things
about young adults, employment and so on. I shall give you a list
of statements that people often make and I should like you to say
whether you agree or disagree with them. I have tried to make the
statements representative of a wide range of views so you should
find some that you agree with and some that you don't. Please
remenber I am interested in your own personal view. Take your









































Young people should not expect to
leave home until they have been
working for a few years.
I
Young people entering their first
job should not expect to be able
to save money.
i
People on YTS should get more money
than they do.
\
Earning a wage makes a young person
independent.
You're not really an adult until you
have left home.
A single woman can get ahead in work
in the same way that a man can. ,
i
People who are working are more
mature than those who are not. ;
1
Teenagers these days need to think




By the time you are 19 you should
be able to support yourself
financially.
Working wives help to raise family
living standards.
Everyone doing the same job should
be paid the same regardless of their
age .
A woman cannot expect to raise a
family and get ahead in work.
Young people should be content to
stay with their parents until they
are earning enough to support
themselves financially.
Everyone doing the same job should




A husband and wife both need to work
in order to keep up with the cost of
living.
1
Work skills that are in demand now
need longer periods of training
! than they used to.
! !
! A mother of young children should work
j if the family needs the money.
j j
There should be more provision for




Everyone needs to work these days:
: being a wife and mother is by itself
I not satisfying enough.
It should be easier than it is for
young people to get their own place
and live independently.
A husband works to support his family
and a wife works for the extras.
A woman should not expect to work while
she is bringing up children.
There should be provision for temporary
I from work so young fathers can share in
looking after their baby.
If a woman can earn more than her husband
then he should stay at home and look


















The first questionnaire schedule included in this appendix is the one used in face
to face interviews with parents. The second schedule comprises the postal
questionnaire.
University of Edinburgh
Department ofSociology 18 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh EH8 9LN
Telephone 031-6671011
Telex: 727442 (UNIVED G)
YOUTH AND ADULTHOOD: A SURVEY OF PARENTS
Emphasise:
I am an independent researcher from Edinburgh University.
All information will be treated confidentially and
respondents identities will be kept anonymous.
As you know I interviewed , and we discussed his/her
experience of work since leaving school and his/her thoughts
about being a young adult in the '80s, and attitudes towards
work, and towards leaving home, starting a family and so on. I
would like to talk to you about your own experience of being a
young adult and the sorts of decisions you made at the time, as
well as your ideas about work and family now.
SECTION 1.
Could you tell me:
1. Are you currently working?
2. What (work) do you do?
I would like you to think back now to your own experience of
youth and early adulthood, what work you did at the time, when
you left home, when you got married and so on. Lets start at the
point at which you left school:
3. How old were you when you left school?
4. What year was that in?
5. What is your date of birth?
6. Did you have any qualifications when you left school?
If yes: what qualifications did you get?
7. Did you study at all after you left school - either in full
time education or while you were working?
8. Did you get any qualifications after you left school?
9. What was your first job after leaving school (/college etc)?
(establish employment status, eg. if apprentice)
10. When did you start that?
2
11. How much did you earn when you started?
(ie. what was your first wage?)
12. Who were you living with at the time?
(if not with parents establish background and situation)
13. When did you leave your parents home?
14. Why did you leave when you did?
15. What type of housing did your parents
live in?
16. Whereabouts was this? (which town?)
17. What type of housing did you move into?









19. Were you still working as at this time?
IF YES, Had you changed your job or grade within this
employment? (Please describe any changes made)
IF NO What were you doing?
Did you do any other types of work up to this point?
20. What were you earning at this point?
21. When did you get married?
Was this to your current partner?
3
22. What was your work at this time?
IF DIFFERENT: trace through changes up to this point.
23. How much were you earning when you got married?
24. Was your husband/wife working at the time?
25. What work was s/he doing?
26. How much was s/he earning when you got married?
27. Did you have any savings put aside when you got married?
28. Did you get any significant loans or gifts of money
from family to help you get started in married life?
29. Where were you living when you got married?
(clarify any moves, and housing circumstance when married)
self:
partner:
30. Did your considerations for getting a place of your own to
live affect when you married in any way?
31. Did you both continue to work after your marriage?
_
(IF NO Why not?)
32. Were you both working full time?
(IF NO Why not?)
33. When did you have your first child?
If mother (you/your wife) was working:
34. At what point did you (she) give up working?
35. What was your/your husband's work at this point?
(check if had changed grade) *
36. What was he/were you earning when your first child was born?
4
37. How many children did you have altogether?
38. In what years were they born?
39. Did you/your wife do any paid work between having children?
What did you /she do?
Why did you /she (not) work?
(probe : would you have worked if you didn't need the money?)
40. (When) did you/your wife work after you finished having
children?
IF DID NOT WORK: Why not?
IF DID WORK: When did you (she) start work again?
What work did you (she) do?
Was this full or part time?
IF PART TIME Did you (she) go back to full time work
at any point?
Was this with the same job?
41. Was it an option, whether or not you (she) went back to work?
42. Why did you (she) go back to work when you /she did?
(Probe)
43. What job changes, if any, have you made since then?
(Dates/year)
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44. What job changes, if any, has your husband/wife made since
then? (Dates/year)
45. What are you earning at the moment?
46. What is your husband/wife earning at the moment?
47. Have you ever changed the type of housing^that you live in,
since getting married? (Explain)
48. Did you move house at all before or when you were having
children? (Explain)
49. Have you /your partner ever been unemployed?
IF YES establish when, and for what periods.
50. Have there been any other significant changes in household/
family circumstance since having children?











51. What is you husband's/wife's date of birth?
52. How many brothers and sisters does s/he have?
53. How old are his/her parents?
If dead: when did they die?
how old were they when they died?
ON SELF:
54. How old are your own parents?
If dead: when did they die?
how old were they when they died?
55. Do you have any brothers or sisters?
For each of them, I would like you to tell me whether they
are married or single, whether they have children, and what ages





Age at which children
were born?
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I would like you to think back now to when you had your first
child. You said you had your first child in 19xx.
56. Did you make a conscious decision to have him/her when you
did?
IF NO CONTINUE, IF YES GO TO 58.
57. Did having a child then make things difficult for you?
IF YES: In what ways?
IF NO: Did you have to adapt your lifestyle in terms of
work, housing or organising your finances in any way?
(probe: eg. husband more overtime? any less able to
afford things?)
GO TO 61.
58. What sorts of things were important in this decision?
59. Would you say that you were financially prepared for having a
child at that point?
60. Did you have to adapt your lifestyle in terms of work,
housing or organising your finances in any way? (or other)
(probe - eg. husband more overtime? any less able to afford
things? etc).
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61. Did you make plans early on over how many children to have?
IF NO Why did you stop having children when you did?
IF YES Did you change these plans at all after you started
a family, or did you have the number of children
you hoped for?
IF changed plans, ask how and why.
62. Looking back now, do you feel you got married at the right
time? (detail) IF NO: how would you change it?
63. Looking back now, do you feel that you had children at the
right time? (detail) IF NO: how would you change it?
64. I would like you now to think of two or three friends
(relatives of your own generation, or neighbours) and I am
going to ask you some questions about them - about how old they
were when they left school, married, had children and so on.
So thinking of the first one..
Are they male or female?
How old is s/he?
What does s/he do?
Who does s/he live with?
How old was s/he when s/he
i. left school
x. started working
ii. got a place of his/her own
iii. got married
iv. had his/her first child
v. had other children
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SECTION C
I would like us to think now about young people today.
65. Thinking of your children and their generation, which of the
following would you say is the most important to achieve
before getting married? Which is the next most important?
(rank all).
The man having a secure job. ch't-bgfeH
The woman having a secure job.
Having a place of their own to move into. '
Having some savings put aside.
The woman having good career prospects.
The man having good career prospects.
Being able to afford home ownership.
Do you think that any of these things have become any more
important or less important since the time that you got married?
IF YES: which?
Why do you think that?
Thinking through these again, and thinking again of your children
and their generation, which would you say is the most important
to achieve before having children? Which is the next most
important?., (rank all).
Do you think that any of these things have become any more
important or any less important since the time that you had
children?
IF YES: which?
Why do you think that?
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66. Thinking still of your children and their generation, and
firstly thinking of young men, what would you think of as
being a sensible age to do the following:
leave home?
get married?
have a first child?




have a first child?
67. Do you feel that the ages you have suggested are different
to the ages at which you actually did these things?
IF YES: Why is that?
Do you feel that things are different for young people
nowadays in deciding when to leave home than they were when you
were young?
Why do you think that?
(probe - eg. compare with own experience)
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Do you feel that things are different for young people
nowadays in deciding when to get married and start a family than
they were when you were young?
Why do you think that?
(probe - eg. compare with own experience)
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SECTION D
The following questions ask you about the ways in which you and
your children help each other out with costs of living and so on.
IF ANY CHILDREN AT HOME, COMPLETE SECTION Dl.
IF ALL CHILDREN LEFT HOME, COMPLETE SECTION D2.
IF BOTH, COMPLETE BOTH SECTIONS.
SECTION Dl
68. How many of your children are living with you?
69. Have any of these children left school? (How many?)
noyes
how many?
IF NO: GO TO SECTION D2
IF YES: CONTINUE.
70. Do they (s/he) pay dig money?
Be explicit on zz.
71. How much do they (s/he) pay?
72. How did you decide on the amount(s)?
73. How far do you think this goes to the cost of their
his/her living here?
74. Have you changed the amount at all over the time since
they (s/he) left school? How?
75. Do they (s/he) help out with other things at home?
(say what)
76. Do you give or loan money to them (him/her) or help him/h
out, for example buying him/her clothes or anything?
77. Have you thought about when your children might leave home?
yes no
IF YES: At what point do you think that might be?
78. Do you think it will make any financial difference to you
when they do leave home?
Detail * ~
IF NO: why not? cf. 73.
IF HAS CHILDREN WHO HAVE LEFT HOME CONTINUE.
IF NOT, GO TO Q. 87.
SECTION D2
Thinking about your children who have left home:
79. Did they (s/he) pay dig money when they (s/he) were living
at home?
80. How much was s/he paying before s/he left?
List individually, + age at leaving (be explicit on zz).
81. Did you change this amount over the period that they lived at
home?
82. How did you decide on the amount?
83. How far do you think this went towards the cost of their
his/her living here?
84. Did it make any financial differences to you when they (s/he)
left home?
85. Do you get any contributions to the family from your
children /zz now that they (s/he) has left home, eg. any
help in paying for things, or helping out with family affairs?
no
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86. Do you give any support to your children/zz now that they
(s/he) has left home, again say in helping to pay for
things, or helping out in any way?
87. Do you think it is easier or harder than it used to be for
young people to leave home and set up on their own?
88. Do you think that this has or will affect you in any way?
yes{ no
IF YES:




Now I would like us to think generally about employment.
89. Can you imagine there is a vacancy for a job and 6 people
apply. Assuming that all are equally qualified, which of the
people on this card would you most like to see given the job? Who
would you next most like to see? (rank all).
Young single man, living at home
Young single man, living away from home
Young single woman, living away from home
Married man, young, with children, wife not working
Married woman, no children at home, husband not working
Woman with no husband, young children
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I am now going to read out some dilemmas that people might find
themselves in, and ask you to say what you think they should do
under the circumstances.
Iain and Lynn intend to get married. They don't have a place of
their own to move into yet though. What should they do?
A. Marry and stay with Lynn's parents until they can get a
place of their own?
B. Delay getting married until they can get a place of their
own?
C. Do something else.
Why?
John and Maggie are a young married couple, and are both working.
Maggie is offered another job which pays less than the one she
has now, but it has better prospects. However, they hope to have
children over the next few years. What should she do?
A. Should she take the new job and quit when she gets pregnant
B. Stay in the old job
C. Take advantage of the potential career prospects and delay
having children.
D. Do something else.
Why?
Duncan and Sue have two children aged 1 and 3. They do not intend
to have any more. Duncan is working, and Sue is offered her old
job back, which she can take on a full or part time basis. Her
mother has offered to look after the children while Sue is at
work. Should Sue:
A. Go back to work full time?
B. Go back to work part time?
C. Stay home and look after the children full time?
D. Do something else?
Why?
16
Sue actually decides to go back to work part time. Things work
out well for a year and Sue's boss has told her that if she was
available to work full time she can expect good career prospects.
Then Duncan loses his job. Sue's mother has become ill and
cannot look after the children now. What should they do:
Should
E. Sue give up her job and look after the children so that
Duncan is free to look for work?
F. Sue work full time, and Duncan look after the children?
G. Do something else.
Why?
Jean is 19, unemployed and pregnant. She intends to keep the
child. She is not seeing the father of her child and she lives
with her mother, two sisters and a brother in law. If she stays
at home her mother can help with the baby. However, she will get
a council house now if she applies for one, but it will be in
another part of town.
Should she:
A. Get a council house and have a place of her own in which to
bring up her baby, by herself?
B. Stay at home and have her mother help with the baby?




















Young people should not expect to
'
leave home until they have been
working for a few years.
|
Young people entering their first
job should not expect to be able
to save money.
People on YTS should get more money
than they do.
Earning a wage makes a young person
independent.
A young person is not really an
adult until s/he has left home.
A single woman can get ahead in work
in the same way that a man can.
People who are working are more
mature than those who are not.
Teenagers these days need to think
about the future more than they used
to .
By the time people are 19 they should
be able to support themselves
financially.
Working wives help to raise family
living standards.
Everyone doing the same job should
be paid the same regardless of their
age .
A woman cannot expect to raise a
family and get ahead in work.
Young people should be content to
stay with their parents until they
are earning enough to support
themselves financially.
Everyone doing the same job should
be paid the same regardless of their
sex .
A husband and wife both need to work






















Work skills that are in demand now
need longer periods of training
than they used to.
A mother of young children should work
if the family needs the money.
There should be more provision for
childcare so that a woman with young
children can work.
Everyone needs to work these days:
being a wife and mother is by itself
not satisfying enough.
It should be easier than it is for
young people to get their own place
and live independently.
A husband works to support his family
and a wife works for the extras.
A woman should not expect to work while
she is bringing up children.
There should be provision for temporary
leave from work so young fathers can share
in looking after their baby.
If a woman can earn more than her husband
then he should stay at home and look after
their young children.
1







Youth and early adulthood: a comparative survey of young adults
and their parents.
As you may know I interviewed as part of my PhD
research project at Edinburgh University. I have interviewed
approximately 100 young adults who I contacted through employers.
I have discussed with them their experience of work since leaving
school and their thoughts about being a young adult in the 1980s,
as well as their attitudes towards work, leaving home, starting a
family and so on. A central part of my research is comparing the
experience of young adults today with their parents' experiences
of being young adults, that is, making a comparison between
generations.
I am therefore sending you a questionnaire which asks you
questions about your own experience of being a young adult and
the sorts of decisions you made at the time, as well as your
ideas about work and family now. I would be grateful if you would
complete the questionnaire and return it to me. Your help will be
of great value to the research and is very much appreciated.
The questionnaire is really not as long as it looks and does
not take very long to complete. I hope that you find it
interesting.
Please note that all information will be treated
confidentially and identities kept anonymous. Please return the
completed questionnaire to me in the stamped addressed envelope
provided.













YOUTH AND ADULTHOOD: A SURVEY OF PARENTS
All information will be treated confidentially and
respondents identities will be kept anonymous.
SECTION 1.
1. Are you currently working?
2. What do you do?
(say what work you do, or if you are not in paid employment
please say what you do, eg. retired; doing unpaid work looking
after home and family; unemployed)
The following questions ask you to think back to your experience
of youth and early adulthood, what work you did at the time, when
you left home, when you got married and so on.
3. What is your date of birth?
4. How old were you when you left school?
5. What year was that in?
6. Did you have any qualifications when you left school?
If yes: what qualifications did you have?
7. Did you study at all after you left school - either in full
time education or while you were working? (please give details)
8. Did you get any qualifications after you left school?
(please give details)
9. What was your first job after leaving school (/college etc)?
10. When did you start that? (Year and month)
11. How much did you earn when you started?
(please say whether this was before or after tax and the pay
period, eg. per week/take home pay)
12. Who were you living with at the time?
(if not with parents please explain your situation)
13. When did you leave your parents home? (Year and month:
14. Why did you leave when you did?
15. What type of housing did your parents
live in?
16. Whereabouts was this? (which town?)
17. What type of housing did you move into?











19. Were you still working in the same job as you described in
Question 9 at this time?
IF YES, Had you changed your job or grade within this
employment? (please describe any changes made).
IF NO, What were you doing?
(please say when you changed jobs)
Did you do any other types of work up to this point?
(please describe any changes made)
20. What were you earning at this point? (ie. when you first got
your own place to live).
21. When did you get married? (Year + month)
22. Was this to your current partner?
23. Were you still working in the same job as you described in
Question 19 at this time?
(If not, please describe any changes made, and when you made
them)
24. How much were you earning when you got married?
25. Was your husband/wife working at the time?
26. What work was s/he doing?
27. How much was s/he earning when you got married?
28. Where were you living immediately before you got married?
(eg: with parents; by self in private rented flat, etc.)
self:
partner:
Where were you living immediately after you got married?
(eg: did you stay wth in-laws, buy or rent your own place?)
29. Did you both continue to work after your marriage?
IF NO: please say why not.
30. Were you both working full time?
IF NO: please say why not.
31. When did you have your first child? (VeAfc t- Momth )
If mother (you/your wife) was working:
32. At what point did you (she) give up working?
33. What was your husband's (your own) work at this point? (when
your 1st child was born).
34. How many children did you have altogether?
35. In what years were they born?
36. Did you/your wife do any paid work between having children?
IF YES: please give details of work.
IF NO: please say if you considered this as an option.
37. Did you/(your wife) work after you finished having children?
IF NO Why not? *
IF YES: What work did you (she) do?
When did you (she) start work again? (year + month)
Why did you start again at that point in time?
Was this work full or part time?
What were the main reasons you decided to enter paid
employment again?
IF FULL TIME GO TO QUESTION 38
IF PART TIME, CONTINUE.
IF PART TIME Did you (she) go back to full time work
at any point, or change the hours that
you (she) worked?
yes I no j
IF T£5. ccmT/NuuE. OVE^lcaP,
IF NO: would you (she) work full time if the
opportunity was there?
GO TO Q.38
IF YES: When did you (she) change your (her) hours?
Was this with the same job?
Why did you (she) change the hours worked when you
(she) did?
38. What job changes, if any, have you made since then?
39. What job changes, if any, has your husband/wife made since
then?
40. What are you earning at the moment?
41. What is your husband/wife earning at the moment?
(please describe his/her job if different to above)
42. Have you /your partner ever been unemployed?
IF YES please say when, and for what periods.
43. Have there been any other significant changes in household/
family circumstance since having children?
(Please include whether you have ever been divorced and/or
set up a different household; please say if the composition of
your household has changed eg. if your children have left home,
if anyone has moved in at all. Did you move house at all since
you got married? (Say if you changed whether you owned or rented
your home). Please indicate the dates (years) of any of these
changes).
continue on back if necessary.
SECTION B.
44. Do you have any brothers or sisters?
If you do, please fill out the table below by saying whether
you are talking about a brother or sister, whether they are
married or single, whether they have children, and the ages at
which they did these things. An example is given for you to
follow.
Brother or sister?
Married or single? M4.vrieA. j
Age at marriage 2-4-
i
Age at which children





Please think back now to when you had your first child,




IF NO CONTINUE, IF YES GO TO 47:
46. Did having a child then make things difficult for you?
IF YES: In what ways?
IF NO: Did you have to adapt your lifestyle in terms of
work, housing or organising your finances in any way?
(for example, did your husband(you) work overtime?
were you any less able to afford things?)
GO TO 50
47. What sorts of things were important in this decision?
48. Would you say that you were financially prepared for having a
child at that point?
49. Did you have to adapt your lifestyle in terms of work,
housing or organising your finances in any way?
(for example, did your husband (you) work overtime? were you any
less able to afford things?)
50. Did you make plans early on over how many children to have?
yes j no
IF NO Why did you stop having children when you did?
IF YES Did you change these plans at all after you started
a family, or did you have the number of children
you hoped for?
IF you changed your plans, please say how and
explain why.




IF NO: how would you change it, and why?
IF YES: please comment on this.
52. Looking back now,
right time?
do you feel that you had children at the
yes no
IF NO: how would you change it, and why?
IF YES: please comment on this.
53. I would like you now to think of 2 or 3 friends (or
relatives of your own generation, or neighbours) and fill
out the following table, saying what their ages were when
they did various things. An example is given.
(Please try to fill out every row, but if you cannot, just
fill out as much as you can.)
Male or female? ftsUA (J£-
1
i
How old is s/he? £5 !
What does s/he do? ifcKOol CCCK
•
|
| Who does s/he live with? i
| How old was s/he when s/he
i i. left school 14-
x. started working I4r
j ii. got a place of his/her own XX
! iii. got married 2-3
1 iv. had his/her first child 2.6
[ v. had other children
5 26 2^
SECTION C
People sometimes say that a lot of things have changed relative
to how they were and that young people today face a very
different world to that experienced by previous generations. The
following questions ask you to consider similarities and
differences between being a young adult today.and being a young
adult yourself.
54. Thinking of your children and their generation, which of the
following would you say is the most important to achieve
before getting married? Which is the next most important?
Indicate in the boxes where you would rank each of them,
1st, 2nd and so on.
.-The man having a secure job.
•Having a place of their own to move into.
•The woman having a secure job.
•Having some savings put aside.
..The man having good career prospects.
[■•The woman having good career prospects.
••Being able to afford home ownership.
Do you think that any of these





things have become any more
the time that you got married?
no
IF NO: please comment
55. Thinking through these again, and thinking again of your
children and their generation, which of the following
would you say is the most important to achieve before
having children? Which is the next most important?
Indicate in the boxes where you would rank each of them,
1st, 2nd and so on.
••The man having a secure job.
i-Having a place of their own to move into.
-The woman having a secure job.
••Having some savings put aside.
••The man having good career prospects.
•The woman having good career prospects.
.•Being able to afford home ownership.
Do you think any of these things have become any more important





IF NO: please comment
56. Thinking still of your children and their generation, and
firstly thinking of young men, what would you think of as
being a desirable age to do the following:
leave home?
get married?
have a first child?




have a first child?
57. Do you feel that the ages you have suggested are different
to the ages at which you actually did these things?
yes
Please comment on this.
no
Are there any other things that you have not mentioned
that you feel are different for young people nowadays in
deciding when to leave home than they were when you were young?
Please say what, if anything, and comment on this.
Are there any things that you feel are different for
young people nowadays in deciding when to get married and start a
family than they were when you were young?
Please say what, if anything, and comment on this.
SECTION D
The following questions ask you about the ways in which you and
your children help each other out with costs of living and so on.
IF YOU HAVE ANY CHILDREN STILL LIVING AT HOME PLEASE COMPLETE
SECTION Dl. IF ALL YOUR CHILDREN HAVE LEFT HOME PLEASE IGNORE
SECTION Dl AND COMPLETE SECTION D2. IF YOU HAVE A CHILD
(CHILDREN) STILL AT HOME AND ONE OR MORE WHO HAS LEFT PLEASE
COMPLETE BOTH SECTIONS.
SECTION Dl
58. How many of your children are living with you?
59. Have any of these children left school? (how many?)
yes i j no
how many?! i
1
IF NO: GO TO SECTION D2
IF YES: CONTINUE.
60. Do they (s/he) pay dig money?
61. How much do they (s/he) pay? pet we«A or >
62. How did you decide on the amount(s)?
63. How far do you think this goes to the cost of their (his/her)
living here?
64. Have you changed the amount at all over the time since
they (s/he) left school? How?
65. Do they (s/he) help out with other things at home?
(please say what)
66. Do you give or loan money to them (him/her) or help out,
for example buying him/her clothes or anything?
67. Have you thought about when your children might leave home?
IF YES: At what point do you think that might be?
68. Do you think it will make any financial difference to you
when they (s/he) leave home?
IF YOU HAVE CHILDREN WHO HAVE LEFT HOME PLEASE COMPLETE SECTION
D2. IF NOT, PLEASE GO TO SECTION E.
SECTION D2
Thinking about your child(ren) who have left home
69. Did they (s/he) pay dig money when they (s/he) were living at
home?
70. How much were they (s/he) paying before they (s/he) left?
71. Did you change this amount over the period that they (s/he)
were living at home?
72. How did you decide on the amount?
73. How far do you think this went towards the cost of their
(his/her) living here?
74. Did it make any financial differences to you when they (s/he)
left home? (please explain)
75. Do you get any contributions to the family from your
children now that they (s/he) has left home, eg. any help
in paying for things, or helping out with family affairs?
(please explain).
no
76. Do you give any support to your child(ren) now that they
(s/he) have left home, again say in helping to pay for things,
or helping out in any way?
77. Do you think it is easier or harder than it used to be for
young people to leave home and set up on their own?
78. Do you think that this has or will affect you in any way?
yes j no
IF YES:




The following question asks you to think generally about
employment.
79. Can you imagine there is a vacancy for a job and 6 people
apply. Assuming that all are equally qualified, which of the
people listed below would you most like to see given the job? Who
would you next most like to see given the job?
Please indicate in the boxes where you would rank each
individual, 1st , 2nd and so on.
r
Young single man, living at home
Young single man, living away from home
Young single woman, living away from home
Married man, young, with children, wife not working
Married woman, no children at home, husband not working
Woman with no husband, young children
The following situations are of dilemmas that people might find
themselves in. I would like you to say what you think they
should do under the circumstances. Please tick what you think is
the best solution for them.
i . )
Iain and Lynn intend to get married. They don't have a place of
their own to move into yet though. What should they do?
A. Marry and stay with Lynn's parents until they can get a
place of their own?
B. Delay getting married until they can get a place of their
own?
C. Do something else. (say what)
ii . )
John and Maggie are a young married couple, and are both working.
Maggie is offered another job which pays less than the one she
has now, but it has better prospects. However, they hope to have
children over the next few years. What should she do?
A. Take the new job and quit when she gets pregnant
B. Stay in the old job
C. Take advantage of the potential career prospects and delay
having children.
D. Do something else, (say what)
i i i . )
Duncan and Sue have two children aged 1 and 3. They do not intend
to have any more. Duncan is working, and Sue is offered her old
job back, which she can take on a full or part time basis. Her
mother has offered to look after the children while Sue is at
work. Should Sue:
A. Go back to work full time?
B. Go back to work part time?
C. Stay home and look after the children full time?
D. Do something else? (say what)
Sue actually decides to go back to work part time. Things work
out well for a year and Sue's boss has told her that if she was
available to work full time she can expect good career prospects.
Then Duncan loses his job. Sue's mother has become ill and
cannot look after the children now. What should they do:
Should
A. Sue give up her job and look after the children so that
Duncan is free to look for work?
B. Sue work full time, and Duncan look after the children?
C. Do something else, (say what)
iv. )
Jean is 19, unemployed and pregnant. She intends to keep the
child. She is not seeing the father of her child and she lives
with her mother, two sisters and a brother in law. If she stays
at home her mother can help with the baby. However, she will get
a council house now if she applies for one, but it will be in
another part of town.
Should she:
A. Get a council house and have a place of her own in which to
bring up her baby, by herself?
B. Stay at home and have her mother help with the baby?
C. Do something else? (say what)
Over the page are a list of statements that people often make and
I would like you think whether you agree or disagree with them,
and tick the appropriate boxes. I have tried to make the
statements representative of a wide range of views so you should
find some that you agree with and some that you disagree with.



























Young people should not expect to
leave home until they have been
working for a few years.
Young people entering their first
job should not expect to be able
to save money.
People on YTS should get more money
than they do.
Earning a wage makes a young person
independent.
A young person is not really an
adult until s/he has left home.
A single woman can get ahead in work
in the same way that a man can.
People who are working are more
mature than those who are not.
Teenagers these days need to think
about the future more than they used
to.
By the time people are 19 they should
be able to support themselves
financially.
Working wives help to raise family
living standards.
Everyone doing the same job should
be paid the same regardless of their
age.
A woman cannot expect to raise a
family and get ahead in work.
Young people should be content to
stay with their parents until they




Everyone doing the same job should





A husband and wife both need to work































Work skills that are in demand now
need longer periods of training
than they used to.
A mother of young children should work
if the family needs the money.
There should be more provision for
childcare so that a woman with young
children can work.
Everyone needs to work these days:
being a wife and mother is by itself
not satisfying enough.
It should be easier than it is for
young people to get their own place
and live independently.
A husband works to support his family
and a wife works for the extras.
A woman should not expect to work while
she is bringing up children.
There should be provision for temporary
leave from work so young fathers can share
in looking after their baby.
If a woman can earn more than her husband
then he should stay at home and look after
their young children.
1
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